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After Baitullah Dawn Editorial Sunday, 09 Aug, 2009 | 07:27 AM PST | What next for the Waziristan agencies and the lethal cocktail of militant groups that have taken refuge there now that Baitullah Mehsud is dead? Mehsud was larger than life and his death is a milestone in Pakistan's fight against militancy, but the ground zero of militancy will not stop being a threat simply because of his elimination. Already, successors are being talked about for Mehsud's group, while other powerful warlords like Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Siraj Haqqani in North Waziristan Agency have the capability to launch a violent new phase of militancy. Clearly, there is a need to press ahead with military operations to degrade the militant networks in the Waziristan agencies. However, it is equally clear that the military option alone will not yield a solution to the Waziristan conundrum. Unlike Swat, Fata is home to warrior tribes, tribes that react very badly to outside 'interference'. And, also unlike Swat, the militants cannot simply be pushed out nor are they easily separable from the local population. So, in the scenario where the state cannot afford to 'occupy' the Waziristan agencies with troops and 'impose' its writ there, long-term peace can only be achieved by keeping the door to talks with the local tribes open. The problem with peace deals struck with militant groups thus far has not been that they have been attempted at all, but the circumstances in which they have been attempted. Invariably, the state has done so from a position of weakness and ceded too much and got too little in return. The deals have been struck largely in the hope that in return for leaving the militants alone, they will leave Pakistan and its people alone. But, knowing the ideology of many of the militants involved in such deals, there was always a slim possibility of that occurring. Instead, what the country's leadership needs to do is find people among the tribes that it can do business with and offer them a set of incentives to reject militancy. It helps that after a series of military operations, the state's stick is now apparent and known to be lethal. And with the aid of drones, the capacity to strike at the heart of militant networks from afar is also now evident. From this position of strength, the state will not win over the most incorrigible of militants, but it may be able to win over reconcilable elements among the tribes. There should be no illusions that this will be an easy or short-term process, but it is time the country's leadership began working on a long-term solution.
