http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IL13Ak03.html

Dec 13, 2007 

Death squads, disappearances and torture
By Greg Grandin 


The world is made up, as Captain Segura in Graham Greene's 1958 novel Our Man 
in Havana put it, of two classes: the torturable and the untorturable. "There 
are people," Segura explained, "who expect to be tortured and others who would 
be outraged by the idea." 

Then - so Greene thought - Catholics, particularly Latin American Catholics, 
were more torturable than Protestants. Now, of course, Muslims hold that 
distinction, victims of a globalized network of offshore and outsourced 
imprisonment coordinated by Washington and knitted together by secret flights, 
concentration camps, and black-site detention centers. The CIA's deployment of 
Orwellian "Special Removal Units" to kidnap terror suspects in Europe, Canada, 
the Middle East and elsewhere and the whisking of these "ghost prisoners" off 
to Third World countries to be tortured goes, today, by the term "extraordinary 
rendition", a hauntingly apt phrase. "To render" means not just to hand over 
but to extract the essence of a thing, as well as to hand out a verdict and 
"give in return or retribution" - good descriptions of what happens during 
torture sessions. 

In the decades after Greene wrote Our Man in Havana, Latin Americans coined an 
equally resonant word to describe the terror that had come to reign over most 
of the continent. Throughout the second half of the Cold War, Washington's 
anti-communist allies killed more than 300,000 civilians, many of whom were 
simply desaparecido - "disappeared". The expression was already well known in 
Latin America when, on accepting his 1982 Nobel Prize for Literature in Sweden, 
Colombian novelist Gabriel Garcia Marquez reported that the region's 
"disappeared number nearly 120,000, which is as if suddenly no one could 
account for all the inhabitants of Uppsala". 

When Latin Americans used the word as a verb, they usually did so in a way 
considered grammatically incorrect - in the transitive form and often in the 
passive voice, as in "she was disappeared." The implied (but absent) 
actor/subject signaled that everybody knew the government was responsible, even 
while investing that government with unspeakable, omnipotent power. The 
disappeared left behind families and friends who spent their energies dealing 
with labyrinthine bureaucracies, only to be met with silence or told that their 
missing relative probably went to Cuba, joined the guerrillas, or ran away with 
a lover. The victims were often not the most politically active, but the most 
popular, and were generally chosen to ensure that their sudden absence would 
generate a chilling ripple-effect. 

An unholy trinity 
Like rendition, disappearances can't be carried out without a synchronized, 
sophisticated and increasingly transnational infrastructure, which, back in the 
1960s and 1970s, the United States was instrumental in creating. In fact, it 
was in Latin America that the CIA and US military intelligence agents, working 
closely with local allies, first helped put into place the unholy trinity of 
government-sponsored terrorism now on display in Iraq and elsewhere: death 
squads, disappearances, and torture. 

Death Squads: Clandestine paramilitary units, nominally independent from 
established security agencies yet able to draw on the intelligence and 
logistical capabilities of those agencies, are the building blocks for any 
effective system of state terror. In Latin America, Washington supported the 
assassination of suspected Leftists at least as early as 1954, when the CIA 
successfully carried out a coup in Guatemala, which ousted a democratically 
elected president. But its first sustained sponsorship of death squads started 
in 1962 in Colombia, a country that then vied with Vietnam for Washington's 
attention. 

Having just ended a brutal 10-year civil war, its newly consolidated political 
leadership, facing a still unruly peasantry, turned to the US for help. In 
1962, the Kennedy White House sent General William Yarborough, later better 
known for being the "Father of the Green Berets" (as well as for directing 
domestic military surveillance of prominent civil-rights activists, including 
Martin Luther King Jr). Yarborough advised the Colombian government to set up 
an irregular unit to "execute paramilitary, sabotage and/or terrorist 
activities against known communist proponents" - as good a description of a 
death squad as any. 

As historian Michael McClintock puts it in his indispensable book Instruments 
of Statecraft, Yarborough left behind a "virtual blueprint" for creating 
military-directed death squads. This was, thanks to US aid and training, 
immediately implemented. The use of such death squads would become part of what 
the counterinsurgency theorists of the era liked to call "counter-terror" - a 
concept hard to define since it so closely mirrored the practices it sought to 
contest. 

Throughout the 1960s, Latin America and Southeast Asia functioned as the two 
primary laboratories for US counterinsurgents, who moved back and forth between 
the regions, applying insights and fine-tuning tactics. By the early 1960s, 
death-squad executions were a standard feature of US counterinsurgency strategy 
in Vietnam, soon to be consolidated into the infamous Phoenix Program, which 
between 1968 and 1972 "neutralized" more than 80,000 Vietnamese - 26,369 of 
whom were "permanently eliminated". 

As in Latin America, so too in Vietnam, the point of death squads was not just 
to eliminate those thought to be working with the enemy, but to keep potential 
rebel sympathizers in a state of fear and anxiety. To do so, the US Information 
Service in Saigon provided thousands of copies of a flyer printed with a 
ghostly looking eye. The "terror squads" then deposited that eye on the corpses 
of those they murdered or pinned it "on the doors of houses suspected of 
occasionally harboring Viet Cong agents". The technique was called "phrasing 
the threat" - a way to generate a word-of-mouth terror buzz. 

In Guatemala, such a tactic started up at roughly the same time. There, a 
"white hand" was left on the body of a victim or the door of a potential one. 

Disappearances: Next up on the counterinsurgency curriculum was Central 
America, where, in the 1960s, US advisors helped put into place the 
infrastructure needed not just to murder but "disappear" large numbers of 
civilians. In the wake of the Cuban Revolution, Washington had set out to 
"professionalize" Latin America's security agencies - much in the way the Bush 
administration now works to "modernize" the intelligence systems of its allies 
in the president's "war on terror". 

Then, as now, the goal was to turn lethargic, untrained intelligence units of 
limited range into an international network capable of gathering, analyzing, 
sharing and acting on information in a quick and efficient manner. American 
advisors helped coordinate the work of the competing branches of a country's 
security forces, urging military men and police officers to overcome 
differences and cooperate. Washington supplied phones, teletype machines, 
radios, cars, guns, ammunition, surveillance equipment, explosives, cattle 
prods, cameras, typewriters, carbon paper and filing cabinets, while 
instructing its apprentices in the latest riot control, record keeping, 
surveillance and mass-arrest techniques. 

In neither El Salvador, nor Guatemala was there even a whiff of serious rural 
insurrection when the Green Berets, the CIA and the US Agency for International 
Development began organizing the first security units that would metastasize 
into a dense, Central American-wide network of death-squad paramilitaries. 

Once created, death squads operated under their own colorful names - an Eye for 
an Eye, the Secret Anticommunist Army, the White Hand - yet were essentially 
appendages of the very intelligence systems that Washington either helped 
create or fortified. As in Vietnam, care was taken to make sure that 
paramilitaries appeared to be unaffiliated with regular forces. To allow for a 
plausible degree of deniability, the "elimination of the [enemy] agents must be 
achieved quickly and decisively" - instructs a classic 1964 textbook 
Counter-Insurgency Warfare - "by an organization that must in no way be 
confused with the counterinsurgent personnel working to win the support of the 
population." But in Central America, by the end of the 1960s, the bodies were 
piling so high that even State Department embassy officials, often kept out of 
the loop on what their counterparts in the CIA and the Pentagon were up to, had 
to admit to the obvious links between US-backed intelligence services and the 
death squads. 

Washington, of course, publicly denied its support for paramilitarism, but the 
practice of political disappearances took a great leap forward in Guatemala in 
1966 with the birth of a death squad created, and directly supervised, by US 
security advisors. Throughout the first two months of 1966, a combined 
black-ops unit made up of police and military officers working under the name 
"Operation Clean-Up" - a term US counterinsurgents would recycle elsewhere in 
Latin America - carried out a number of extrajudicial executions. 

Between March 3 and 5 of that year, the unit netted its largest catch. More 
than 30 Leftists were captured, interrogated, tortured, and executed. Their 
bodies were then placed in sacks and dropped into the Pacific Ocean from 
US-supplied helicopters. Despite pleas from Guatemala's archbishop and more 
than 500 petitions of habeas corpus filed by relatives, the Guatemalan 
government and the American Embassy remained silent on the fate of the 
executed. 

Over the next two and a half decades, US-funded and trained Central American 
security forces would disappear tens of thousands of citizens and execute 
hundreds of thousands more. When supporters of the "war on terror" advocated 
the exercise of the "Salvador Option", it was this slaughter they were talking 
about. 

Following US-backed coups in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina, death 
squads not only became institutionalized in South America, they became 
transnational. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, the CIA supported Operation 
Condor - an intelligence consortium established by Chilean dictator General 
Augusto Pinochet that synchronized the activities of many of the continent's 
security agencies and orchestrated an international campaign of terror and 
murder. 

According to Washington's ambassador to Paraguay, the heads of these agencies 
kept "in touch with one another through a US communications installation in the 
Panama Canal Zone which covers all of Latin America". This allowed them to 
"co-ordinate intelligence information among the southern cone countries". Just 
this month, Pinochet's security chief, General Manuel Contreras, who is serving 
a 240-year prison term in Chile for a wide-range of human rights violations, 
gave a TV interview in which he confirmed that the CIA's then-deputy director, 
General Vernon Walters (who served under director George H W Bush), was fully 
informed of the "international activities" of Condor. 

Torture: Torture is the animating spirit of this triad, the unholiest of this 
unholy trinity. In Chile, Pinochet's henchmen killed or disappeared thousands - 
but they tortured tens of thousands. In Uruguay and Brazil, the state only 
disappeared a few hundred, but fear of torture and rape became a way of life, 
particularly for the politically engaged. Torture, even more than the 
disappearances, was meant not so much to get one person to talk as to get 
everybody else to shut up. 

At this point, Washington can no longer deny that its agents in Latin America 
facilitated, condoned and practiced torture. Defectors from death squads have 
described the instruction given by their US tutors, and survivors have 
testified to the presence of Americans in their torture sessions. One Pentagon 
"torture manual" distributed in at least five Latin American countries 
described at length "coercive" procedures designed to "destroy [the] capacity 
to resist". 

As Naomi Klein and Alfred McCoy have documented in their recent books, these 
field manuals were compiled using information gathered from CIA-commissioned 
mind control and electric-shock experiments conducted in the 1950s. Just as the 
"torture memos" of today's war on terror parse the difference between "pain" 
and "severe pain," "psychological harm" and "lasting psychological harm", these 
manuals went to great lengths to regulate the application of suffering. "The 
threat to inflict pain can trigger fears more damaging than the immediate 
sensation of pain," one handbook read. 

"Before all else, you must be efficient," said US police advisor Dan Mitrione, 
assassinated by Uruguay's revolutionary Tupamaros in 1970 for training security 
forces in the finer points of torture. "You must cause only the damage that is 
strictly necessary, not a bit more." Mitrione taught by demonstration, 
reportedly torturing to death a number of homeless people kidnapped off the 
streets of Montevideo. "We must control our tempers in any case," he said. "You 
have to act with the efficiency and cleanliness of a surgeon and with the 
perfection of an artist." 

Florencio Caballero, having escaped from Honduras's notorious Battalion 316 
into exile in Canada in 1986, testified that US instructors urged him to 
inflict psychological, not "physical", pain "to study the fears and weakness of 
a prisoner". Force the victim to "stand up", the Americans taught Caballero, 
"don't let him sleep, keep him naked and in isolation, put rats and cockroaches 
in his cell, give him bad food, serve him dead animals, throw cold water on 
him, change the temperature." Sound familiar? 

Yet, as Abu Ghraib demonstrated so clearly and the destroyed CIA interrogation 
videos would undoubtedly have made no less clear, maintaining a distinction 
between psychological and physical torture is not always possible. As one 
manual conceded, if a suspect does not respond, then the threat of direct pain 
"must be carried out". One of Caballero's victims, Ines Murillo, testified that 
her captors, including at least one CIA agent - his involvement was confirmed 
in Senate testimony by the CIA's deputy director - hung her from the ceiling 
naked, forced her to eat dead birds and rats raw, made her stand for hours 
without sleep and without being allowed to urinate, poured freezing water over 
her at regular intervals for extended periods, beat her bloody and applied 
electric shocks to her body, including her genitals. 

Anything goes 
Murillo was definitely a member of Greene's torturable class. Yet Greene was 
writing in a more genteel time, when to torture the wrong person would be, as 
he put it, as cheeky as a "chauffeur" sleeping with a "peeress". Today, when it 
comes to torture, anything goes. 

Ideologues in the war on terror, like Berkeley law professor John Yoo, have 
worked mightily to narrow the definition of what torture is, thereby expanding 
possibilities for its application. They have worked no less hard to increase 
the number of people throughout the world who could be subjected to torture - 
by defining anyone they cared to choose as a stateless "enemy combatant", and 
therefore not protected by national and international laws banning cruel and 
inhumane treatment. Even former US attorney general John Ashcroft has declared 
himself potentially torturable, telling a University of Colorado audience in 
late November that he would be willing to submit to waterboarding "if it were 
necessary". 

Things are so freewheeling that Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz - who, at 
his perch at Harvard would undoubtedly be outraged if he were to be tortured - 
thinks that the practice needs to be regulated, as if it were a routine medical 
act. He has suggested empowering judges to issue "warrants" that would allow 
interrogators to insert "sterile needles" underneath finger nails to "to cause 
excruciating pain without endangering life". 

Pinochet, who didn't shy away from justifying his actions in the name of 
Western Civilization, would never have dreamed of defending torture as brazenly 
as has Dick Cheney, backed up by legal theorists like Yoo. At the same time, 
revisionist historians, like Max Boot, and pundits, like the Atlantic Monthly's 
Robert Kaplan, rewrite history, claiming that operations like the Phoenix 
Program in Vietnam or the death squads in El Salvador were effective, morally 
acceptable tactics and should be emulated in fighting today's "war on terror". 

But this kind of promiscuity has its risks. In Latin America, the word 
"disappeared" came to denote not just victimization but moral repudiation, as 
the mothers and children of the disappeared led a continental movement to 
restore the rule of law. They provide hope that one day the world-wide network 
of repression assembled by the Bush administration will be as discredited as 
Operation Condor is today in Latin America. As Greene wrote half a century ago, 
on the eve of the fall of another famous torturer, Cuba's Fulgencio Batista, 
"it is a real danger for everyone when what is shocking changes". 

Greg Grandin is the author of a number of books, most recently Empire's 
Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New 
Imperialism. He teaches history at NYU. 

(Copyright 2007 Greg Grandin.) 

(Used by permission Tomdispatch) 

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