As usual, don’t put too much weight into the bite-size digests from the press, 
especially the Register, which has a track record of sensationalism. 
Unfortunately the actual truth is fairly bad. I recommend reading the paper:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxxXk1d3yyuZOFlsdkNMSGswSGs/view 
<https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxxXk1d3yyuZOFlsdkNMSGswSGs/view>

Haven’t gotten all the way through it, but the security problems in the OS seem 
to be not about the fundamentals — the integrity of sandboxes and the Keychain 
are OK — but some slipshod security at the API level and in the ways these 
components get used. The two OS X attacks I’ve read about are:

1. Keychain ACLs control which apps are allowed to read which Keychain secrets. 
But it’s possible for a malicious app to create a blank Keychain password item 
for a secret it knows some other app will store there (like a login password), 
and give both itself and the real app access. Then the true app will store the 
secret in the existing Keychain item, which is readable by the malware so it 
can get the password from it.

2. Sandboxed apps are given private directories named after their bundle IDs. 
The Mac App Store submission process verifies that an app’s bundle ID is a 
valid one that’s registered to the developer … but it doesn’t verify the bundle 
IDs of embedded executables like plugins, which get their own sandboxes. So a 
malicious app can include a plugin with the bundle ID registered to a real app, 
and its plugin will be able to share the sandbox with the real app and 
read/write its data.

(I may have gotten details wrong. Don’t quote me on this, read the paper 
yourself.)

Both of these are pretty bad. I’m very disappointed that Apple didn’t address 
these during the six months’ advance notice that the security researchers gave 
before they went public.

—Jens
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