http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/openrussia/moldova-russian-peacekeepers-in-transnistria-and-the-need-for-reforms

Carrots and sticks in Moldova: Russian peacekeepers, big loans and the need for 
reforms 
Louis O'Neill, 7 - 10 - 2009 

The rhetoric of the new Moldovan government is not music to the Kremlin's ears. 
However the powers that be in Chishinau have no choice. Immediately after the 
present summit of the Community of Independent States, the government has to 
move ahead with the hard work of serious reform of the economy, judiciary, 
media and bureaucracy. 

Moldova hosts the Summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States this week 
and hopes to have a better turnout than President Medvedev did in July, at the 
annual "summit-at-the-races". Back then, only five CIS leaders made it to 
Moscow, but the Russian horse, Monomakh, did win the day.  Moldova will preside 
over an expansive multi-lateral agenda on social and economic anti-crisis 
measures, wrap up its CIS presidency and attempt to prepare a raft of joint CIS 
agreements for ratification by heads of government in November in Yalta.  

However, what's really on the new Moldovan leadership's mind, is a couple of 
vital bilateral issues with the Russian Federation.  The first is the 
continuing presence of Russian troops  ("peacekeepers" in an artificially 
maintained "conflict") and armaments (thousands of tons of Soviet-era ordnance 
and bullets at Colbasna that need guarding) in Transnistria, despite Moldova's 
constitutional neutrality and long-standing request for their withdrawal.  The 
second concerns trade with, and economic support from Russia, including the 
still-open question of a $500 million loan promised before the July 29 repeat 
Moldovan elections.  

Russian president Medvedev is expected to attend on the second day, October 9, 
and this will provide the first opportunity for contact between him and 
Moldova's new pro-European leadership. But in contrast to the positive 
pre-Summit sounds coming out of Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, 
both Russia and Moldova have already transmitted signals and laid down markers 
which make it unlikely that significant progress will be made regarding the 
troops and the loan. 

While Sergei Naryshkin, chief of the Russian president's apparatus, was in 
Chisinau recently to check on preparations for the Summit, acting Moldovan 
president Mihai Ghimpu, prime minister Vlad Filat and other members of the 
majority Alliance for European Integration (AEI) publicly insisted on a Russian 
withdrawal from Moldova.  This of course comes as no surprise, as it has been 
the consistent position of all Moldovan governments since the Transnistrian 
conflict.  

At the same time, however, the Moldovan leadership downplayed and downgraded 
the importance of its own reintegration efforts.  While organizing its new 
government, the AEI eliminated the Moldovan Ministry of Reintegration, which 
had garnered a good deal of institutional experience in dealing with the vexing 
questions that arise - or are provoked - on the left bank of the Nistru.  
Perhaps more significantly, an individual relatively inexperienced in 
separatist matters, albeit one of four new Deputy Prime Ministers, was put in 
charge of the reintegration effort, while the well-regarded (and non-political) 
former deputy minister of reintegration was overlooked.   

These changes quickly elicited a snide statement from Transnistria's "foreign 
ministry" that it really didn't much matter what the Moldovans did with their 
Ministry of Reintegration, because the breakaway region didn't - and wouldn't - 
interact with it anyway.  The unsurprising subtext here was that any change in 
the status quo was unlikely and that Moldova's internal political struggles 
will simply provide another convenient argument for Transnistria to avoid 
negotiations, regardless of the formal exhortations of the "3+2" - mediators 
Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE along with the EU and U.S. as observers + which met 
yesterday in Vienna. 

Eternal Transnistrian strongman Igor Smirnov was, as usual, more direct, 
declaring categorically just before the Summit that "Transnistria is ready to 
join the Russian Federation" and that the self-proclaimed republic has no 
intention of improving ties with Moldova. Smirnov added, that it would, of 
course, accept good neighborly relations, as between sovereign equals, 
following Moldova's overdue election of a president.  However he warned that 
political instability on the right bank could lead to "military provocations," 
the "danger" of which, naturally, justifies the on-going Russian military 
presence. 

No change in peace-keeping operation 

Nor was there any pre-Summit good news on the long-standing effort to transform 
the Russian "peacekeeping" operation into a more transparent - and finite - 
civilian observer mission.  Here, the new Moldovan leadership cannot help but 
trip over former President Vladimir Voronin's efforts to secure pre-election 
Russian support for his Communist Party.  On March 18, just days before the 
first Moldovan election, Voronin signed a joint "1+2" declaration with Russian 
president Medvedev and Smirnov in Moscow.  In the future, this document will 
remain one of the many contradictory and chaotic "ratified agreements" that are 
trotted out as needed to stymie progress or avoid negotiations.  

In it, Voronin agreed that the current Russian-dominated peacekeeping operation 
in Transnistria could not be transformed (let alone withdrawn) until a final 
settlement of the conflict is reached.  Voronin's deal served to formalize what 
was indeed the long-standing state of affairs on the ground.  Certainly, 
without Russian consent, there is no way to withdraw or transform the 
peacekeepers, but until March 18 Moldova's policy had been to continue 
advocating for a re-formatting and de-escalation before settlement and to 
resist recognising an obvious, but imposed, condition.  

Chisinau and the EU 

Acting president Mihai Ghimpu was in Brussels on October 6 and 7 in an attempt, 
among other things, to move EU officials away from the now-official "1+2" 
formula - this is a losing battle.  The European Union has never had any 
appetite whatsoever for peacekeeping transformation before settlement and is 
surely not going to expend any political capital with Moscow over this issue 
now.  OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut wisely pointed out 
during his own visit to Bucharest on October 6 that "we have to accept the 
reality [that] we need the support of all involved parties in order to make 
this suggestion [peacekeeping transformation] effective." 

Another sign that the Kremlin is not expecting any uncontrolled activities or 
sudden troubles on the left bank, was the decision last month to replace the 
commander of Russian forces in Transnistria, retiring Major General Boris 
Sergeyev, with a non-flag officer.  Colonel Vyacheslav Sitchikhin was sworn in 
as commander of the 1,500 Russian troops on September 11, marking the first 
time that a non-general officer has commanded the 14th Army or its successor 
force.  While there may be all kinds of unrelated internal reasons for this 
move, it does suggest that there is an expectation of low-simmering "controlled 
instability," rather than reconciliation and  withdrawal, or more serious 
trouble. 

China becomes a new player on the Moldovan stage 

Finally, there is a new player in the military mix in Moldova, a highly 
circumspect one, who is likely to be taking a long-term view of its 
involvement.  Following its intention to lend the Moldovans $1 billion on 
favorable terms, the Chinese government has also made a move to enhance its 
military cooperation with Chisinau.  As Moldovan Chief of the General Staff Ion 
Coropcean met with Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie in Beijing late last 
month, the Chinese declared their willingness to "step up military ties with 
the National Army of Moldova."  Shortly thereafter the Chinese and Moldovan 
Defense Ministries signed an agreement under which China will provide a 
500-thousand euro grant to the Moldovan military, for items yet to be 
determined.  While only a fairly small proportion of Moldova's military budget, 
this appears to be the most substantial aid that China has provided to the 
Moldovan military since the Sino-Moldovan agreement on military cooperation was 
signed in 2002.  Nonetheless, although the Chinese abhor separatism, it is 
likely that  in this case they are more concerned with looking after their own 
investments and bustling in a multi-polar world than rocking the boat on 
Transnistria, at least for now. 

The return of the International Monetary Fund   

Meanwhile, the new leadership in Moldova is discovering (and possibly 
exaggerating for its own political purposes) just what an economic mess the 
previous government left behind.  If the upcoming vote in parliament for 
president fails and new elections are called, there will be plenty of finger 
pointing.  In a time of sharply declining remittances and economic contraction, 
the AEI urgently needs to find the resources to ensure that salaries and 
pensions are paid on time and basic services are not interrupted this winter.  

After a thrashing from former President Voronin, the International Monetary 
Fund is back in Moldova, and the EU and U.S. are also stepping up support in 
both the short- and long-term.  The Russian position is complex.  On the one 
hand, Moscow promised the Moldovans half a billion dollars on good terms before 
the elections, and reiterated the offer afterwards, albeit with less 
enthusiasm.  On the other hand, the Kremlin has announced this week that it 
will not give Belarus the remaining $500 million tranche of its $2 billion loan 
and that it will not be lending Ukraine any of the $5 billion that Kiev 
requested.  Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin referred these countries instead to 
the European Economic Community's (EvrAzEs) emergency fund, which Moscow leads, 
and the IMF, in which Moscow looks to increase its influence.  Many analysts 
believe that the decisions on Belarus and Ukraine were more political than 
economic, given that Moscow subsequently promised Serbia a $1 billion loan to 
cover its budget deficit and spur infrastructure improvements and proposed new 
credits for Bulgaria. 

Change what you can, not what you wish you could 

Moscow knows that the new Moldovan government, by making nice with the IMF and 
other western donors, has more latitude in obtaining emergency financial 
support.  Precisely for this reason, the Russians have taken an interest in 
working more closely with the IMF to provide input on an economic package for 
Moldova.  This allows them to kill two birds with one stone - playing a larger 
role in the IMF commensurate with their enhanced economic status and having a 
say on the conditions under which Moldova will receive credits.  If, moreover, 
the new government's western-leaning actions become too unruly for Moscow, it 
still retains strong levers over the Moldovan economy in the form of potential 
phyto-sanitary limitations on wine and agricultural imports to Russia.  These 
were only eased in Moldova's favor towards the end of Voronin's term as 
president, and are easily switched on again. 

Moscow has declared that it wants to see stability and a permanent president in 
Moldova, and has probably already reached out to the expected candidate.  
Nonetheless, the orientation and rhetoric of the new Chisinau team is not music 
to the Kremlin's ears, and it has little reason to make the AEI's way forward 
any easier.  Given the unlikelihood of any progress on a Transnistrian 
settlement for the meanwhile and the fact that the promised half billion 
dollars, if it comes at all, will likely be subject to more stringent 
conditions, the Moldovans will have some hard decisions to make. They need to 
take stock of those matters over which they have some degree of control and not 
expect the geo-political chessboard to miraculously tilt in their favor. After 
the CIS Summit concludes and the leaders depart, their best bet is to finally 
move ahead with the hard work of serious reform of the economy, judiciary, 
media and bureaucracy that will make this small country more attractive to 
individuals living in Transnistria and to decision-makers sitting in Brussels. 

-------------- 

Louis O'Neill was OSCE Ambassador and Head of Mission to Moldova from 2006 to 
2008

Kirim email ke