http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/analysis-pr-success-of-gaza-flotilla-could-be-a-trap-for-hamas-1.298493
Published 01:50 27.06.10
Latest update 01:50 27.06.10
ANALYSIS / PR success of Gaza flotilla could be a trap for Hamas
The success of the "freedom flotilla" has created a few ripples. Many more
goods will be entering Gaza, coriander and pasta will cease to be symbolic and
even cement and iron will reach building sites waiting for years for a fresh
start. Hamas has achieved a new international status, and the Palestinian
Authority has had to praise the flotilla and demand the full cessation of the
blockade. Turkey has revealed itself to be the Palestinians' new friend and
Israel has found itself pushed into a corner.
It isn't the idea of armed resistance, the muqwama, the Qassam rockets or the
terror attacks that brought Hamas these achievements, but the marketing of the
humanitarian crisis. From now on every rocket launched from Gaza into Israel
will only erode this success. Like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas is aware of the
trap. Unless there is a political achievement to be used as leverage for
influence and control, the success becomes temporary and ultimately forgotten.
After it was announced the blockade would be eased, Hamas stated: "We think
these steps to lift the siege on land are merely throwing sand in the eyes of
the world."
Hamas is demanding the full lifting of the blockade and especially the opening
of the Rafah crossing point between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Egypt is in no
hurry.
"Opening the Rafah crossing point in full will be done only after the
occupation of the Gaza Strip has ended," declared Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed
Nazif.
Opening Rafah to all goods and people would be chalked up as another Hamas
achievement, one Egypt is not prepared to grant - not until Hamas and Fatah
sign the Egyptian reconciliation document.
Signature needed
Hamas has been dragging its feet for more than half a year since Egypt handed
it the comprehensive document, which, inter alia, includes arrangements for
holding elections; the expansion of the Palestine Liberation Organization so
Hamas will have significant standing; the building of joint military bodies;
and a system of compensation for everyone who was harmed in the Hamas takeover
of Gaza in 2007.
The most difficult provision for Hamas to digest is the necessity of adopting
agreements the PLO signed and agreements it reached both with Israel and in the
context of the Arab initiative. Agreeing to this means recognition of Israel,
even if that's not stated explicitly.
This is the dilemma Hamas faces. Without signing the agreement it will continue
to control Gaza the way it has for the past three years - with no orderly
budget, with no recognition and, above all, without a chance of trying to
expand its influence and control to the West Bank.
Thus, from a situation in which it won a sweeping victory in the 2006
elections, which could have enabled it to control both parts of Palestine, it
has had to make do with managing the crisis in Gaza. Without a return to the
important political race in the West Bank, it can claim only a humanitarian
success, but not a political or diplomatic achievement.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is intimately acquainted with the trap
Hamas is in and therefore he, too, is in no hurry. Last month he decided to
hold elections for the Palestinian parliament on July 17 - and then announced
their postponement to an unknown date. Was this a decision or a
"recommendation" from Israel and the United States? Both countries worry they
could again face a government in which Hamas is an important, if not dominant,
element.
We will know the truth only when Abbas or his successors publish the 70-volume
chronicles of his term in office in which he daily notes the details of his
conversations and musings. Abbas, in an interview to the Palestinian newspaper
Al-Ayyam, said he has "reached the age at which he can no longer continue to
serve in his position" and "very much misses quality time with his family and
especially with his grandchildren,." He is not eager to end his tenure, but
wants to avoid a war of succession, which is liable to crush Fatah and paint
Hamas as the only orderly alternative.
Won't mention Fayyad
When asked who his successor will be, he refrains from even mentioning the name
of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. Abbas has said: "He is doing excellent work."
Abbas admits he is not watching the World Cup matches, he prefers religious
television and he reads religious philosophy. But, at 75, he's very good at arm
wrestling. While he continues to pay $13 million a month for the power station
in Gaza, he is planning projects worth $400,000 million to rehabilitate the
Gaza Strip and through the good offices of Salam Fayyad, he is running the
boycott of Israeli goods, which he believes is likely to double Palestinian
production in the local market and create some 100,00 jobs for Palestinians.
Together with the Egyptians, he is maintaining the freeze on the market in
Gaza.
Last week Arab League Secretary General Amr Mussa visited Gaza and heard
suggestions from Hamas as to how to continue the reconciliation process. The
disagreement between the sides depends on a seemingly procedural issue: Will
Hamas' reservations concerning the Egyptian document be included in the
reconciliation document, as it is demanding, or will they be dealt with after
the document is signed, as Abbas and the Egyptians are demanding? The
compromise apparently emerging is that an additional agreement between Hamas
and Fatah will be formulated in which its reservations will be listed, and that
agreement together with the Egyptian document will be the source of authority
for implementing the reconciliation. Despite the tough rhetoric between the
sides this compromise could lead to a breakthrough.
If achieving Palestinian reconciliation is a challenge, its implementation will
present an especially explosive challenge for Israel and the United States, as
well as for the PLO and the PA. Israel will have to decide whether it will
repeat the mistake it made in 2006 and boycott the Palestinian unity government
or adopt the American policy, which does not spurn dialogue with Lebanon even
though Hezbollah is a senior partner in the government.
