22 August
2006
In light of Iran's recent statements regarding its nuclear
research program, PINR recommends the following past analysis:
"Intelligence Brief: Iran and the U.S. Maneuver Carefully Toward
Confrontation" http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=470
------------------------------
Asia's Coming Water Wars
Drafted By: Chietigj Bajpaee http://www.pinr.com
While
the world's attention is focused on record high oil prices, water, like oil, is
increasingly emerging as a catalyst for international instability and conflict
as the recent upsurge in violence in Sri Lanka illustrates. On July 20, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (L.T.T.E.) shut down the Maavilaru dam's sluice
gate near the town of Kantalai in the northeastern Trincomalee district, which
cut off water supplies for 60,000 people in government-controlled areas. This
led the Sri Lankan military to commence an aerial bombardment of Tiger positions
and a ground offensive to gain control of the reservoir's control point. The
Tigers claim that their actions were sparked by the government's failure to
build a water tower to supply L.T.T.E.-controlled areas and responded by going
on the offensive in Mutur. With more than 500 people killed since fighting
erupted over the disputed waterway, the 2002 ceasefire has now collapsed in all
but name.
Water is increasingly emerging as a scarce commodity, fueled by
population pressures, intensive irrigation, and erratic weather patterns brought
on by global warming. According to the International Water Management Institute,
by 2025 one-third of the world's population will lack access to water.
Developing countries bear the brunt of water shortages given the lack of clean
drinking water and adequate sanitation in these states, which has been
exacerbated by rapid development, population pressures and significant
urban-to-rural migration. Developing countries are also the most likely to face
water-related conflict given the lack of cooperative management mechanisms
between developing states on managing shared water resources.
Of the
world's 263 international basins, three-fifths of them lack a feasible
cooperative management framework. While water disputes alone are not likely to
spark a conflict, they are likely to fuel already existent, long-standing
tensions within and between states. Since 1948, close to 40 incidents of
hostilities have taken place over water resources, most of which have taken
place in the Middle East. In the Middle East, the Jordan River Basin and the
Tigris-Euphrates Basin are the most likely regions of water-related conflict,
while in Africa the Nile River, Volta River, Zambezi River, and the Niger Basin
are conflict-prone zones.
In the 21st century, however, Asia may emerge
as the new focal point of water-related conflict given the rapid growth of the
region, which is likely to put pressure on water resources, coupled with the
concentration of long-standing internal and inter-state tensions, which can act
as a spark for turning water-related disputes into full-scale conflicts. Asia is
home to 57 international basins, the third largest after Europe and Africa.
In Asia, three regions are the most likely candidates for water-related
conflict: Central Asia, South Asia and the Mekong sub-region in Southeast Asia.
Central Asia's water fault-lines include the division of the Caspian Sea between
the five littoral states (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and
Turkmenistan) and a dispute over access to water from the Syr Darya and Amu
Darya rivers between upstream states (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and downstream
states (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).
South Asia's water
tensions include the Indo-Pakistan dispute over the Wular Barrage,
Indo-Bangladesh water dispute over the Farakka Barrage and the Indo-Nepal
dispute over the Mahakali River Treaty.
In Southeast Asia, water-related
tensions arise from attempts by the six riparian states (Cambodia, China, Laos,
Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) to construct dams in order to reroute the Mekong
River system. While management systems have been established for these disputes
-- such as the Mekong River Committee (1957) and its successor the Mekong River
Commission, the treaties of Sarada (1920), Kosi (1954) and Gandak (1959) between
India and Nepal, the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan (1960), the
Ganges Waters Treaty between India and Bangladesh (1977), and the 1998
"Agreement on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syr Darya Basin"
between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan -- they have been poorly enforced.
Furthermore, all three regions are plagued by long-standing historical
animosities and internal instabilities and water disputes serve to focus these
tensions. The fact that these river systems run through multiple countries --
notably the Aral Sea, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna and Mekong Rivers are each
shared by at least five states -- creates the potential for regional conflict
over water.
Mekong River Delta: Dams a Barrier for
Cooperation
The Asian Development Bank launched the Mekong Sub-region
in 1992 as an initiative aimed at promoting development, trade and integration
through enhancing transportation, communication, and power networks between the
six countries in the region. The Mekong region covers over 2.3 million square
miles and is home to 240 million people. The 4,880 kilometer (3,032 miles)
Mekong River begins in the Tibetan plateau, and makes its way through China's
Yunnan province, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and discharges out
into the South China Sea. Close to 70 million people depend on the river for
food, water and transport and the region accounts for 20 percent of all fish
caught from the inland waters of the world.
While the world's attention
is focused on the Three Gorges Dam, which was completed in May 2006, less
attention has been paid to a number of other massive dam projects under
construction or consideration in China. China's dam-construction binge has been
fueled by its growing energy needs, the appeal of hydropower as a clean fuel,
the need for flood control, as well as the interest in massive infrastructure
projects by provincial governments in order to boost their growth figures.
Sixteen percent of China's electricity generation comes from hydropower,
with a government survey putting China's hydropower potential at 700,000
megawatts. China currently has more than 85,000 dams, close to half of the
world's total. More than 16 million people have been displaced as a result of
the construction of these dams and tensions have been further fueled by the lack
of public participation in evaluating the environmental impact of these projects
and determining compensation for relocation.
In the Upper Mekong Basin in
Yunnan Province, China has planned to construct eight cascade hydropower dams,
the first of which, the Manwan Dam, was completed in 1996. This has diverted
water from downstream countries in the Mekong River Delta, resulting in
irregular fluctuations in water levels, which has harmed local industries in the
region, including farming and fishing in Cambodia and Thailand, and the tourism
industry in Laos.
The environmental impact of China's Mekong River
policy is being further felt by its US$20 billion proposal to build a canal
across Thailand's Kra Isthmus to transport petroleum from Thailand to southern
China. This initiative is being encouraged by China's desire to bypass the
narrow Strait of Malacca, through which 80 percent of China's oil imports
currently transit, which Beijing views as a strategic vulnerability given that
the waters are a hub for piracy and potential terrorist attacks and patrolled by
the U.S. Navy. However, an oil spill along this waterway would devastate the
ecosystem of the Mekong River as well as the economies of the region that depend
on the river for their livelihood.
Beijing has been slow in sharing
information on its river diverting projects along the Upper Mekong Basin. While
China claims to support multilateralism, it has refused to join the four-country
Mekong River Commission (M.R.C.) comprising Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and
Vietnam, although both Myanmar and China are Dialogue Partners. The M.R.C. was
established in 1995 as the successor to the 1957 Mekong Committee (Committee for
Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin) to ensure the
equitable use of the river system as well as addressing issues of fisheries
management, safe navigation, irrigated agriculture, watershed management,
environmental protection, flood management and hydropower development.
Following in the footsteps of China, other countries in the delta have
also pursued a unilateral approach toward projects along the river system --
Vietnam has engaged in several dam construction projects without consulting with
Cambodia, as has Laos. Coupled with long-standing historical animosities between
states in the region such as between China and Vietnam and Thailand and Myanmar,
as well as internal frictions caused by poverty and a number of long-standing
insurgencies, water disputes act as a potential catalyst for regional conflict.
South Asia: Holy Rivers and Holy War
Three of the seven
South Asian states -- Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal -- are involved in water
sharing conflicts with India. These conflicts are exacerbated by the fact that
these countries are mainly agrarian economies.
Tensions between India
and Pakistan are focused on their territorial dispute over Kashmir, Pakistan's
alleged support for terrorist attacks in India and historical animosities
emanating from the partition of the Indian subcontinent. Water disputes between
both states, however, offer a potential catalyst for conflict. The Indus River
system is the largest, contiguous irrigation system in the world with a command
area of 20 million hectares and an annual irrigation capacity of over 12 million
hectares. The headwater of the basin is in India.
Although the Indus
Water Treaty of 1960 has tempered disputes between India and Pakistan over the
river system, it has failed to resolve their long-standing dispute over the
Wular Barrage. Since 1985, Pakistan has objected to India's Tubul Navigation
Project on the River Jhelum. Pakistan claims that India has violated Article I
(11) of the Indus Waters Treaty, which prohibits both parties from undertaking
any "man-made obstruction" that may cause "change in the volume of the daily
flow of waters" and Article III (4) which bars India from "storing any water of,
or construct any storage works on, the Western Rivers."
Furthermore,
Pakistan regards India's control of the River Jhelum as a threat to its security
should India decide to withhold the water. The Indus Waters Commission has
failed to resolve the issue and it has been on the agenda of the Indo-Pak talks
at Lahore in February 1999, the Agra Summit of July 2001, and part of the
Composite Dialogue initiated in January 2004.
Meanwhile, on its eastern
borders India is also engaged in several water disputes with Nepal, Bangladesh
and China. The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna region comprises the catchment areas of
three major river systems that flow through India, Nepal, Bhutan, China and
Bangladesh. This system is second only to the Amazon with an annual discharge of
1,350 billion cubic meters and a total drainage area of 1.75 million square
kilometers. With a population of over 600 million people living in the region,
which is growing at an annual rate of two percent, there is considerable
pressure on the region's resources.
The Mahakali River flows along the
Nepal-India western border. The river was fixed as the western boundary between
Nepal and British India in 1816. Nepal's rivers have the potential to generate
83,000 MW of electricity through hydropower generation, most of which could be
exported to India to meet its growing energy needs -- northern India currently
faces a power deficit of 9,500 MW, which is expected to rise to 20,000 MW by
2010. Although both states have reached numerous water-resource development
agreements, Indo-Nepali cooperation on the river systems has been slow.
Tensions grew following India's construction of the Tanakpur Barrage on
the Mahakali River in 1998. This was based on a memorandum of understanding that
was signed between both states in 1991 and renegotiated as the "Integrated
Development of the Mahakali River including Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur Barrage and
Pancheswar Project" in 1996. The ratification of the treaty has not only soured
relations between India and Nepal but also enflamed internal Nepalese politics
as the Nepali Congress and United Marxist Leninist party have accused each other
of selling out Nepal's interests under foreign pressure. Discussions have raged
over the interpretation of the treaty, the presence of Indian troops in disputed
upstream territory, the issue of water rights, the selling price of electricity,
the environmental impact of the infrastructure project and the displacement of
as many as 65,000 people as a result of the project.
Water-related
tensions in South Asia, however, are greatest between India and Bangladesh.
Tensions between Bangladesh and India emanate from the disputed status of their
border, illegal migration and Bangladesh's alleged support for militant groups
operating in India's northeast, coupled with rising Islamic fundamentalist
sentiment in Bangladesh under the Bangladesh National Party (B.N.P.)-led
government. These tensions have even led to skirmishes between India's Border
Security Force and the Bangladesh Rifles, as occurred most recently on
Bangladesh's border with Assam in August.
Water disputes are likely to
enflame these tensions given that 54 rivers flow from India into Bangladesh.
Although the Joint Rivers Commission was established in 1972 as the facilitating
body to resolve trans-boundary water disputes between both states, which was
complemented by the Ganges Water Agreement in 1977, several water-related
disagreements continue to exist between both states.
First, both states
have accused each other of causing the erosion of riverbanks that mark the 180
kilometer (112 miles) of international boundary between both states as a result
of constructing concrete embankments. Second, Bangladesh has accused India of
reducing water flow along the River Ganges, known as Padma in Bangladesh, as a
result of India's construction of the Farakka Barrage across the Ganges in 1970.
Dhaka has also accused Delhi of being slow in sharing data regarding river flows
for flood control purposes. Bangladesh has also opposed India's plans for a $15
billion project to link rivers across the country in order to provide excess
water in the north to water-deficient states in the south, which Bangladesh
claims will affect river flow through the Brahmaputra and Ganges rivers systems
into Bangladesh.
Tensions have been further fueled by Bangladeshi
political parties using water-related tensions with India to gain electoral
support, with the B.N.P. using the issue of water to discredit the opposition
Awami League, which signed several treaties with India when it was the ruling
party. Finally, both states have differed in their approach toward addressing
water disputes, with India favoring a bilateral approach while Bangladesh has
favored a multilateral approach. This was illustrated at the recent conference
on "Trans-boundary Water Issues: South Asian Cooperation" organized by the
International Farakka Committee (I.F.C.), where Bangladesh proposed a basin-wide
approach to addressing water disputes through the creation of a Ganges River
Commission or Brahmaputra River Authority involving Bangladesh, India, China,
Nepal and Bhutan.
There are concerns over China's diversion of rivers
from Tibet to South Asia, such as the Indus, Sutlej, and the Brahmaputra, which
are critical to Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and Pakistan. India has accused China
of being slow in sharing information on the status of the rivers in the run up
to landslides, which have caused flooding in northeastern India and Bangladesh.
Beijing's construction of a barrage along the Sutlej/Langqen Tsangbo and dams
along the Brahmaputra/Sang Po has also concerned Delhi, as it will allow Beijing
to control and regulate the flow of water into India. The lack of any formal
water-sharing agreement between Delhi and Beijing due to their disputed borders
has contributed to Sino-Indian tensions over water.
Sino-Indian
relations have shown significant improvement in recent years fueled by their
burgeoning trade relationship, direct transport links, and China's recognition
of Sikkim as Indian territory as a quid pro quo for India's recognition of Tibet
as Chinese territory.
Nonetheless, both states' rapid growth rates and
rising middle classes have translated into a growing global competition for
resources, most notably oil and gas but also water. Water disputes coupled with
suspicions emanating from India's improving relationship with the United States,
China's long-standing relationship with Pakistan, and both states' quest for
regional and global prominence threaten to sour any rapprochement between Asia's
two rising powers.
Central Asia: The "Great Game" Over
Water
While international attention on Central Asia has tended to
focus on its oil and gas reserves and its role in the war on terrorism, the
region is also home to several long-standing water disputes, which have the
potential to escalate the region's instabilities.
While Central Asia is
rich in water resources, more than 90 percent is concentrated in Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan where the region's two main rivers, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya,
originate. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are the region's main water
consumers with Uzbekistan alone consuming more than half of the region's water
resources. As such, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan control the water needed by the
other Central Asian states. The upstream states, however, view water as a
strategic commodity as they are poorly endowed with other resources and use
water to generate much of their own power needs.
The region's growing
water consumption emanates from the 1960s during which time the Soviets
constructed an extensive network of canals and reservoirs in order to increase
cotton production in the region. Under the Soviet rule, power grids in the
region were integrated under a single network so that upstream states could
export electrical power to downstream states during the winter, and import from
them during the summer when water was drawn for cotton production.
With
the independence of the Central Asian republics, frictions have arisen over the
breakdown of the Soviet system. Water flow to downstream states has fallen,
significantly affecting cotton production and cooling needs during the summer,
while downstream states have not met the gas and coal needs of upstream states,
especially during the harsh winters. The region's growing water consumption has
also reduced water levels in the Aral Sea, which is fed by the Syr Darya and Amu
Darya river systems. Although the states established the Interstate Commission
for Water Coordination in 1992, they have failed to implement an effective water
management mechanism. Combined with inter-state tensions over disputed borders,
great power competition over the region's energy resources and internal
instabilities emanating from rising poverty, authoritarian rule and religious
extremism, water disputes have the potential to tip the region into
conflict.
A further source of instability emanates from the lack of
agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea between the five littoral
states (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan). The Caspian Sea
is the world's largest inland body of water. It is rich in sturgeon, which is
harvested for the production of caviar, as well as hydrocarbon reserves, with
total oil reserves (proven and possible) at 235.7 billion barrels and gas
reserves (proven and possible) at 560 trillion cubic feet, according to the U.S.
Energy Information Administration.
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the Caspian Sea was divided between Iran and the Soviet Union on the
basis of the Friendship Treaty of 1921 and the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
of 1940, although it left some issues unresolved such as the protection of the
local environment and development of resources on the seabed. It also failed to
distinguish whether the Caspian was a "sea" or "lake," the former of which would
lead to an equidistant division of the body of water under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea while the latter would lead to joint
development, characterized as the condominium approach.
Following the
Soviet collapse, the six littoral states have adopted differing positions on the
status of the Caspian, which have shifted with the growing importance of energy
resources in the region. Notably, Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have favored
sharing the surface waters and dividing the seabed based on the principle of the
median line, which has been opposed by Iran and Turkmenistan. Furthermore,
Russia has favored a bilateral "phased" approach in resolving the dispute while
Iran has preferred a multilateral condominium approach whereby all five littoral
states collectively agree on developing the resources on the seabed, with either
joint development or equal division of the sea. By dividing the sea using the
median line approach, the seabed would be divided between Kazakhstan,
Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Iran as 28.4 percent, 21 percent, 19
percent, 18 percent and 13.6 percent respectively; under the condominium
approach favored by Iran, each state would receive 20 percent of the seabed.
Tensions have been further fanned by the emergence of the region as a
global energy flashpoint. With the inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude
oil pipeline in July 2006 and discussions to extend the pipeline to Kazakhstan,
the United States has a vested interest in supporting Azerbaijan's and
Kazakhstan's positions in the Caspian Sea dispute. Meanwhile, Russia has opposed
this pipeline project, which undermines its monopoly on transporting energy
resources from the region while both Iran and Russia have voiced concerns over
the growing U.S. presence in their backyard.
Conclusion
Approximately 20 percent of Asians do not have
easy access to water while almost 60 river basins in Asia have been identified
as potential flashpoints for inter-state conflict according to a joint study by
the United Nations and the University of Oregon. The rapid development, growing
populations and long-standing inter-state and internal instabilities in South
Asia, Central Asia, and the Mekong Sub-region in Southeast Asia increases the
likelihood of water-related conflict in these regions and makes any
water-related tensions in these areas of wider regional and potentially global
significance.
The development of international water dispute mechanisms
has been slow, as evinced by the fact that the "1997 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses" has
failed to muster the 35 votes needed for it to take effect. This gives added
importance to those pushing for the development of a pan-Asian multilateral
system for arbitration on inter-state water disputes. As the recent
conflagration of hostilities in Sri Lanka demonstrates, water disputes can add
fuel to the fire of long-standing historical animosities.
Report
Drafted By: Chietigj Bajpaee
__._,_.___
Complete archives at http://www.sitbot.net/
Please let us stay on topic and be civil.
OM
SPONSORED LINKS
YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
__,_._,___
|