http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/988/op15.htm
4 - 10 March 2010 Issue No. 988 Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 Islam and the civic state The true kernel of Islamic government is not rule by experts, but self-rule by conscience. Hence the people should be primary source of authority, writes Salah Salem* -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Every religion has its own genius for finding a universal meaning or value that serves to carve its niche in history. This genius might be inspired by the challenges it faces, by the aims it aspires to, or by the historical role it seeks to play. Islam appeared in a tribal and pagan environment, one characterised by the lack of a dominant religion and by the absence of an overarching political society -- an early Arabian without tribal protection had little chance of survival. Islam thus encountered a three-fold challenge: a crisis in creed in the face of prevailing paganism; a social crisis fed by prevailing tribalism; and a civilisational crisis in light of the backwardness of life in the Arabian Peninsula in comparison to the overwhelming superiority of neighbouring civilisations. Islam is a universalist religion with a project for redeeming history from the inevitable dissolution and chaos that prevailed in the absence of the laws of justice and equality. As such, politics was of principal importance and political authority, as a mechanism for organising and administering society, was a crucial component of political life. However, the central scriptures of Islam (the Quran) contain no clear designation of how authority/the state should be formed or function and there was no consensus on the matter in the formative era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. As a result, the question of innovation and change in the political domain has remained the most problematic area in Islam. To Muslim fundamentalists, early Islamic heritage reveals the contours of a theocratic state that can and should be revived in application of the tenet of the dominion of the Lord, as opposed to "unlawful" dominion of man as embodied in the modern civic state. The claim begs two reservations. First, the question of the state or the "Great Imamate" is remote from the context of creed, in which dispute is governed by the standards of "faith" versus "heresy", and closer to the framework of applied ethics in which disputes are governed by the standards of "right" versus "wrong". All Islamic theological schools agree on this, apart from the Shia who subscribe to the notion of a divine Imamate endowed with the qualities of perfection and infallibility. Second, man's dominion on earth derives from a mandate conferred upon man in his capacity as the second party to a divine covenant in which God is the first. This mandate entitles human beings to establish their temporal authority over human society, which is the realm of their tangible activity and conscious presence in history. Man's dominion on earth is not sinful as long as it abides by the Laws of God in the universe. Accordingly, we can hold that the universality of Islam implies the authority of a divine value system governing the whole of our human existence, but not the imposition of a particular form of political authority. Perhaps this is precisely the initial point of divergence between critical schools that place the state in the realm of the profane and fundamentalist trends that place it in the realm of the divine. While the former camp acknowledges the evolutionary force of human societies, which have developed different forms of government from the moment they transcended the primitive clan, the latter insists that a Muslim society must have a distinct form of political authority with a set of sacred characteristics that are impervious to historical forces. I take exception to this outlook on two grounds. The first is theoretical. Given a religion that requires no priesthood to intercede with the divine and granting that faith is an individual belief, a pious person could live in seclusion and survive without political authority. Indeed, in Islam such a life would be regarded as virtuous. Now, let us imagine a utopian society in which people are governed solely by their consciences. Such a society would not require a ruling authority. The purpose of a ruling authority is to regulate society and to enforce the law in order to prevent chaos, not to monitor the conscience of the faithful or to impose a faith on disbelievers. In fact, many religious minorities have remained true to their faiths while under the rule of authorities of different creeds. Moreover, people tend to become even more zealous in their faith when subject to persecution. The Muslims themselves in the Meccan phase, before the establishment of the Medina state and society, are no exception to this rule. My second objection rests on historical ground and has to do with the many embodiments of the concept of the "state" in the early Islamic experience, none of which can be singled out as the correct one that makes the others wrong. The Medina state epitomised a historical context in which prophesy combined with rule. It was headed by a prophet who was divinely guided and to whom the faithful owed obedience. Naturally, such a government was unique and unrepeatable; it ended with the death of Mohamed who was not so much a ruler as he was a prophet and judge. In the subsequent era, there were no religiously codified rules for choosing a successor or fixed traditions for the handover of power. Each of the next four "Rightly Guided" caliphs assumed power under different political circumstances and in different ways. History relates how Omar pledged his allegiance to Abu Bakr, the first to succeed Mohamed, in Al-Saqifa, and subsequently how Abu Bakr nominated Omar who was then confirmed as the second caliph by a consensus in the Muslim community. These two caliphs came to form the conception of the ideal ruler in Islam. It incorporated numerous principles and virtues, foremost among which are shura (taking counsel), abstemiousness and justice. Deterioration of the ideal began with the third caliph, Othman Ibn Affan, who was elected by a council of electors but who was eventually killed by some who were disaffected by his "kingly" ways. The succession of Ali Ibn Abi Taleb, who was not universally accepted as caliph, sparked a period of rebellion spearheaded by the governor of Syria, Muawiya Bin Abi Safyan. This period culminated with the death of Ali and the victory of Muawiya who transformed the caliphate into a kingship that, in turn, degenerated into a hereditary monarchy with the succession of Muawiya's son, Yazid. Clearly the fundamentalist apologists have confused what they regard as the loss of the "Islamic state" with the loss of the Islamic ideal of rule. The historical record since the early positive and effective "rightly-guided" experiences of government does not reflect a decline in the Islamic political ideal but rather a deterioration in the ability of successive rulers to embody that ideal, which nevertheless remains eternal and waiting for the persons and political institutions capable of attaining it. What is important in Islam is not the shape of the state, for that is a question of the historical environment, but the Islamic ideal that transcends history and is forever capable of inspiring it. Perhaps the most crucial bone of contention between the advocates of government as a product of social evolution and the fundamentalist template of an Islamic state is what constitutes the source of authority. Should it be the people/nation as a community of mature human beings capable of determining their own fate or should it be Sharia (Islamic law)? If we regard the people as the source of legislation in an Islamic society, as in any other human society, and Sharia as the moral frame of reference that breathes its Islamic essence, then this should resolve the dilemma. Then Muslims can establish the form of government that best suits the circumstances of a particular time in history on the condition that that government, regardless of its form and composition, preserves the higher purposes of Sharia. Islam would thus attain its comprehensive presence in the sacred and the profane without a theocratic state. Conversely, the notion that Sharia must be the source of legislation paves the way after a step or two to a theocratic state. After all, Sharia is inevitably interpreted and exercised by human beings and, in the course of their various exegeses and pronunciations, these soon coalesce into political priesthoods as they scramble to answer such questions as, "Who is most qualified to extract the essence of Sharia from Islamic scriptures?" If the answer to this is the conventional, "Those in power," one can only come up with the rejoinder, "Who chooses those in power, and are the choosers and the ways they choose supposed to remain the same regardless of the day and age?" Furthermore, how are the powerful supposed to reach an agreement, supposing they are even so inclined? If discord could escalate into fierce internecine strife as early as the age of the "rightly-guided" Caliphs, what are we to expect in this excessively egotistic age? So in the not unlikely event of a dispute, who is to arbitrate? Are those in power capable of selecting the one among them who has the solidest theological grounding? On what criteria would they base their judgement and would they then agree to defer to his superior authority? Now, let's take the argument forward in time. Supposing "those in power" agreed on an interpretation of a certain scriptural text, is their interpretation binding on future generations regardless of changing times and circumstances? What are later generations to do when faced with a conflict between the handed-down judgement and present-day needs and demands? Should they defer to contemporary specialists or should they sacrifice their interests for the sake of Sharia as interpreted by the ancients? Surely if they sacrificed their interests they would be sacrificing Islam, which ultimately consists of the Muslim people themselves. Conversely, if contemporary specialists are to be consulted on everyday matters that fall outside the realm of Sharia, what differentiates them from civic authorities chosen or dismissed by the people through their established methods at their time in history, as long as these authorities are committed to protect the higher aims of Sharia? Clearly the people/nation has three advantages over "those in power" as the source of authority. First, the power to choose implies the right to reward a chosen authority for virtue and excellence or to punish him for negligence and harm. It is therefore an affirmation of the freedom of human will. Second, it opens the possibility of change without courting the spectre of "sin" and, hence, it inspires dynamism and the desire to influence the course of history. Third, it would cause no offence to Sharia if the people chose poorly. Islam is innocent of human folly and the will of God towers above our corruption, so the eternally sacred should not become a cover for human error in history. * The writer is a political analyst.
