http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/openrussia/moldova-russian-peacekeepers-in-transnistria-and-the-need-for-reforms
Carrots and sticks in Moldova: Russian peacekeepers, big loans and the need for
reforms
Louis O'Neill, 7 - 10 - 2009
The rhetoric of the new Moldovan government is not music to the Kremlin's ears.
However the powers that be in Chishinau have no choice. Immediately after the
present summit of the Community of Independent States, the government has to
move ahead with the hard work of serious reform of the economy, judiciary,
media and bureaucracy.
Moldova hosts the Summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States this week
and hopes to have a better turnout than President Medvedev did in July, at the
annual "summit-at-the-races". Back then, only five CIS leaders made it to
Moscow, but the Russian horse, Monomakh, did win the day. Moldova will preside
over an expansive multi-lateral agenda on social and economic anti-crisis
measures, wrap up its CIS presidency and attempt to prepare a raft of joint CIS
agreements for ratification by heads of government in November in Yalta.
However, what's really on the new Moldovan leadership's mind, is a couple of
vital bilateral issues with the Russian Federation. The first is the
continuing presence of Russian troops ("peacekeepers" in an artificially
maintained "conflict") and armaments (thousands of tons of Soviet-era ordnance
and bullets at Colbasna that need guarding) in Transnistria, despite Moldova's
constitutional neutrality and long-standing request for their withdrawal. The
second concerns trade with, and economic support from Russia, including the
still-open question of a $500 million loan promised before the July 29 repeat
Moldovan elections.
Russian president Medvedev is expected to attend on the second day, October 9,
and this will provide the first opportunity for contact between him and
Moldova's new pro-European leadership. But in contrast to the positive
pre-Summit sounds coming out of Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh,
both Russia and Moldova have already transmitted signals and laid down markers
which make it unlikely that significant progress will be made regarding the
troops and the loan.
While Sergei Naryshkin, chief of the Russian president's apparatus, was in
Chisinau recently to check on preparations for the Summit, acting Moldovan
president Mihai Ghimpu, prime minister Vlad Filat and other members of the
majority Alliance for European Integration (AEI) publicly insisted on a Russian
withdrawal from Moldova. This of course comes as no surprise, as it has been
the consistent position of all Moldovan governments since the Transnistrian
conflict.
At the same time, however, the Moldovan leadership downplayed and downgraded
the importance of its own reintegration efforts. While organizing its new
government, the AEI eliminated the Moldovan Ministry of Reintegration, which
had garnered a good deal of institutional experience in dealing with the vexing
questions that arise - or are provoked - on the left bank of the Nistru.
Perhaps more significantly, an individual relatively inexperienced in
separatist matters, albeit one of four new Deputy Prime Ministers, was put in
charge of the reintegration effort, while the well-regarded (and non-political)
former deputy minister of reintegration was overlooked.
These changes quickly elicited a snide statement from Transnistria's "foreign
ministry" that it really didn't much matter what the Moldovans did with their
Ministry of Reintegration, because the breakaway region didn't - and wouldn't -
interact with it anyway. The unsurprising subtext here was that any change in
the status quo was unlikely and that Moldova's internal political struggles
will simply provide another convenient argument for Transnistria to avoid
negotiations, regardless of the formal exhortations of the "3+2" - mediators
Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE along with the EU and U.S. as observers + which met
yesterday in Vienna.
Eternal Transnistrian strongman Igor Smirnov was, as usual, more direct,
declaring categorically just before the Summit that "Transnistria is ready to
join the Russian Federation" and that the self-proclaimed republic has no
intention of improving ties with Moldova. Smirnov added, that it would, of
course, accept good neighborly relations, as between sovereign equals,
following Moldova's overdue election of a president. However he warned that
political instability on the right bank could lead to "military provocations,"
the "danger" of which, naturally, justifies the on-going Russian military
presence.
No change in peace-keeping operation
Nor was there any pre-Summit good news on the long-standing effort to transform
the Russian "peacekeeping" operation into a more transparent - and finite -
civilian observer mission. Here, the new Moldovan leadership cannot help but
trip over former President Vladimir Voronin's efforts to secure pre-election
Russian support for his Communist Party. On March 18, just days before the
first Moldovan election, Voronin signed a joint "1+2" declaration with Russian
president Medvedev and Smirnov in Moscow. In the future, this document will
remain one of the many contradictory and chaotic "ratified agreements" that are
trotted out as needed to stymie progress or avoid negotiations.
In it, Voronin agreed that the current Russian-dominated peacekeeping operation
in Transnistria could not be transformed (let alone withdrawn) until a final
settlement of the conflict is reached. Voronin's deal served to formalize what
was indeed the long-standing state of affairs on the ground. Certainly,
without Russian consent, there is no way to withdraw or transform the
peacekeepers, but until March 18 Moldova's policy had been to continue
advocating for a re-formatting and de-escalation before settlement and to
resist recognising an obvious, but imposed, condition.
Chisinau and the EU
Acting president Mihai Ghimpu was in Brussels on October 6 and 7 in an attempt,
among other things, to move EU officials away from the now-official "1+2"
formula - this is a losing battle. The European Union has never had any
appetite whatsoever for peacekeeping transformation before settlement and is
surely not going to expend any political capital with Moscow over this issue
now. OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut wisely pointed out
during his own visit to Bucharest on October 6 that "we have to accept the
reality [that] we need the support of all involved parties in order to make
this suggestion [peacekeeping transformation] effective."
Another sign that the Kremlin is not expecting any uncontrolled activities or
sudden troubles on the left bank, was the decision last month to replace the
commander of Russian forces in Transnistria, retiring Major General Boris
Sergeyev, with a non-flag officer. Colonel Vyacheslav Sitchikhin was sworn in
as commander of the 1,500 Russian troops on September 11, marking the first
time that a non-general officer has commanded the 14th Army or its successor
force. While there may be all kinds of unrelated internal reasons for this
move, it does suggest that there is an expectation of low-simmering "controlled
instability," rather than reconciliation and withdrawal, or more serious
trouble.
China becomes a new player on the Moldovan stage
Finally, there is a new player in the military mix in Moldova, a highly
circumspect one, who is likely to be taking a long-term view of its
involvement. Following its intention to lend the Moldovans $1 billion on
favorable terms, the Chinese government has also made a move to enhance its
military cooperation with Chisinau. As Moldovan Chief of the General Staff Ion
Coropcean met with Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie in Beijing late last
month, the Chinese declared their willingness to "step up military ties with
the National Army of Moldova." Shortly thereafter the Chinese and Moldovan
Defense Ministries signed an agreement under which China will provide a
500-thousand euro grant to the Moldovan military, for items yet to be
determined. While only a fairly small proportion of Moldova's military budget,
this appears to be the most substantial aid that China has provided to the
Moldovan military since the Sino-Moldovan agreement on military cooperation was
signed in 2002. Nonetheless, although the Chinese abhor separatism, it is
likely that in this case they are more concerned with looking after their own
investments and bustling in a multi-polar world than rocking the boat on
Transnistria, at least for now.
The return of the International Monetary Fund
Meanwhile, the new leadership in Moldova is discovering (and possibly
exaggerating for its own political purposes) just what an economic mess the
previous government left behind. If the upcoming vote in parliament for
president fails and new elections are called, there will be plenty of finger
pointing. In a time of sharply declining remittances and economic contraction,
the AEI urgently needs to find the resources to ensure that salaries and
pensions are paid on time and basic services are not interrupted this winter.
After a thrashing from former President Voronin, the International Monetary
Fund is back in Moldova, and the EU and U.S. are also stepping up support in
both the short- and long-term. The Russian position is complex. On the one
hand, Moscow promised the Moldovans half a billion dollars on good terms before
the elections, and reiterated the offer afterwards, albeit with less
enthusiasm. On the other hand, the Kremlin has announced this week that it
will not give Belarus the remaining $500 million tranche of its $2 billion loan
and that it will not be lending Ukraine any of the $5 billion that Kiev
requested. Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin referred these countries instead to
the European Economic Community's (EvrAzEs) emergency fund, which Moscow leads,
and the IMF, in which Moscow looks to increase its influence. Many analysts
believe that the decisions on Belarus and Ukraine were more political than
economic, given that Moscow subsequently promised Serbia a $1 billion loan to
cover its budget deficit and spur infrastructure improvements and proposed new
credits for Bulgaria.
Change what you can, not what you wish you could
Moscow knows that the new Moldovan government, by making nice with the IMF and
other western donors, has more latitude in obtaining emergency financial
support. Precisely for this reason, the Russians have taken an interest in
working more closely with the IMF to provide input on an economic package for
Moldova. This allows them to kill two birds with one stone - playing a larger
role in the IMF commensurate with their enhanced economic status and having a
say on the conditions under which Moldova will receive credits. If, moreover,
the new government's western-leaning actions become too unruly for Moscow, it
still retains strong levers over the Moldovan economy in the form of potential
phyto-sanitary limitations on wine and agricultural imports to Russia. These
were only eased in Moldova's favor towards the end of Voronin's term as
president, and are easily switched on again.
Moscow has declared that it wants to see stability and a permanent president in
Moldova, and has probably already reached out to the expected candidate.
Nonetheless, the orientation and rhetoric of the new Chisinau team is not music
to the Kremlin's ears, and it has little reason to make the AEI's way forward
any easier. Given the unlikelihood of any progress on a Transnistrian
settlement for the meanwhile and the fact that the promised half billion
dollars, if it comes at all, will likely be subject to more stringent
conditions, the Moldovans will have some hard decisions to make. They need to
take stock of those matters over which they have some degree of control and not
expect the geo-political chessboard to miraculously tilt in their favor. After
the CIS Summit concludes and the leaders depart, their best bet is to finally
move ahead with the hard work of serious reform of the economy, judiciary,
media and bureaucracy that will make this small country more attractive to
individuals living in Transnistria and to decision-makers sitting in Brussels.
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Louis O'Neill was OSCE Ambassador and Head of Mission to Moldova from 2006 to
2008