Lev, I think you ought to post this summary to the crypto list at <[email protected]>.
-kevin On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 11:06 PM, Novikov, Lev <[email protected]> wrote: > Last week we had a BOF at IETF 81. Thanks to all who attended (in-person > and via Jabber). For those who couldn't make it, a summary: > > --- Begin Summary --- > Dan Harkins and Dan Lanz were the BOF Chairs. > > Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell are the Security ADs. > > Vincent Roca presented slides about using CICM in a > High Assurance, High Performance Security Gateway. > Slides: http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/81/slides/cicm-1.pdf > > Lev Novikov presented slides about CICM's logical model and how > security domain separation makes CICM different from other crypto APIs. > Slides: http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/81/slides/cicm-2.pdf > > There were several points of discussion: > > 1. What about existing approaches: > * Why can't you extend PKCS#11 so that crypto operations like > encrypt always return TRUE? > > A few reasons were given: > (a) CICM needs richer semantics (more and different kinds of > inputs) than what is available in PKCS#11. Previous attempts > at extending PKCS#11 became a mess. > (b) Return values can be more complex than just TRUE (e.g., list > of things that went wrong). > > * What about using an existing protocol as an interface? > > CICM could sit under such a protocol; it is also intended manage > the crypto (note the large number of management commands), and not > just the pipe (channel). > > * Which approach, C-style or object-oriented, was intended? The .NET > crypto classes might be suitable for an object-oriented approach. > > CICM is defined in IDL for which one can generate bindings in many > different languages including C, C++, Java, etc. We will have to > investigate the .NET approach further. > > ** There was a request that folks on the list discuss these issues for > the benefit of the community. > > 2. The charter is insufficient for a Working Group: > > * It was noted that there could be two goals: > (a) to produce multi-vendor support for a standard interface > (b) to introduce these concepts into existing IETF protocols > > * The charter appears to be too detailed; it should focus more > on outlining the problem scope well. > > * CICM appears to address requirements that are not well explained > in published documents. > > * How would CICM work with Authenticated Encryption with > Authenticated Data [RFC 5116], TLS, or IPSEC? What are the > consequences on other protocols? > > The major consequence of these points is that we should re-write the > charter and write documents to address the: > * larger problem scope > * logical model (in more generic terms) and requirements > * impact of this logical model on 2-3 existing protocols > * details for an corresponding API (e.g., CICM) > > --- End Summary --- > > More on this to follow. > > Lev > _______________________________________________ > cicm mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cicm > -- Blog: http://off-the-wall-security.blogspot.com/ "The most likely way for the world to be destroyed, most experts agree, is by accident. That's where we come in; we're computer professionals. We *cause* accidents." -- Nathaniel Borenstein _______________________________________________ cicm mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cicm
