The conventional COMPUSEC view of high assurance was that - it was indicated where the Policy had to be enforced for certain (mandatory) e.g. no flow down tolerated.
----- Original Message ----- From: [email protected] <[email protected]> To: CICM Discussion List <[email protected]> Sent: Mon May 23 05:27:45 2011 Subject: Re: [cicm] BoF Request for CICM at IETF 81 Richard, On 2011-05-22 at 06:36, Richard Graveman wrote: > It seems to me that high assurance may well be needed in cases with > only one domain. Is that out of scope? Single domain use cases are definitely in scope; but they are very similar (conceptually) to existing commercial crypto APIs. The ability to separate domains is what sets CICM apart. See: "2.3. Single Security Domain" in CICM Logical Model http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lanz-cicm-lm-00#section-2.3 "18. Single-Domain" in CICM Channel Management http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lanz-cicm-cm-00#section-18 Lev _______________________________________________ cicm mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cicm
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