[+Jay Simmons]

Hi Andrew.  We made some progress on this issue.  Below is the response from 
Jay Simmons who researched this for you.  Jay agreed to join this thread.

"Thanks for your extreme patience on this issue.    Your findings were correct 
– Windows servers up through Windows Server 2003 will attempt to use the 
well-known key “SystemLibraryDTC” to decrypt data, if no SMB session has been 
established for the incoming client (which is usually the case when invoking 
RPC calls over TCP).    Windows servers after WS03 behave only slightly better 
– for those OS versions, a “random” key will be used whose contents depend on 
memory\stack contents at the time the call is made.    While the server-side 
behavior is not ideal, the client must still first be authenticated and 
authorized for the operation (eg, password set) to be allowed.   Therefore the 
security vulnerability lies in the fact that the client chose to expose 
sensitive data to a potential wire-sniffing attack, by using an insecure means 
of making the call in the first place (this assumes that RPC-level transport 
security was not leveraged to protect the data).   Note that we explicitly 
document in MS-SAMR (see section 2.1) which calls must be made using 
RPC-over-SMB, at least in part for preventing exactly this problem.    No 
Windows client will ever invoke such a call (ie, one with SMB-session-key 
encrypted parameters) without an SMB session.    

"This probably goes without saying, but please do not attempt to rely on this 
behavior as it will likely be blocked at some point in the future.  

"Feedback welcomed, especially if you think we have misunderstood the security 
implications of the issue."

Please let us know your feedback.
 
Bryan


-----Original Message-----
From: Andrew Bartlett [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2012 10:36 PM
To: Bryan Burgin
Cc: '[email protected]'; MSSolve Case Email; Tarun Chopra
Subject: RE: [cifs-protocol] [REG:111101553031054] SystemLibraryDTC

On Mon, 2012-02-13 at 06:21 +0000, Bryan Burgin wrote:
> Andrew,
> 
> I'm touching base to see if you can provide the exact smbtorture steps to 
> reproduce your issue.

bin/smbtorture  ncacn_np:win2003r2-2[seal] rpc.lsa.secrets 
-Uadministrator%penguin

win2003r2-2 is naturally a win2003r2 server, currently not a DC. 

I note with interest that this test fails with NO_USER_SESSION_KEY in win2k8r2, 
so I would like to know when this was changed and any important details, so we 
on the Samba Team can assess removing SystemLibraryDTC eventually. 

Thanks,

Andrew Bartlett

-- 
Andrew Bartlett                                http://samba.org/~abartlet/
Authentication Developer, Samba Team           http://samba.org


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