On Security of Power System State Estimation KEC 1003 Monday, May 4, 2015 - 4:00pm to 4:50pm
Jinsub Kim Assistant Professor School of EECS Oregon State University Abstract: A defining feature of a smart grid is its ability to incorporate advanced data analytics for real time monitoring and control. However, heavy reliance on networking for data collection inevitably exposes a grid to threats of cyber attacks. In this talk, we consider data falsification attacks on power system state estimation, where an attacker alters certain sensor data to mislead the control center with an incorrect state estimate. We first present a necessary and sufficient condition under which an undetectable attack exists. We present a data-driven undetectable attack that does not require any system parameter information; by exploiting subspace estimation technique, we show that partial sensor observations can provide sufficient information for designing undetectable attacks. Then, in order to protect a grid from potential attacks, we develop countermeasures based on sensor data authentication. It is shown that if data from a set of sensors satisfying certain graph-covering property are protected, any attack can be detected. Speaker Biography: Jinsub Kim has been an assistant professor of the School of EECS at Oregon State University since 2014. He received his Ph.D. in Electrical and Computer Engineering from Cornell University in 2014. His research interest spans statistical signal processing, optimization, power systems, and security. In particular, he is currently working on developing robust state estimator for power system and potential mechanism of dynamic data falsification attack. _______________________________________________ Colloquium mailing list [email protected] https://secure.engr.oregonstate.edu/mailman/listinfo/colloquium
