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Subject: [PINR] 26 February 2007: Russia's Upcoming Revised Military Doctrine
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Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
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26 February 2007
Today's analyst, Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Marcel de Haas, is Senior
Research Fellow on military doctrine, strategy, and security policy of the
Netherlands, N.A.T.O., E.U., Russia and C.I.S., at the Netherlands Institute of
International Relations Clingendael in The Hague.
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Russia's Upcoming Revised Military Doctrine
Drafted By: Dr. Marcel de Haas
http://www.pinr.com
On January 20, 2007, a conference of the Russian Academy of Military
Sciences took place in Moscow. At the conference, the academy's president, Army
General Makhmut Gareyev, and the chief of the general staff of the Russian
armed forces, Army General Yuri Baluyevsky, presented elements of a new
military doctrine. The revised doctrine -- to be published at the end of the
summer -- is to replace the current one, which was ratified by President
Vladimir Putin in 2000. A striking point is the apparent effort of the military
to strengthen its position on security issues within Russia's decision-making
circles. Moreover, not surprisingly, the preliminary entries of the new
doctrine resemble the present complicated relationship between the West and
Russia.
Development of a New Doctrine
After the terror attacks of "Nord-Ost" in 2002 and Beslan in 2004, Putin
ordered a revision of the country's political strategy, national security
concept, and related security documents. In 2005, Putin ordered the revision of
Russia's military doctrine. In August 2006, reports appeared in the Russian
press on the draft of a new doctrine, to be completed in 2007. These reports,
however, were immediately denied by the minister of defense at the time, Sergei
Ivanov. With the announcement of the draft-in-process of a new doctrine in
January, it seems that the news reports were correct after all. At the Moscow
conference, it was stated that the current doctrine of 2000 -- i.e. before the
September 11 attacks -- needed revision because of the deterioration of the
international security situation since then.
Threats
Russia's military has observed that security cooperation with the West
has not brought a diminished number of military threats. According to
Baluyevsky, current threats come from Washington: "The course of the United
States toward global leadership and its desire to get a foothold in regions
where Russia traditionally is present." The next threat is the enlargement of
the N.A.T.O. bloc to the east and the fact that this alliance is involved in
local conflicts near Russia's borders. Another threat is the increasing spread
of hostile information on Russia's policies. Terrorism and separatism were only
mentioned further down on his and Gareyev's list of threats.
Gareyev was less outspoken on the threats emanating from the West, and
chose to mention them in general terms. His priority threat are those of
specific international forces and leading states to affect the sovereignty of
Russia, to damage Russia's economic and other interests, as well as political
and information pressure and undermining activities. The threat of energy
security is a vital threat, since leading circles within N.A.T.O. now consider
price changes of energy resources as a form of aggression.
The second threat on Gareyev's list was that of nuclear weapons -- among
others resulting from the construction of anti-missile defense systems -- and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the end, nearly all
holders of nuclear arms have them aimed at Russia.
Thirdly, the start of armed conflicts and even large-scale wars are
considered a threat. This threat derives from the motivations of great powers
to reach military superiority and the presence of large military contingents
near the borders of Russia, resulting in a change of the military balance.
Finally, the fact that N.A.T.O. has broadened its sphere of activities
and is striving to act on a global level is also considered a threat by Russia.
Furthermore, Gareyev called for a comparison with military doctrines of other
key players in international security -- such as China, the United States and
N.A.T.O. -- in order to include entries of their common threats, for instance
on terrorism, into Russia's revised military doctrine. Moreover, to counter
threats, Gareyev pleaded for a "division of labor" among East and West, by
determining areas of responsibility between N.A.T.O. and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (C.S.T.O.), the Russian-led C.I.S. military
alliance further comprising Armenia, Belarus and all the former Soviet
republics in Central Asia except for Turkmenistan.
Doctrine Versus Political Strategy
In the editions of the military doctrine of 1993 and 2000, military
threats and measures were separated from other dimensions, such as political,
economic, diplomatic and other non-violent means to prevent wars and conflicts.
These other spheres of security traditionally belonged to the competence of the
national security concept, Russia's political strategy. The development of the
international security situation demonstrates that this division in threats and
corresponding measures is disappearing. This leads to the conclusion that
either all related dimensions -- i.e. all military or non-military security
threats -- should be dealt with in the military doctrine or that the doctrine
and the national security concept should be combined into one document, perhaps
a so-called defense or security doctrine.
As discussed before, after the terror attacks of 2002 and 2004, Putin had
already ordered a revision of the national security concept. However, after the
February 2005 report of Igor Ivanov, Secretary of the Security Council of the
Russian Federation (S.C.R.F.), on the preliminary contents of the revised
national security concept, nothing has been heard since of this draft document.
At the Moscow conference, Gareyev explained that the revision of the national
security concept has been delayed and that the revision of the military
doctrine will be accomplished first.
Reinforcing Military Power
To counter the threats, Russia's military organization is to be
strengthened, both financially and politically. To do so, the preliminary
entries of the doctrine emphasize the reinforcement of Russia's nuclear
capabilities. In addition to advancing the strength of the armed forces by
increasing the defense budget from 2.5 percent to 3.5 percent of the G.N.P. and
by enlarging the mobilization capacity, the position of the minister of defense
should also be reinforced, according to Baluyevsky and Gareyev.
The doctrine suggests enhancing the status of the minister of defense by
promoting him to deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Considering
that Russia's president is the commander-in-chief, this proposal would include
granting the minister of defense the position of vice president. The S.C.R.F.
should be the all-compassing security organ of the Russian state, which has not
been the case in recent years. To raise its standard to this level, the
S.C.R.F. should be under administrative command of the vice president.
Doctrine as Leading Document
The development of the new military doctrine, its sequence with the
national security concept and the preliminary contents of the doctrine clearly
demonstrate an attempt by the military to increase their influence among
Russia's security elite. The current development of the doctrine bears a
resemblance to that of the previous one in 1999-2000. Theoretically spoken, a
country should first draft a political strategy before a military doctrine,
which should be in line with and derived from this grand strategy.
Traditionally, Russia's military has had a fundamental influence on the
state's security policy. To remain in the forefront of security policy, the
military in 1999 managed to avoid the S.C.R.F. and to bring out a draft of the
revised military doctrine before the revised draft of the national security
concept was made public. After taking over from President Boris Yeltsin,
President Putin in 2000 returned order in the security documents by first
ratifying the final edition of the national security concept and then that of
the military doctrine.
The current development of security documents seems like a repetition of
1999. For unknown reasons, the revised political strategy is delayed but
instead of waiting for this, the military is well underway in releasing a new
doctrine, which -- according to the statements of both generals -- is likely to
include non-military threats and measures as well, which actually belong to the
national security concept. Therefore, the military strengthens its position,
apparently with Putin's approval.
Defense Minister as Second-in-Command
The call to make the minister of defense deputy commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, as well as vice president, looks like another effort to increase
the leverage of the military in security-related decision-making. Undoubtedly
part of the secrets of the Kremlin, the question is whether this proposal was
meant for Sergei Ivanov before he recently was promoted to first deputy prime
minister and since then no longer serves as minister of defense. Controlling
not only the military, but also the troops of the other so-called power
ministries -- such as the F.S.B. and the Interior Ministry -- as well as the
military-industrial complex, the promotion of Ivanov to the positions of deputy
commander-in-chief of the armed forces and that of vice president would have
been in line with his increasing power in recent years and his preparation for
the presidency, as one of Putin's "crown princes." However, things have
developed differently.
Apparently, Putin decided to expand Ivanov's powers and experience by
providing him a position in the civilian economy, including conferring him
authority over energy infrastructure and energy security, which makes sense
since energy in addition to military force clearly has become Russia's main
instrument of power. Consequently, this career move of Ivanov might cancel the
doctrinal proposal to increase the powers of the minister of defense.
Threat Perception
The entries on threats -- mainly referring to the West in general and the
United States and N.A.T.O. in particular -- correspond with the deteriorating
relationship between Russia and the West. Nevertheless, the anti-Western
entries are not new and, therefore, not alarming. Similar phrases were used in
the current military doctrine of 2000. In addition to this, some interesting
points of view should be recognized and considered in a positive way. The
demand for a comparison of threat perceptions with doctrines of other important
actors -- such as China, the United States, and N.A.T.O. -- demonstrates
Russia's willingness to learn from others and not to consider itself in an
isolated position.
Related to this is the proposal to construct a division in areas of
responsibility between N.A.T.O. and the C.S.T.O. Although this undoubtedly will
be unacceptable to N.A.T.O. -- according to its Strategic Concept, the alliance
regards itself as responsible for the unspecified Euro-Atlantic region -- the
fact that Russia encourages cooperation between both military partnerships
might be valuable in the near future but more importantly shows that Russia
wishes to continue security teamwork with the West.
Another valuable feature of the new doctrine is the recognition that a
distinction can no longer be made between internal and external security and
military and non-military threats and corresponding responses. As do Western
doctrinal experts, their Russian counterparts now also acknowledge that
security is comprehensive and comprises all dimensions. In line with this is
the call to strengthen the status of the S.C.R.F., which is the organ to
provide an all-inclusive and interdepartmental response to internal and
external security challenges. These entries again demonstrate that Russia's
military has an open eye for international security developments and for
recognizing the value of related analyses of others.
Consequently, the preliminary contents of Russia's new military doctrine
gives evidence to the fact that Russia's military is incorporating
international experiences into its security thinking, which may be regarded as
a positive development. It will be interesting to see how the draft doctrine
further develops, especially in relation to the position of the military as
part of the security elite and with regard to the status of the doctrine
compared to that of the national security concept.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Marcel de Haas
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