On April 24-25, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev paid his first
official visit to Moscow, holding a series of talks that focused heavily
on the security dimension of Russian-Kyrgyz relations.
The visit was Bakiyevs fourth trip to Russia since the Tulip
Revolution last year and treads the path of a close interlinking of
security and economics.
There have been indications of the deepening security relationship
between Russia and Kyrgyzstan.
After talks in Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the
expansion of the Russian airbase in Kant opened in 2003 would be a
priority of bilateral cooperation. Russian military officials have
indicated that Moscow intends to double the number of planes and personnel
at the base, which currently hosts 20 Sukhoi jet fighters and
fighter-bombers and around 500 servicemen.
Putin has also announced that the two countries will hold joint
anti-terrorism exercises later this year. The two presidents agreed to
enhance Bishkeks participation in regional economic and security
groupings, including the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty
Organization which technically operates the Kant airbase and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Plans for several Russian investment projects in Kyrgyzstan worth up to
$3 billion have been announced. They are likely to focus on the energy
sector and involve leading Russian conglomerates, such as state gas
monopoly Gazprom and state electricity company Unified Energy Systems.
After Bakiyevs visit, on April 27, Russian Security Council Secretary
Igor Ivanov traveled to Bishkek, where he outlined energy, gas and
metallurgy as the most promising sectors for Russian investment in the
country.
Indeed, meeting Russian business leaders has been a priority for
Bakiyev since his accession to power in March 2005. He traveled to Moscow
in May last year to meet Oleg Deripaska, the main owner of the worlds
second largest aluminum producer, Rusal, in an attempt to attract Russian
capital to the construction of an aluminum smelter in Kyrgyzstan. The
Bakiyev government has also sought to involve Russian interests in the
joint completion of two unfinished hydroelectric power plants in
Kyrgyzstan, Kambar-Ata-1 and -2.
The strengthening military and economic links between Russia and
Kyrgyzstan come at the expense of U.S. influence and possibly military
presence in the region. In February, Bakiyev indicated he would like to
raise the annual lease on the U.S. base from $2 million to $207 million.
Before his Moscow visit, Bakiyev complained that talks had dragged on
since July and gave the United States until June 1 to agree to the rent
increase.
The issue of the U.S. base in Kyrgyzstan has acquired greater salience
since July 2005, when the SCO, led by Russia and China, issued a
declaration calling for the United States to set a timeline for the
withdrawal of its military forces from the region. This was followed by
the eviction of the U.S. base in Uzbekistan.
Although on the surface the U.S. authorities have mostly remained
positive about prospects for concluding a deal on Manas, there have been
few signs of progress. Speaking at a congressional committee hearing, the
deputy assistant secretary of defense for Eurasia, James MacDougall, said
the Pentagon hoped to reach a deal with Bishkek within the next two
months. However, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for South and
Central Asian affairs, Richard Boucher, was quoted as saying that
negotiations would rely on objective criteria.
The U.S.-Kyrgyz relationship is also facing difficulties in the area of
the economy. While Russia is offering Kyrgyzstan large-scale investments,
Washington has voiced support for Bishkeks move to join the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, designed to help countries with
overwhelming external debts to pursue debt reduction.
Kyrgyzstans external debt stands at $2 billion, but some Kyrgyz
experts believe that joining the initiative will make the country highly
dependent on Western funds. Ahead of his visit to Moscow, Bakiyev was
careful not to commit to the HIPC, despite Prime Minister Feliks Kulovs
earlier letter to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
asking to be allowed to join the initiative.
Tensions escalated when Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Alikbek Jekshenkulov,
seen as being close to Moscow, reprimanded the U.S. ambassador in Bishkek,
Marie Yovanovitch, for making public comments in favor of Kyrgyzstans
participation in the HIPC. The Foreign Ministry said that such comments
verged on interference in Kyrgyzstans internal affairs. Washington
responded that it reserves the right to speak about matters such as the
HIPC initiative.
The increasingly close relationship between Moscow and Bishkek is part
of a larger drive by the Kremlin to assert its political and strategic
interests in Central Asia, backed by the economic power of Russias
booming hydrocarbon economy. However, such strategic reassertion need not
take the shape of open intervention and may be done in part through
state-controlled companies.
In Moscow and across Central Asia, the presence of Russia and the
United States in the same region is being increasingly viewed in
competitive, even zero-sum, terms. Moscow offers Bishkek enhanced
cooperation, an offer that at a time of strained relations with Washington
and rising domestic pressures the Bakiyev government is likely to find
hard to refuse.
A stronger and more explicit alignment with the Kremlin may take place,
as Bakiyev struggles to quell the brewing unrest in the country and stay
in power. If Bakiyev uses force against protesters (as he has threatened
to do), who have set a deadline of May 27 for the government to rid the
country of corruption or resign, he will face stronger criticism from the
West and look increasingly toward Russia for diplomatic backing.
However, although Moscow is keen to restore its leading role in the
region, it is reluctant to be drawn into costly interventions on behalf of
Central Asian governments. While Bakiyev was able to garner some support
during his visit to Moscow, shoring up his domestic standing will have to
be done without Russian or U.S. security assistance.
The Kyrgyz-Russian security dialogue is likely to intensify even
further, possibly with greater initiative coming from Bishkek aimed at
securing sufficient support to counter growing instability within the
country. Bakiyev needs an alliance with Moscow, but the degree of its
military assistance may be less than he
expects.
