http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=20593


A New Slogan.Want to Try It?


16/04/2010
By Mshari Al-Zaydi


A news item, published in this paper, stated that the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt is considering changing its famous slogan 'Islam is the solution' as a 
precaution against obstacles that it might face from the government, especially 
as articles within the constitution emphasise the danger of practicing politics 
based on religion. The news item adds that the Muslim Brotherhood is currently 
looking into the idea of adopting other slogans instead of or as well as 'Islam 
is the solution.' According to the news item, the Muslim Brotherhood said that 
"this slogan caused there to be many legal and political reservations." Muslim 
Brotherhood students at Egyptian universities had anticipated the MB's official 
idea or to be more specific, the MB's new position by using an alternative 
slogan, 'we hope for the best for Egypt' during the university student 
elections. They argued, as the news item indicates, that they coined that new 
slogan to alleviate security pressures.


What was the position of the reformist figure in the Brotherhood leadership 
hierarchy, Essam al Eryan, towards this new youthful slogan? Al Eryan "decreed" 
that the new student slogan does not contradict the most cherished and sacred 
slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood, 'Islam is the solution.' He believes that the 
new slogan is part of a larger and more comprehensive slogan, namely, 'Islam is 
the solution.' It doesn't stop there. The Brotherhood mediator amazed us even 
further by stating that "every stage requires a different slogan." Al Eryan 
maintained that the slogan 'Islam is the solution' represents the identity of 
the Muslim Brotherhood.


Of course the Muslim Brotherhood has its own way of interpreting this flagrant 
religious slogan and normalizing it within the civil state and I am talking 
about the constitution here not the regime because the MB is feeling this 
constitutional dilemma that lies at the core of these slogans and it came up 
with the following solution or ploy: whoever says that the 'Islam is the 
solution' slogan contradicts the constitution of the Egyptian state is wrong. 
These are the words of former Muslim Brotherhood Deputy Chairman Mohammed 
Habib. He believes that rejecting this slogan means rejecting the Egyptian 
constitution, the second article of which states that Islam is the official 
state religion. Habib says that those who oppose the slogan 'Islam is the 
solution' are actually "opposing and protesting the public order of the state." 
But, Mohammed Hassan Shaban, the journalist who wrote this news item, cleverly 
pointed out that Habib did not refer to the fifth clause of the constitution 
that he cited from that outlaws practicing politics based on religion. 


This controversy will never end; the theorists and politicians of the Muslim 
Brotherhood will always find a way out; they will always try verbal, emotional 
and constitutional tricks as well. This is not unusual with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other bodies. We all remember how the Supreme Council for 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq dropped the word 'revolution' and opted for the 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. The then party leader Abdul Aziz al Hakim 
defended that change after securing enough votes for his party in the Iraqi 
parliament. 


We also recall how the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, after the war of 
liberation in 1991, called itself the Islamic Constitutional Movement in order 
to ride the wave of increasing Kuwaiti patriotism and demanding a return to the 
constitution and parliamentary life in Kuwait after the invasion. Also in Iraq 
today, the State of Law Coalition headed by Nouri al Maliki is nothing but a 
façade for the fundamentalist Dawaa Party. 


Let us return to Egypt; perhaps all this can be understood in light of the 
vehemence of political rivalry for power and rule in Egypt, especially as 
parliamentary elections are drawing closer.


The war of words intensifies and arguments are being debated by rivals in a 
climate of electoral and political conflict.

My goal is not to recommend one Arab political party over another in Egypt or 
elsewhere as that is another topic altogether. Rather, the aim here is to 
reflect specifically on this clear "flexibility" in changing and altering 
slogans that are meant to be sacred and irrevocable, as their guardians have 
always claimed.


What the Muslim Brotherhood is doing in Egypt and elsewhere is political 
manoeuvring and the person carrying out these manoeuvres is open to change and 
transformation. Even Essam al Eryan, in the middle of defending the Muslim 
Brotherhood's slogan change and its durability, acknowledged that there was 
flexibility and willingness towards change if the position of its rival, i.e. 
the Egyptian authorities, forces them to adopt that approach. If the 
authorities show tolerance, the Muslim Brotherhood would introduce their sacred 
slogan unabashed. But if the authorities show vigilance and strictness then the 
MB would search for another slogan that is suitable to that stage and its 
requirements, and does not negate the basis of the main slogan.


What does that mean? It means that the slogan is not the goal here but rather 
what the slogan leads to, in other words, power and rule by exploiting public 
sentiment and riding the wave of religion. It is true that the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt has always been clever at switching positions quickly. It 
forged an alliance with the liberal Wafd party of Egypt at a certain period 
because it was working secretly. However, a few years ago, it allied with the 
rest of the leftists and the Nasserist party under the banner of Kefaya, the 
Egyptian Movement for Change. Kefaya originally emerged in 2004 with the goal 
of fighting inheritance of power. It then developed its demands and its 
discourse towards revolutionary political discourse, both internally and 
externally, and aims to cancel the peace treaties with Israel and revolutionize 
the Egyptian political orientation so as to turn the Egyptian regime into a 
radical, revolutionary regime.


It is true that the two Muslim Brotherhood figures Essam al Eryan and Abdul 
Monim Abu al Futuh were among the signatories of Kefaya's manifesto but that 
was not enough to reassure Nasserist and Leftist patriarchs of the Muslim 
Brotherhood's renunciation of political ambitions to assume power. This 
prompted Abdul Halim Qandil, a Kefaya hawk, at some point and on several 
occasions, to express scepticism regarding the intentions of the Muslim 
Brotherhood towards the issue of inheritance of power and communication with 
Israel if the MB were ever rise to power. Qandil cited Essam al Eryan who said 
in an article published in October 2007 that "If the MB reached power it would 
recognize the state of Israel and honour the treaties signed by Egypt." To tell 
the truth, we cannot confirm what Qandil attributed to al Eryan. It is not 
important whether it is true or not. What really matters here is how a 
Nasserist figure from Kefaya now views the position of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Sometimes it is far more important to know how others view you rather than 
focusing on how you view yourself. 


These pragmatic margins, with which the Muslim Brotherhood, unlike Kefaya, has 
distinguished itself, can be explained as follows:


Firstly, the fundamentals and the cultural and ideological foundations upon 
which the MB is based, particularly with respect to the issue of inheritance of 
power, is not far removed from the political Sunni notion, consistent with the 
theories of al Mawardi and others. The Muslim Brotherhood position on the issue 
of inheritance of power is equally open to rejection or acceptance. Serving its 
immediate interests is what determines its official position. If the MB 
declares a rejection then that would please the Kefaya movement and the 
international democratic culture just as much as it would vex the supporters of 
this. If they declare an acceptance, that might be the trump card the Muslim 
Brotherhood will play to win its future position, considering that the issue of 
inheritance of power is well established in the political juristic heritage.


Secondly, the Muslim Brotherhood has a lot to win or lose in the political 
arena. Unlike the intellectuals of Kefaya who are backed by some figures in the 
press and other mediums, the Muslim Brotherhood has considerable weight on the 
ground and in parliament. I have previously analyzed the relationship between 
Kefaya and the Muslim Brotherhood in an article published on August 5, 2008 and 
I believe this analysis is still useful in interpreting the conduct of the 
Egyptian and non-Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood towards the contradiction between 
requirements of politics on the one hand and the obligations of the central 
doctrine on the other.


The problem with the Muslim Brotherhood, and all Islamist political movements, 
is that they are two-faced entities that speak two languages. If they are 
politically embarrassed or are asked to make certain concessions, they seek 
refuge in the immunity of religion and start to remind others of how dangerous 
it is to abandon the constants of religion. On the other hand, if someone 
attacks them from the angle of religion and asks them how they could forgo 
Jihad and fighting for the sake of God (just like Jihadist movements are doing 
to Hamas now) or how they could fall back with respect to the issues of women, 
entertainment and arts etc they worm their way out of it by using the excuse of 
political necessity and legitimate interests. The Muslim Brotherhood would then 
win over the religious camp and the political camp and enjoy heaven on earth 
and paradise in the afterlife. 


What caused all this chaos? I think the Arab political life and its predominant 
culture are the main reasons that such movements flourish as they develop amid 
an environment of frustration, cultural illiteracy and lack of criticism. If 
there had been actual development and progress in science and criticism and if 
there had been an economic foundation and a solid and just judicial system, we 
wouldn't be experiencing a period of stagnation and psychological frustration. 
It is the perfect environment for the growth of movements that promote hope in 
the afterlife and salvation. A saviour would then emerge and eliminate all 
sorts of injustice. This is what the Muslim Brotherhood slogan 'Islam is the 
solution' implies.


The slogan is reminiscent of the one adopted by the Abbasids to overpower the 
Ummayads: 'Pledge allegiance to Imam Reda from the family of the Prophet 
(PBUH), who will fill the world with equality and justice.' Such slogans aim to 
sell promises that are never fulfilled just until the makers of such promises 
rise to power.


I wish the Muslim Brotherhood would come up with another slogan that might 
serve them well in other circumstances such as 'Muslims are the solution,' as 
human beings are the centre and target of any activity on this planet.I think!

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