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Jan 6, 2009 21:38 | Updated Jan 7, 2009 19:49
Analysis: It's all in how you want to define 'victory'
By YOSSI ALPHER
Israel's war with Gaza-based Hamas is a faithful expression of its broader
dilemma with militant Islam. That dilemma is being played out against the
backdrop of Israel's complex relations with a troubled Arab world.
Smoke rises from buildings on the outskirts of Gaza City, Tuesday.
Photo: AP
As with Hizbullah in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, Israel is now fighting a
non-state actor, backed by Iran and operating out of a sovereign no-man's land
or "black hole" from which Israel had previously withdrawn unilaterally.
Both the 2005 Gaza withdrawal and the current fighting reflect Israel's
military problem: none of the classic strategies for dealing with a military
enemy seem to work. Occupation, removal of occupation, deterrence, tit-for-tat
punishment, economic blockade-all have failed.
The enemy welcomes extreme hardship and loss of life ("martyrdom") and
seemingly would welcome reoccupation. Anything that highlights Gazans' human
suffering sells well in the Arab world and among human rights activists in the
West. Any opportunity to wage a war of attrition against Israelis - soldiers
and civilians, there is no difference in militant Islamist eyes - drives home
the militant Islamist message that the Zionist enterprise is doomed.
The leadership in Israel's Sunni Arab state neighbors is torn among its
sympathy for the plight of Palestinians, its anger with the militant Islamists,
its fear of Iran and its concern lest the Arab masses support Hamas, Hizbullah
and Iran.
The regime in Egypt, in particular, is being targeted by Iran because it
(correctly) blames Hamas for this conflict and because of its silent complicity
with Israel in keeping the Rafah crossing closed.
Silent, because the entire Arab state system, which to its credit has agreed to
normalize relations with Israel once peace is achieved, appears to be too weak
to take serious action against the Islamist threat.
The ghoulish nature of the militant Islamist campaign was perhaps best
illustrated a few days ago when a suicide bomber in Iraq targeted an
anti-Israel protest there.
The non-Islamist psyche is hard put to grasp what is going on. That's why
Israel's official war aim of punishing Hamas in order "to bring about an
improved and more stable security situation for residents of southern Israel
over the long term" is probably based on faulty logic.
Hamas might accept these terms under duress, but not sincerely or for any
length of time.
Hence, however successful from Israel's standpoint the current ground offensive
is in Gaza, in its search for longer-lasting remedies Israel is once again, as
in 2006, reaching out to the international community. It wants to see some sort
of international force deployed as part of a solution to keep Hamas from
rearming.
Hizbullah's reluctance thus far to join the fray and open up a second Islamist
front against Israel by firing rockets over the heads of UNIFIL, offers silent
testimony to the efficacy of the arrangements instituted in southern Lebanon
through UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
But Hizbullah's silence also apparently reflects its aspiration not to spoil
its chances of becoming the dominant political power in Lebanon in next May's
elections. Herein lies a warning for Israel and its neighbors, including the
Fatah leadership in the West Bank.
Hizbullah parlayed its survival in the 2006 war into a political victory in
Lebanon, assisted by Qatari mediation (and bribes).
One political solution to the current Gaza conflict offered by Egypt, Qatar and
Fatah is renewal of Hamas-PLO unity talks.
If Hamas, riding on a wave of Palestinian and broader Arab sympathy, agrees to
return to such talks, it is important both for Israel and the moderate Arab
leadership that it not be allowed to exploit them to ride to power in the West
Bank as well.
Few Israelis and Arabs hold out the hope that Operation Cast Lead will actually
lead to the elimination of Hamas, whose true leadership is in Damascus and
whose Palestinian supporters easily number in the hundreds of thousands.
If Hamas' Gaza-based leadership and armed cadres can be significantly weakened
and a blow struck against one of Iran's two Mediterranean bases, this operation
will have to be considered a moderate success but not a decisive victory.
The writer is coeditor of the bitterlemons.org family of Internet publications.
He is former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv
University. bitterlemons.org
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