Script 'mail_helper' called by obssrc
Hello community,
here is the log from the commit of package openssl_tpm2_engine for
openSUSE:Factory checked in at 2022-02-19 00:07:22
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/openssl_tpm2_engine (Old)
and /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.openssl_tpm2_engine.new.1958 (New)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Package is "openssl_tpm2_engine"
Sat Feb 19 00:07:22 2022 rev:6 rq: version:3.1.0
Changes:
--------
--- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/openssl_tpm2_engine/openssl_tpm2_engine.changes
2022-02-18 22:54:35.385455729 +0100
+++
/work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.openssl_tpm2_engine.new.1958/openssl_tpm2_engine.changes
2022-02-19 00:07:29.181017502 +0100
@@ -1,0 +2,8 @@
+Thu Feb 17 14:09:11 UTC 2022 - [email protected]
+
+- Update to version 3.1.0
+ * Bandaid openssl-3 support
+ * direct pcr policy creation options
+ * TPM key RFC
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
Old:
----
openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1.tar.gz
New:
----
openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0.tar.gz
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Other differences:
------------------
++++++ openssl_tpm2_engine.spec ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.lGBlID/_old 2022-02-19 00:07:29.789017427 +0100
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.lGBlID/_new 2022-02-19 00:07:29.793017427 +0100
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#
# spec file for package openssl_tpm2_engine
#
-# Copyright (c) 2021 SUSE LLC
+# Copyright (c) 2022 SUSE LLC
# Copyright (c) 2017 [email protected]
#
# All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
Name: openssl_tpm2_engine
-Version: 3.0.1
+Version: 3.1.0
Release: 0
Summary: OpenSSL TPM 2.0 interface engine plugin
License: LGPL-2.1-only
++++++ openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1.tar.gz -> openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0.tar.gz
++++++
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/Makefile.am
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/Makefile.am
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/Makefile.am 2021-04-04 22:47:14.000000000
+0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/Makefile.am 2022-02-17 00:15:34.000000000
+0100
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
CLEANFILES = $(man1_MANS)
endif
+if HAVE_OPENSSL3
+CFLAGS+= -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L
+endif
+
openssl_engine_LTLIBRARIES=libtpm2.la
bin_PROGRAMS=create_tpm2_key load_tpm2_key seal_tpm2_data unseal_tpm2_data
openssl_enginedir=@enginesdir@
@@ -41,4 +45,4 @@
install-data-hook:
cd $(DESTDIR)$(openssl_enginedir) && $(LN_S) -f libtpm2@SHREXT@
tpm2@SHREXT@
-SUBDIRS = tests
+SUBDIRS = tests doc
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/configure.ac
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/configure.ac
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/configure.ac 2021-04-04 22:47:14.000000000
+0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/configure.ac 2022-02-17 00:15:34.000000000
+0100
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# configure.in for the OpenSSL TPM engine project
#
-AC_INIT(openssl-tpm2-engine, 3.0.1, <[email protected]>)
+AC_INIT(openssl-tpm2-engine, 3.1.0, <[email protected]>)
AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([foreign 1.6.3])
AC_CANONICAL_HOST
AM_CONDITIONAL(NATIVE_BUILD, test "x$cross_compiling" = "xno")
@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@
AC_SUBST(OPENSSL_INCLUDE_DIR)])
AC_LANG(C)
+
+PKG_CHECK_MODULES([DEPS], [libcrypto >= 3.0.0],
+ [ac_have_openssl3=1],
+ [PKG_CHECK_MODULES([DEPS], [libcrypto])])
+
AC_ARG_WITH(
[enginesdir],
[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-enginesdir], [OpenSSL engines directory])],
@@ -95,6 +100,8 @@
])
AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_IBM_TSS, test "$tsslibs" = "IBM")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_OPENSSL3, test "$ac_have_openssl3" = "1")
+
AC_DISABLE_STATIC
AC_PROG_CC_STDC
AM_PROG_CC_C_O
@@ -128,6 +135,8 @@
AC_PATH_PROG(TPMSERVER,
tpm_server,,/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/lib/ibmtss:/usr/libexec/ibmtss)
AC_PATH_PROG(SWTPM, swtpm,,/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/lib/ibmtss:/usr/libexec/ibmtss)
AC_PATH_PROG(SWTPM_IOCTL,
swtpm_ioctl,,/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/lib/ibmtss:/usr/libexec/ibmtss)
+AC_CHECK_PROG(XML2RFC, xml2rfc, xml2rfc)
+AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_XML2RFC, test -n "${XML2RFC}")
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wall"
SHREXT=$shrext_cmds
AC_SUBST(CFLAGS)
@@ -147,7 +156,7 @@
AC_SUBST(testtpm)
-AC_OUTPUT([Makefile tests/Makefile])
+AC_OUTPUT([Makefile tests/Makefile doc/Makefile])
cat <<EOF
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/create_tpm2_key.1.in
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/create_tpm2_key.1.in
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/create_tpm2_key.1.in 2021-04-04
22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/create_tpm2_key.1.in 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -31,6 +31,20 @@
$ echo 0000016b >> policy.txt
+[PCR Values]
+
+The PCR values are specified as
+
+ <bank>:<list>
+
+Where <bank> is any supported PCR hash bank and list specifies the
+PCRs to lock the key to as both comma separated individual values as
+well as comma separated ranges. So
+
+ sha256:1,3 means PCRs 1 and 3 in the sha256 bank
+
+ sha512:1,3-5 means PCRs 1,3,4 and 5 in the sha512 bank
+
[examples]
Create a self-signed cert using the TPM engine:
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/create_tpm2_key.c
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/create_tpm2_key.c
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/create_tpm2_key.c 2021-04-04
22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/create_tpm2_key.c 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
{"key-size", 1, 0, 's'},
{"name-scheme", 1, 0, 'n'},
{"parent-handle", 1, 0, 'p'},
+ {"pcr-lock", 1, 0, 'x'},
{"wrap", 1, 0, 'w'},
{"version", 0, 0, 'v'},
{"password", 1, 0, 'k'},
@@ -94,6 +95,9 @@
" may not be used for general
signing or\n"
" decryption but may be the
parent of other\n"
" keys (i.e. it is a storage
key)\n"
+ "\t-x, --pcr-lock <pcrs> Lock the created key to the
specified PCRs\n"
+ " By current value. See PCR
VALUES for\n"
+ " details about formatting\n"
"\n"
"Report bugs to " PACKAGE_BUGREPORT "\n",
argv0);
@@ -817,6 +821,10 @@
ENCRYPTED_SECRET_2B secret, *enc_secret = NULL;
int restricted = 0;
char *parent_str = NULL;
+ TPML_PCR_SELECTION pcr_lock;
+ int has_policy = 0;
+
+ pcr_lock.count = 0;
OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
/* may be needed to decrypt the key */
@@ -824,7 +832,7 @@
while (1) {
option_index = 0;
- c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "n:s:ab:p:hw:vk:re:ldc:i:",
+ c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "n:s:ab:p:hw:vk:re:ldc:i:x:",
long_options, &option_index);
if (c == -1)
break;
@@ -899,6 +907,9 @@
case 'i':
import = optarg;
break;
+ case 'x':
+ tpm2_get_pcr_lock(&pcr_lock, optarg);
+ break;
case OPT_DEPRECATED:
version = 0;
break;
@@ -944,11 +955,24 @@
exit(1);
}
+ if (pcr_lock.count !=0 && policyFilename) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "cannot specify both policy file and pcr
lock\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (pcr_lock.count != 0 && import) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "cannot specify pcr lock and import because
pcrs may not be correct\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (pcr_lock.count != 0 || policyFilename)
+ has_policy = 1;
+
digest.hashAlg = name_alg;
sizeInBytes = TSS_GetDigestSize(digest.hashAlg);
memset((uint8_t *)&digest.digest, 0, sizeInBytes);
- if (policyFilename) {
+ if (has_policy) {
sk = sk_TSSOPTPOLICY_new_null();
if (!sk) {
rc = NOT_TPM_ERROR;
@@ -956,10 +980,11 @@
goto out_err;
}
- rc = tpm2_parse_policy_file(policyFilename, sk, auth, &digest);
- if (rc) {
+ if (policyFilename) {
+ rc = tpm2_parse_policy_file(policyFilename, sk, auth,
&digest);
reason = "parse_policy_file";
- goto out_free_policy;
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free_policy;
}
}
@@ -975,6 +1000,8 @@
goto out_free_auth;
}
}
+ if (has_policy && !policyFilename)
+ tpm2_add_auth_policy(sk, &digest);
}
if (import) {
@@ -982,6 +1009,8 @@
EVP_PKEY *pkey = openssl_read_key(wrap);
TPMT_SENSITIVE s;
+ rc = NOT_TPM_ERROR;
+
if (parent_str) {
parent = tpm2_get_parent_ext(parent_str);
if (parent == 0) {
@@ -996,8 +1025,6 @@
pub = &objectPublic;
priv = &outPrivate;
- rc = NOT_TPM_ERROR;
-
if (!p_pkey || !pkey) {
reason = "read openssl key";
goto out_err;
@@ -1014,7 +1041,7 @@
reason = "openssl_to_tpm_public";
goto out_err;
}
- if (policyFilename) {
+ if (has_policy) {
VAL(pub->publicArea.objectAttributes) &=
~TPMA_OBJECT_USERWITHAUTH;
rc = TSS_TPM2B_Create(
@@ -1059,6 +1086,15 @@
goto out_free_auth;
}
+ if (pcr_lock.count != 0) {
+ rc = tpm2_pcr_lock_policy(tssContext, &pcr_lock,
+ sk, &digest);
+ if (rc) {
+ reason = "create pcr policy";
+ goto out_free_auth;
+ }
+ }
+
if (parent_str) {
parent = tpm2_get_parent(tssContext, parent_str);
if (parent == 0) {
@@ -1111,7 +1147,7 @@
goto out_flush;
}
- if (policyFilename) {
+ if (has_policy) {
VAL(objectPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes) &=
~TPMA_OBJECT_USERWITHAUTH;
rc = TSS_TPM2B_Create(
@@ -1171,7 +1207,7 @@
tpm2_public_template_ecc(&objectPublic.publicArea, ecc);
}
- if (policyFilename) {
+ if (has_policy) {
VAL(objectPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes) &=
~TPMA_OBJECT_USERWITHAUTH;
rc = TSS_TPM2B_Create(
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/doc/Makefile.am
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/doc/Makefile.am
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/doc/Makefile.am 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/doc/Makefile.am 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+XML2RFC_TARGETS = draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.txt \
+ draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.html
+
+if HAVE_XML2RFC
+all: $(XML2RFC_TARGETS)
+
+clean-local:
+ rm -fr $(XML2RFC_TARGETS)
+endif
+
+$(builddir)/%.txt: $(srcdir)/%.xml
+ $(XML2RFC) --text -o $@ $<
+
+$(builddir)/%.html: $(srcdir)/%.xml
+ $(XML2RFC) --html -o $@ $<
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore'
old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/doc/draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.xml
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/doc/draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.xml
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/doc/draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.xml
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/doc/draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.xml
2022-02-17 00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,465 @@
+<?xml version="1.0"?>
+<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd" [
+<!-- One method to get references from the online citation libraries.
+There has to be one entity for each item to be referenced.
+An alternate method (rfc include) is described in the references.
+-->
+<!ENTITY RFC2119 SYSTEM
"http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml";>
+<!ENTITY RFC8017 SYSTEM
"http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8017.xml";>
+]>
+<?rfc toc="yes" ?>
+<rfc ipr="trust200902" category="info" docName="draft-bottomley-tpm-keys-00">
+ <front>
+ <title abbrev="TPM 2 Key Format">ASN.1 Specification for TPM 2.0 Key
Files</title>
+ <author initials="J." surname="Bottomley" fullname="James E.J. Bottomley">
+ <organization>Linux Kernel</organization>
+ <address>
+ <postal>
+ <street/>
+ <city/>
+ <region/>
+ <country>USA</country>
+ </postal>
+ <email>[email protected]</email>
+ </address>
+ </author>
+ <date month="May" year="2021"/>
+ <area>Security</area>
+ <keyword>I-D</keyword>
+ <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
+ <keyword>X.509</keyword>
+ <abstract>
+ <t>
+ This specification is designed to be an extension to the ASN.1
+ (defined in <xref target="X.680"/>) specification of PKCS #1
+ <xref target="RFC8017"/> to define the file format of private
+ keys that need to be loaded into a TPM 2 device to operate.
+ </t>
+ </abstract>
+ </front>
+ <middle>
+ <section anchor="intro" title="Introduction">
+ <t>
+ The Security of private keys has long been a concern and the
+ ability of ubiquitous devices like TPMs has made it useful to
+ use them for secure private key storage. With the advent of
+ TPM 2.0, private key storage inside the TPM (acting as a token
+ which could be referred to by PKCS #11) has been discouraged,
+ and instead key files which are loaded and evicted as
+ necessary is the encouraged format. This standard defines an
+ interoperable ASN.1 representation for such key files, so that
+ a key created by one tool should be loadable by a different
+ one.
+ </t>
+ </section>
+ <section anchor="terms" title="Terminology">
+ <t>
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
+ NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
+ "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
+ <xref target="RFC2119"/>.
+ </t>
+ <section title="Notation">
+ <dl>
+ <dt>ASN.1</dt>
+ <dd>Abstract Syntax Notation defined in
+ <xref target="X.680"/></dd>
+ <dt>DER</dt>
+ <dd>Distinguished Encoding Rules. Basically a defined binary
+ representation for ASN.1</dd>
+ <dt>MSO</dt>
+ <dd>Most Significant Octet (the highest order
+ byte of an integer)</dd>
+ <dt>PEM</dt>
+ <dd>Privacy enhanced Electronic Mail. An ASCII compatible
+ representation of DER</dd>
+ <dt>TCG</dt>
+ <dd>Trusted Computing Group</dd>
+ <dt>TPM</dt>
+ <dd>Trusted Platform Module</dd>
+ </dl>
+ </section>
+ </section>
+ <section anchor="keyrep" title="Key Representation">
+ <t>
+ All TPM 2.0 keys consist of two binary pieces, a public part,
+ which can be parsed according to the TPM specification for
+ TPM2B_PUBLIC <xref target="TPM2.0"/> and a private part, which
+ is cryptographically sealed in such a way as to be only
+ readable on the TPM that created it. The purpose of this
+ specification is to specify a format by which the public and
+ private pieces of a TPM key can be loaded.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ The design of the TPMkey ASN.1 format is that it should have a
+ distinguishing OID at the beginning so the DER form of the
+ key can be easily recognized. In PEM form, the key MUST have
+ "-----BEGIN TSS2 PRIVATE KEY-----" and "-----END TSS2 PRIVATE
+ KEY-----" as the PEM guards. All additional information that
+ may be needed to load the key is specified as optional
+ explicit elements, which can be extended by later
+ specifications, which is why the TPMkey is not versioned.
+ </t>
+ <section anchor="tpmkey" title="TPMkey Syntax">
+ <figure><artwork>
+ TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL
+ policy [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy OPTIONAL
+ secret [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
+ parent INTEGER
+ pubkey OCTET STRING
+ privkey OCTET STRING
+ }
+ </artwork></figure>
+ <t>
+ The fields of type TPMKey have the following meanings:
+ </t>
+ <section title="type">
+ <t>
+ A unique OID specifying the key type. This standard
+ currently defines three types of keys: a loadable key,
+ specified by id-loadablekey, (to be loaded with
+ TPM2_Load), an importable key, specified by
+ id-importablekey, (to be loaded with TPM2_Import) and a
+ sealed data key, specified by id-sealedkey, (to be
+ extracted with TPM2_Unseal). The TCG has reserved the
+ following OID prefix for this:
+ </t>
+ <figure><artwork>
+ id-tpmkey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ {joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) 133 10}
+ </artwork></figure>
+ <t>
+ And the three key types are:
+ </t>
+ <figure><artwork>
+ id-loadablekey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ {id-tpmkey 3}
+ </artwork></figure>
+ <figure><artwork>
+ id-importablekey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ {id-tpmkey 4}
+ </artwork></figure>
+ <figure><artwork>
+ id-sealedkey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ {id-tpmkey 5}
+ </artwork></figure>
+ </section>
+ <section title="emptyAuth">
+ <t>
+ An implementation needs to know as it formulates the
+ TPM2_Load/Import/Unseal command whether it must also send
+ down an authorization, so this parameter gives that
+ indication. emptyAuth MUST be true if authorization is
+ NOT required and MUST BE either false or absent if
+ authorization is required. Since this element has
+ three states (one representing true and two representing
+ false) it is RECOMMENDED that implementations emitting
+ TPMkey representations use absence of the tag to represent
+ false. However, implementations reading TPMKey MUST
+ be able to process all three possible states.
+ </t>
+ </section>
+ <section title="policy">
+ <t>
+ This MUST be present if the TPM key has a policy hash
+ because it describes to the implementation how to
+ construct the policy. The forms of the policy statement
+ are described in section <xref target="policy"/>.
+ </t>
+ </section>
+ <section title="secret">
+ <t>
+ This section describes the additional cryptographic
+ secret used to specify the outer wrapping of an
+ importable key. It MUST be present for key type
+ id-importablekey and MUST NOT be present for any other
+ key type.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ Importable keys (designed to be processed by TPM2_Import)
+ MUST have an unencrypted inner wrapper (symmetricAlg MUST
+ be TPM_ALG_NULL and encryptionKey MUST be empty) and an
+ outer wrapper encrypted to the parent key using
+ inSymSeed. The secret parameter is the fully marshalled
+ TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET form of inSymSeed.
+ </t>
+ </section>
+ <section title="parent">
+ <t>
+ This MUST be present for all keys and specifies the handle
+ of the parent key. The parent key SHOULD be either a
+ persistent handle (MSO 0x81) or a permanent handle (MSO
+ 0x40). Since volatile handle numbering can change
+ unexpectedly depending on key load order, the parent
+ SHOULD NOT be a volatile handle (MSO 0x80). The parent MUST
+ NOT have any other MSO.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ If a permanent handle (MSO 0x40) is specified then the
+ implementation MUST run TPM2_CreatePrimary on the handle
+ using the TCG specified Elliptic Curve template for the
+ NIST P-256 curve and use the primary key so generated as
+ the parent.
+ </t>
+ </section>
+ <section title="pubkey">
+ <t>
+ This MUST be present and MUST correspond to the fully
+ marshalled TPM2B_PUBLIC structure of the TPM Key.
+ </t>
+ </section>
+ <section title="privkey">
+ <t>
+ This MUST be present and MUST correspond to the fully
+ marshalled TPM2B_PRIVATE structure of the TPM Key. For
+ importable keys, this must be the duplicate parameter that
+ would be input to TPM2_Import.
+ </t>
+ </section>
+ </section>
+ </section>
+ <section anchor="policy" title="Key Policy Specification">
+ <t>
+ Policy is constructed on a TPM by executing a sequence of
+ policy statements. This specification currently only defines
+ a limited subset of the allowed policy statements. The policy
+ is specified by a hash, which the execution of the policy
+ statements must reach in order for the policy to be validated
+ (See <xref target="TPM2.0"/> Part 1 for a detailed description.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ The TPMPolicy ASN.1 MUST be a sequence of policy statements
+ which correspond exactly to TPM policy instructions in the
+ order they should be executed and additionally from which the
+ ultimate policy hash can be constructed.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ The current policy specification is strictly for AND based
+ policy only and may be extended at a later date with OR
+ policy. However, the ASN.1 for policy is formulated as CONS
+ elements, leaving the possibility of adding additional but
+ optional elements for policy statements which are not
+ supported by this standard (such as TPM2_PolicyAuthorize).
+ </t>
+ <section title="TPMPolicy Syntax">
+ <figure><artwork>
+ TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
+ CommandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER
+ CommandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
+ }
+ </artwork></figure>
+ <t>
+ The Fields of type TPMPolicy have the following meanings:
+ </t>
+ <section title="CommandCode">
+ <t>
+ This is the integer representation of the TPM command code
+ for the policy statement.
+ </t>
+ </section>
+ <section title="CommandPolicy">
+ <t>
+ This is a binary string representing a fully marshalled,
+ TPM ordered, command body for the TPM policy command.
+ Therefore to send the command, the implementation simply
+ marshalls the command code and appends this octet string
+ as the body.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ Commands which have no body, such as TPM2_AuthVal, MUST be
+ specified as a zero length OCTET STRING
+ </t>
+ </section>
+ </section>
+ <section title="Policy Implementation Considerations">
+ <t>
+ The policy hash for AND based policies is constructed by extension of
the prior policy hash
+ </t>
+ <figure><artwork>
+ newHash = HASH ( oldHash || policyHash )
+ </artwork></figure>
+ <t>
+ where policyHash is usually simply the hash of the fully
+ marshalled policy command (including the CommandCode).
+ However, this isn't true for TPM2_PolicyCounterTimer() so
+ always consult the <xref target="TPM2.0"/> specifications
+ for how to construct the policyHash.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ The implementation should fail fast for policy problems, so
+ if an individual policy command returns a failure (which
+ usually indicates a particular policy requirement cannot be
+ met), that failure should be reported in as much detail as
+ possible and processing of the key should fail at that
+ point.
+ </t>
+ <section title="Authorization Policy">
+ <t>
+ When Authorization (Passing in a password) is required,
+ the emptyAuth parameter MUST be absent or set to false
+ and additionally the TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue MUST be
+ specified as the command code for one entry in the
+ TPMPolicy sequence. However, the implementation MAY
+ choose to execute either TPM2_PolicyPassword for TPM_RS_PW
+ or TPM2_PolicyAuthValue for HMAC based authorization
+ depending on whether the command being authorized is using
+ sessions or not. If the policy does not require an
+ authorization then the emptyAuth parameter MUST be set to
+ true.
+ </t>
+ </section>
+ </section>
+ </section>
+ <section anchor="implementation" title="Implementation Considerations">
+ <t>
+ Implementations SHOULD support all TCG mandated algorithms,
+ but MAY omit those deemed insecure, such as the SHA1 hash.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ TPM2_Import transforms the privKey into a TPM2B_PRIVATE which
+ can then be used as a source to TPM2_Load, making the loading
+ of importable keys is necessarily a two stage process, which
+ can be time consuming on some TPMs. Since the TPM2B_PRIVATE
+ structure emitted by TPM2_Import is fully secure,
+ Implementations SHOULD minimize the number of TPM2_Import
+ operations by caching the emitted TPM2B_PRIVATE.
+ </t>
+ </section>
+ <section anchor="security" title="Security Considerations">
+ <t>
+ The TPM 2.0 supports a variety of algorithms, the most common
+ being SHA1 and SHA256 for hashing and RSA2048 and NIST P-256
+ for asymmetric keys. Implementors SHOULD NOT use deprecated
+ algorithms, such as SHA1, for any TPM operation. In
+ particular, the algorithm used for the policy hash SHOULD NOT
+ be SHA1 and this means that SHA1 SHOULD NOT be used as the
+ name algorithm hash for any TPM key.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ TPM 2.0 supports a session mode (TPM_RS_PW) where
+ authorizations are passed to the TPM in clear text over the
+ TPM connection. Implementations SHOULD consider the
+ possibility of snooping on the wire between the implementation
+ and the TPM, such as <xref target="TPM GENIE"/>, and SHOULD
+ use HMAC session authorizations as best practice for all TPM
+ keys.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ In addition to snooping authorizations, snooping may also
+ occur when key material is being exchanged between the TPM and
+ the implementation, such as wrapping of private keys and the
+ sealing and unsealing operations for sealed keys.
+ Implementations SHOULD always use HMAC sessions with
+ TPMA_SESSION_DECRYPT when sensitive information is passed in
+ to the TPM and HMAC sessions with TPMA_SESSION_ENCRYPT when
+ sensitive information is received from the TPM.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ The easiest way to get the TPM to wrap an external private key
+ is to use TPM2_Import. However, since TPMA_SESSION_DECRYPT
+ only protects the first parameter (which is encryptionKey),
+ the duplicate should use inner symmetric encryption with a
+ randomly generated ephemeral key, which is then presented to
+ the TPM via the protected encryptionKey parameter.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ The TPM has a mode where it can generate private key material
+ internally (using TPM2_Create) such that the private part of
+ the key can never leave the TPM. Implementations SHOULD
+ support this mode but should be aware that while keys created
+ like this may be more secure than wrapped keys, they can also
+ be used only while access to the TPM that created them is
+ available, so implementations SHOULD also support wrapping for
+ keys that are expected to outlive the TPM that's using them.
+ Clients can then develop best practices around TPM wrapped
+ identity keys, possibly with TPM created sub keys, which can
+ only be used on the device they were wrapped for.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ Since TPM keys can only be used by the specific TPM that
+ created them, which is usually embedded in a piece of
+ hardware, they are secure against exfiltration attacks.
+ However, consideration should be given to an attacker gaining
+ access to the system containing the TPM. TPM keys are most
+ secure when used as part of an operating system that has
+ guaranteed trust properties, such as secure and measured boot.
+ Implementations SHOULD assist users in constructing key
+ policies that ensure the key can be used only when the
+ operating system is within its trusted parameters to minimize
+ threats from co-located attackers.
+ </t>
+ </section>
+ <section anchor="IANA" title="IANA Considerations">
+ <t>
+ None.
+ </t>
+ </section>
+ <section anchor="comments" title="Comments on and Enhancements to this
Document">
+ <t>
+ Comments on this document should be addressed to the author
+ ([email protected]) but should also CC the
+ email lists of the two projects implementing this
+ specification:
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ The OpenSSL engine: [email protected]
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ The Linux Kernel: [email protected]
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ The OpenSSL TPM2 engine <xref target="OPENSSL TPM2 ENGINE"/>
+ is currently the only implementation of this full
+ specification, so enhancements should be proposed after
+ patches implementing the enhancement have been accepted by
+ openssl_tpm2_engine or another full specification
+ implementation.
+ </t>
+ </section>
+
+ </middle>
+ <back>
+ <references title="Normative References">
+ &RFC2119;
+ &RFC8017;
+ <reference anchor="TPM2.0"
target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-specification/";>
+ <front>
+ <title>TPM 2.0 Library Specification</title>
+ <author>
+ <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
+ </author>
+ <date year="2013" month="March" day="15"/>
+ </front>
+ </reference>
+ <reference anchor="X.680"
target="https://itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680-201508-I/en";>
+ <front>
+ <title>ITU-T Recommendation X.680,
+ Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One
+ (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation.</title>
+ <author><organization>International Telecommunication
Union</organization></author>
+ <date year="2015" month="August"/>
+ </front>
+ </reference>
+ </references>
+ <references title="Informative References">
+ <reference anchor="TPM GENIE"
target="https://www.nccgroup.com/globalassets/about-us/us/documents/tpm-genie.pdf";>
+ <front>
+ <title>TPM Genie: Interposer Attacks Against the Trusted
+ Platform Module Serial Bus</title>
+ <author initials="J." surname="Boone" fullname="J. Boone">
+ <organization>NCC Group</organization>
+ </author>
+ <date year="2018" month="March" day="9"/>
+ </front>
+ </reference>
+ <reference anchor="OPENSSL TPM2 ENGINE"
target="https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/openssl_tpm2_engine.git/";>
+ <front>
+ <title>OpenSSL TPM2 Engine</title>
+ <author><organization>Open Source Project</organization></author>
+ </front>
+ </reference>
+ </references>
+ </back>
+</rfc>
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/e_tpm2-ecc.c
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/e_tpm2-ecc.c
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/e_tpm2-ecc.c 2021-04-04 22:47:14.000000000
+0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/e_tpm2-ecc.c 2022-02-17 00:15:34.000000000
+0100
@@ -103,7 +103,11 @@
#endif
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, eck);
+#else
EC_KEY_free(eck);
+#endif
}
static void tpm2_ecc_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/e_tpm2-rsa.c
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/e_tpm2-rsa.c
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/e_tpm2-rsa.c 2021-04-04 22:47:14.000000000
+0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/e_tpm2-rsa.c 2022-02-17 00:15:34.000000000
+0100
@@ -130,8 +130,12 @@
RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, ex_app_data, data);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+#else
/* release the reference EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA obtained */
RSA_free(rsa);
+#endif
}
static void tpm2_rsa_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/ibm-tss.h
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/ibm-tss.h
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/ibm-tss.h 2021-04-04 22:47:14.000000000
+0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/ibm-tss.h 2022-02-17 00:15:34.000000000
+0100
@@ -487,6 +487,32 @@
return rc;
}
+static inline TPM_RC
+tpm2_PCR_Read(TSS_CONTEXT *tssContext, TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrSelectionIn,
+ TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrSelectionOut, TPML_DIGEST *pcrValues)
+{
+ PCR_Read_In in;
+ PCR_Read_Out out;
+ TPM_RC rc;
+
+ in.pcrSelectionIn = *pcrSelectionIn;
+
+ rc = TSS_Execute(tssContext,
+ (RESPONSE_PARAMETERS *)&out,
+ (COMMAND_PARAMETERS *)&in,
+ NULL,
+ TPM_CC_PCR_Read,
+ TPM_RH_NULL, NULL, 0);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ *pcrSelectionOut = out.pcrSelectionOut;
+ *pcrValues = out.pcrValues;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static inline TPM_HANDLE
tpm2_handle_int(TSS_CONTEXT *tssContext, TPM_HANDLE h)
{
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/intel-tss.h
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/intel-tss.h
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/intel-tss.h 2021-04-04 22:47:14.000000000
+0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/intel-tss.h 2022-02-17 00:15:34.000000000
+0100
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
\
*buffer += offset; \
*size -= offset; \
- *written = offset; \
+ *written += offset; \
\
return rc; \
}
@@ -179,6 +179,9 @@
TSS_CONVERT_MARSHAL(TPM2B_DIGEST, )
TSS_CONVERT_MARSHAL(TPM2B_PUBLIC, )
TSS_CONVERT_MARSHAL(TPM2B_PRIVATE, )
+TSS_CONVERT_MARSHAL(TPML_PCR_SELECTION, )
+TSS_CONVERT_MARSHAL(UINT32, *)
+#define TSS_TPM_CC_Marshal TSS_UINT32_Marshal
TSS_CONVERT_UNMARSHAL(TPML_PCR_SELECTION, )
TSS_CONVERT_UNMARSHAL(TPM2B_PRIVATE, )
@@ -935,6 +938,25 @@
operandB, offset, operation);
}
+static inline TPM_RC
+tpm2_PCR_Read(TSS_CONTEXT *tssContext, TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrSelectionIn,
+ TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrSelectionOut, TPML_DIGEST *pcrValues)
+{
+ TPML_PCR_SELECTION *out;
+ TPML_DIGEST *val;
+ TPM_RC rc;
+
+ rc = Esys_PCR_Read(tssContext, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE,
+ pcrSelectionIn, NULL, &out, &val);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ *pcrSelectionOut = *out;
+ *pcrValues = *val;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static inline TPM_HANDLE
tpm2_handle_ext(TSS_CONTEXT *tssContext, TPM_HANDLE esysh)
{
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/seal_tpm2_data.1.in
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/seal_tpm2_data.1.in
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/seal_tpm2_data.1.in 2021-04-04
22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/seal_tpm2_data.1.in 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -7,6 +7,20 @@
TPM. Possible uses for this blob of data include as a symmetric key,
which is the use in the linux kernel trusted key infrastructure.
+[PCR Values]
+
+The PCR values are specified as
+
+ <bank>:<list>
+
+Where <bank> is any supported PCR hash bank and list specifies the
+PCRs to lock the key to as both comma separated individual values as
+well as comma separated ranges. So
+
+ sha256:1,3 means PCRs 1 and 3 in the sha256 bank
+
+ sha512:1,3-5 means PCRs 1,3,4 and 5 in the sha512 bank
+
[examples]
Create a sealed data blob to the storage parent (owner hierarchy)
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/seal_tpm2_data.c
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/seal_tpm2_data.c
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/seal_tpm2_data.c 2021-04-04
22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/seal_tpm2_data.c 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
{"auth-parent", 1, 0, 'b'},
{"help", 0, 0, 'h'},
{"parent-handle", 1, 0, 'p'},
+ {"pcr-lock", 1, 0, 'x'},
{"version", 0, 0, 'v'},
{"password", 1, 0, 'k'},
{"da", 0, 0, 'd'},
@@ -71,6 +72,10 @@
"\t-m,--nomigrate Create a sealed data bundle
that can be\n"
" migrated to other systems.\n"
"\t-n, --name-scheme <scheme> name algorithm to use sha1
[sha256] sha384 sha512\n"
+ "\t-x, --pcr-lock <pcrs> Lock the created key to the
specified PCRs\n"
+ " By current value. See PCR
VALUES for\n"
+ " details about formatting\n"
+ "\n"
"\n"
"Report bugs to " PACKAGE_BUGREPORT "\n",
argv0);
@@ -106,6 +111,10 @@
int32_t size;
uint16_t pubkey_len, privkey_len;
char *parent_str = NULL;
+ TPML_PCR_SELECTION pcr_lock;
+ int has_policy = 0;
+
+ pcr_lock.count = 0;
while (1) {
option_index = 0;
@@ -165,6 +174,9 @@
case 'm':
nomigrate = 1;
break;
+ case 'x':
+ tpm2_get_pcr_lock(&pcr_lock, optarg);
+ break;
default:
printf("Unknown option '%c'\n", c);
usage(argv[0]);
@@ -183,22 +195,32 @@
usage(argv[0]);
}
+ if (pcr_lock.count !=0 && policyFilename) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "cannot specify both policy file and pcr
lock\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (pcr_lock.count != 0 || policyFilename)
+ has_policy = 1;
+
digest.hashAlg = name_alg;
sizeInBytes = TSS_GetDigestSize(digest.hashAlg);
memset((uint8_t *)&digest.digest, 0, sizeInBytes);
- if (policyFilename) {
+ if (has_policy) {
sk = sk_TSSOPTPOLICY_new_null();
if (!sk) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate policy stack\n");
exit(1);
}
- rc = tpm2_parse_policy_file(policyFilename, sk,
- data_auth, &digest);
- if (rc) {
- reason = "parse_policy_file";
- goto out_free_policy;
+ if (policyFilename) {
+ rc = tpm2_parse_policy_file(policyFilename, sk,
+ data_auth, &digest);
+ if (rc) {
+ reason = "parse_policy_file";
+ goto out_free_policy;
+ }
}
}
@@ -215,6 +237,8 @@
goto out_free_auth;
}
}
+ if (has_policy && !policyFilename)
+ tpm2_add_auth_policy(sk, &digest);
}
dir = tpm2_set_unique_tssdir();
@@ -224,6 +248,15 @@
goto out_rmdir;
}
+ if (pcr_lock.count != 0) {
+ rc = tpm2_pcr_lock_policy(tssContext, &pcr_lock,
+ sk, &digest);
+ if (rc) {
+ reason = "create pcr policy";
+ goto out_free_auth;
+ }
+ }
+
if (parent_str) {
parent = tpm2_get_parent(tssContext, parent_str);
if (parent == 0) {
@@ -245,7 +278,7 @@
tpm2_public_template_seal(p);
- if (policyFilename) {
+ if (has_policy) {
VAL(p->objectAttributes) &=
~TPMA_OBJECT_USERWITHAUTH;
rc = TSS_TPM2B_Create(
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore'
old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/check_counter_timer.sh
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/check_counter_timer.sh
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/check_counter_timer.sh 2021-04-04
22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/check_counter_timer.sh 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -27,10 +27,11 @@
# 3. encode a message using the TPM key
# 4. verify the message through the public key
##
+echo "policy counter timer" > plain.txt
${bindir}/create_tpm2_key key.tpm -a -k paSSW0RD -c policy.txt && \
openssl rsa -engine tpm2 -inform engine -pubin -in key.tpm -pubout -out
key.pub && \
-echo "policy counter timer" | openssl rsautl -sign -passin pass:paSSW0RD
-engine tpm2 -engine tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey key.tpm -out tmp.msg && \
-openssl rsautl -verify -in tmp.msg -inkey key.pub -pubin || exit 1
+openssl pkeyutl -sign -in plain.txt -passin pass:paSSW0RD -engine tpm2 -engine
tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey key.tpm -out tmp.msg && \
+openssl pkeyutl -verify -in plain.txt -sigfile tmp.msg -inkey key.pub -pubin
|| exit 1
##
# advance the TPM clock by ten minutes and a second which should make
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@
# now the signing operation should fail
##
echo "Check key failure due to counter timer policy"
-echo "policy fail counter timer" | openssl rsautl -sign -passin pass:paSSW0RD
-engine tpm2 -engine tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey key.tpm -out tmp.msg 2>
tmp.txt && exit 1
+openssl pkeyutl -sign -in plain.txt -passin pass:paSSW0RD -engine tpm2 -engine
tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey key.tpm -out tmp.msg 2> tmp.txt && exit 1
# check we got the right failure message
grep "Policy Failure: Counter Timer at offset 8 is not <=" tmp.txt
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore'
old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/check_enhanced_auth.sh
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/check_enhanced_auth.sh
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/check_enhanced_auth.sh 2021-04-04
22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/check_enhanced_auth.sh 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -19,7 +19,22 @@
${bindir}/create_tpm2_key key.tpm -c policies/policy_bogus.txt
a=0; while [ $a -lt 5 ]; do
a=$[$a+1]
- echo "This is a message" | openssl rsautl -sign -engine tpm2 -engine tpm2
-keyform engine -inkey key.tpm -out tmp.msg && exit 1
+ echo "This is a message" | openssl pkeyutl -sign -engine tpm2 -engine tpm2
-keyform engine -inkey key.tpm -out tmp.msg && exit 1
+done
+
+##
+# Randomize the PCR banks
+##
+for h in "sha1" "sha256" "sha384"; do
+ pcr=0;
+ while [ $pcr -lt 24 ]; do
+ tsspcrextend -ha $pcr -halg $h -ic $RANDOM
+ pcr=$[$pcr + 1]
+ done
+ ##
+ # reset PCR 16 for the fixed policy tests
+ ##
+ ${tss_pcrreset_cmd} -ha 16
done
for h in "sha1" "" "sha384"; do
@@ -35,10 +50,11 @@
# 2. get the corresponding public key from the engine
# 3. encode a message using the TPM key
# 4. verify the message through the public key
+ echo "This is a Message" > plain.txt
${bindir}/create_tpm2_key ${n} -a -k passw0rd key2.tpm -c
policies/policy_authvalue.txt && \
openssl rsa -engine tpm2 -inform engine -passin pass:passw0rd -in key2.tpm
-pubout -out key2.pub && \
- echo "This is a message" | openssl rsautl -sign -engine tpm2 -engine tpm2
-keyform engine -inkey key2.tpm -passin pass:passw0rd -out tmp.msg && \
- openssl rsautl -verify -in tmp.msg -inkey key2.pub -pubin || exit 1
+ openssl pkeyutl -sign -engine tpm2 -engine tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey
key2.tpm -passin pass:passw0rd -in plain.txt -out tmp.msg && \
+ openssl pkeyutl -verify -in plain.txt -sigfile tmp.msg -inkey key2.pub
-pubin || exit 1
##
# test is
@@ -52,8 +68,8 @@
${tss_pcrextend_cmd} -ha 16 -ic aaa
${bindir}/create_tpm2_key ${n} key2.tpm -c policies/policy_pcr${h}.txt && \
openssl rsa -engine tpm2 -inform engine -in key2.tpm -pubout -out
key2.pub && \
- echo "This is a message" | openssl rsautl -sign -engine tpm2 -engine
tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey key2.tpm -out tmp.msg && \
- openssl rsautl -verify -in tmp.msg -inkey key2.pub -pubin || exit 1
+ openssl pkeyutl -sign -in plain.txt -engine tpm2 -engine tpm2 -keyform
engine -inkey key2.tpm -out tmp.msg && \
+ openssl pkeyutl -verify -in plain.txt -sigfile tmp.msg -inkey key2.pub
-pubin || exit 1
##
# test is
@@ -65,8 +81,8 @@
${tss_pcrreset_cmd} -ha 16
${bindir}/create_tpm2_key ${n} key2.tpm -c policies/policy_pcr${h}.txt
openssl rsa -engine tpm2 -inform engine -in key2.tpm -pubout -out key2.pub
&& \
- echo "This is a message" | openssl rsautl -sign -engine tpm2 -engine
tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey key2.tpm -out tmp.msg && \
- openssl rsautl -verify -in tmp.msg -inkey key2.pub -pubin
+ openssl pkeyutl -sign -in plain.txt -engine tpm2 -engine tpm2 -keyform
engine -inkey key2.tpm -out tmp.msg && \
+ openssl pkeyutl -verify -in plain.txt -sigfile tmp.msg -inkey key2.pub
-pubin
if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then
echo "TPM key should not be accessible"
exit 1
@@ -85,8 +101,8 @@
${tss_pcrextend_cmd} -ha 16 -ic aaa
${bindir}/create_tpm2_key ${n} -a -k passw0rd key2.tpm -c
policy_authvalue_pcr.txt && \
openssl rsa -engine tpm2 -inform engine -passin pass:passw0rd -in
key2.tpm -pubout -out key2.pub && \
- echo "This is a message" | openssl rsautl -sign -engine tpm2 -engine
tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey key2.tpm -passin pass:passw0rd -out tmp.msg && \
- openssl rsautl -verify -in tmp.msg -inkey key2.pub -pubin || exit 1
+ openssl pkeyutl -sign -in plain.txt -engine tpm2 -engine tpm2 -keyform
engine -inkey key2.tpm -passin pass:passw0rd -out tmp.msg && \
+ openssl pkeyutl -verify -in plain.txt -sigfile tmp.msg -inkey key2.pub
-pubin || exit 1
##
# test is
@@ -101,6 +117,36 @@
${tss_pcrextend_cmd} -ha 16 -ic aaa
${bindir}/create_tpm2_key ${n} -a -k passw0rd key2.tpm -c
policy_pcr_authvalue.txt && \
openssl rsa -engine tpm2 -inform engine -passin pass:passw0rd -in
key2.tpm -pubout -out key2.pub && \
- echo "This is a message" | openssl rsautl -sign -engine tpm2 -engine
tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey key2.tpm -passin pass:passw0rd -out tmp.msg && \
- openssl rsautl -verify -in tmp.msg -inkey key2.pub -pubin || exit 1
+ openssl pkeyutl -sign -in plain.txt -engine tpm2 -engine tpm2 -keyform
engine -inkey key2.tpm -passin pass:passw0rd -out tmp.msg && \
+ openssl pkeyutl -verify -in plain.txt -sigfile tmp.msg -inkey key2.pub
-pubin || exit 1
+
+ ##
+ # test is
+ # 1. Create a key on a huge range of PCRs (testing multiple reads)
+ # 2. verify key works with undisturbed PCRs
+ # 3. extend non-mentioned pcr and verify key works
+ # 4. extend mentioned PCR and verify key fails
+ ##
+ ${bindir}/create_tpm2_key ${n} -a -k passw0rd key.tpm --pcr-lock
1,2,3-15,17-23 --pcr-lock sha1:1-4 --pcr-lock sha384:10-20 || exit 1
+ openssl rsa -engine tpm2 -inform engine -passin pass:passw0rd -in key.tpm
-pubout -out key.pub || exit 1
+ openssl pkeyutl -sign -in plain.txt -engine tpm2 -engine tpm2 -keyform
engine -inkey key.tpm -passin pass:passw0rd -out tmp.msg || exit 1
+ openssl pkeyutl -verify -in plain.txt -sigfile tmp.msg -inkey key.pub
-pubin || exit 1
+ ${tss_pcrextend_cmd} -ha 16 -ic $RANDOM
+ ${tss_pcrextend_cmd} -ha 5 -halg sha1 -ic $RANDOM
+ ${tss_pcrextend_cmd} -ha 9 -halg sha384 -ic $RANDOM
+ openssl pkeyutl -sign -in plain.txt -engine tpm2 -engine tpm2 -keyform
engine -inkey key.tpm -passin pass:passw0rd -out tmp.msg || exit 1
+ openssl pkeyutl -verify -in plain.txt -sigfile tmp.msg -inkey key.pub
-pubin || exit 1
+ ${tss_pcrextend_cmd} -ha 1 -halg sha1 -ic $RANDOM
+ openssl pkeyutl -sign -in plain.txt -engine tpm2 -engine tpm2 -keyform
engine -inkey key.tpm -passin pass:passw0rd -out tmp.msg && exit 1
+ ##
+ # Check a smaller PCR lock with no auth
+ ##
+ ${bindir}/create_tpm2_key ${n} --pcr-lock 2,4,7,10 --pcr-lock sha1:1,3
key.tpm || exit 1
+ openssl rsa -engine tpm2 -inform engine -in key.tpm -pubout -out key.pub
|| exit 1
+ openssl pkeyutl -sign -in plain.txt -engine tpm2 -engine tpm2 -keyform
engine -inkey key.tpm -out tmp.msg || exit 1
+ openssl pkeyutl -verify -in plain.txt -sigfile tmp.msg -inkey key.pub
-pubin || exit 1
+ ${tss_pcrextend_cmd} -ha 4 -halg sha256 -ic $RANDOM
+ echo "This is a message" | openssl pkeyutl -sign -engine tpm2 -engine tpm2
-keyform engine -inkey key.tpm -out tmp.msg && exit 1
done
+
+exit 0
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/create_ecc.sh
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/create_ecc.sh
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/create_ecc.sh 2021-04-04
22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/create_ecc.sh 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
# 2. Create a self signed x509 certificate
# 3. verify the certificate
for curve in $(${bindir}/create_tpm2_key --list-curves); do
- if openssl ecparam -name ${curve} 2>&1 | grep 'unknown curve'; then
+ if openssl ecparam -name ${curve} 2>&1 | egrep '(invalid|unknown) curve';
then
continue
fi
echo "Checking curve ${curve}"
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore'
old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/create_nonopenssl_ecc.sh
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/create_nonopenssl_ecc.sh
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/create_nonopenssl_ecc.sh
2021-04-04 22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/create_nonopenssl_ecc.sh
2022-02-17 00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
for curve in $(${bindir}/create_tpm2_key --list-curves); do
- if openssl ecparam -name ${curve} 2>&1 | grep -v 'unknown curve'; then
+ if openssl ecparam -name ${curve} 2>&1 | egrep -v '(invalid|unknown)
curve'; then
continue
fi
echo "Checking curve ${curve}"
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/da_check.sh
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/da_check.sh
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/da_check.sh 2021-04-04
22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/da_check.sh 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
count=1;
while true; do
echo "This is a message" |
- openssl rsautl -sign -engine tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey key.tpm -passin
pass:passwrd -out tmp.msg 2>tmp.txt
+ openssl pkeyutl -sign -engine tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey key.tpm -passin
pass:passwrd -out tmp.msg 2>tmp.txt
val=$?
cat tmp.txt
if [ $val -ne 1 ]; then
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
echo "Locked out after $count tries"
# try with correct password, should still be locked out
echo "This is a message" |
-openssl rsautl -sign -engine tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey key.tpm -passin
pass:passw0rd -out tmp.msg 2>tmp.txt
+openssl pkeyutl -sign -engine tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey key.tpm -passin
pass:passw0rd -out tmp.msg 2>tmp.txt
val=$?
cat tmp.txt
if [ $val -ne 1 ]; then
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/derive_ecc.sh
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/derive_ecc.sh
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/derive_ecc.sh 2021-04-04
22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/derive_ecc.sh 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
##
for curve in $(${bindir}/create_tpm2_key --list-curves); do
- if openssl ecparam -name ${curve} 2>&1 | grep 'unknown curve'; then
+ if openssl ecparam -name ${curve} 2>&1 | egrep '(invalid|unknown) curve';
then
continue
fi
echo "Checking curve ${curve} explicitly named"
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/fail_connect.sh
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/fail_connect.sh
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/fail_connect.sh 2021-04-04
22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/fail_connect.sh 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
# conversion to public key doesn't actually contact the TPM
# so this should succeed
##
-openssl rsa -engine tpm2 -inform engine -in tmp.tpm -pubout -out tmp.pub 2>
tmp.txt
+openssl pkey -engine tpm2 -inform engine -in tmp.tpm -pubout -out tmp.pub 2>
tmp.txt
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
echo "TPM key import failed with $?"
cat tmp.txt
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
# key operation does contact the TPM and should fail
##
echo "This is a message" |\
-openssl rsautl -sign -engine tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey tmp.tpm -out tmp.msg
2> tmp.txt
+openssl pkeyutl -sign -engine tpm2 -keyform engine -inkey tmp.tpm -out tmp.msg
2> tmp.txt
if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then
echo "TPM key signing failed with $?"
cat tmp.txt
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/seal_unseal.sh
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/seal_unseal.sh
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/seal_unseal.sh 2021-04-04
22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/seal_unseal.sh 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -16,4 +16,22 @@
echo $DATA | ${bindir}/seal_tpm2_data -a -k ${AUTH} seal.tpm || exit 1;
${bindir}/unseal_tpm2_data -k ${AUTH} seal.tpm | grep -q "${DATA}" || exit 1;
+##
+# Check with policy
+# test is
+# 1. seal with a pcr lock and no auth
+# 2. verify unseal
+# 3. move PCR on and verify no unseal
+# 4. 1-3 with auth and pcr lock
+##
+echo $DATA | ${bindir}/seal_tpm2_data --pcr-lock 2,16 seal.tpm || exit 1;
+${bindir}/unseal_tpm2_data seal.tpm | grep -q "${DATA}" || exit 1;
+tsspcrextend -ha 16 -ic $RANDOM
+${bindir}/unseal_tpm2_data seal.tpm && exit 1
+echo $DATA | ${bindir}/seal_tpm2_data -a -k ${AUTH} --pcr-lock 2,16 seal.tpm
|| exit 1;
+${bindir}/unseal_tpm2_data -k ${AUTH} seal.tpm | grep -q "${DATA}" || exit 1;
+tsspcrextend -ha 16 -ic $RANDOM
+${bindir}/unseal_tpm2_data -k ${AUTH} seal.tpm && exit 1
+
+
exit 0
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/wrap_ecc.sh
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/wrap_ecc.sh
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/wrap_ecc.sh 2021-04-04
22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/wrap_ecc.sh 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# 3. Create a self signed x509 certificate
# 4. verify the certificate
for curve in $(${bindir}/create_tpm2_key --list-curves); do
- if openssl ecparam -name ${curve} 2>&1 | grep 'unknown curve'; then
+ if openssl ecparam -name ${curve} 2>&1 | egrep '(unknown|invalid) curve';
then
continue
fi
echo "Checking curve ${curve}"
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
exit 1
done
for curve in $(${bindir}/create_tpm2_key --list-curves); do
- if openssl ecparam -name ${curve} 2>&1 | grep 'unknown curve'; then
+ if openssl ecparam -name ${curve} 2>&1 | egrep '(invalid|unknown) curve';
then
continue
fi
echo "Checking curve ${curve}"
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/wrap_generic_ecc.sh
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/wrap_generic_ecc.sh
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tests/wrap_generic_ecc.sh 2021-04-04
22:47:14.000000000 +0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tests/wrap_generic_ecc.sh 2022-02-17
00:15:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# 3. Create a self signed x509 certificate
# 4. verify the certificate
for curve in $(${bindir}/create_tpm2_key --list-curves); do
- if openssl ecparam -name ${curve} 2>&1 | grep 'unknown curve'; then
+ if openssl ecparam -name ${curve} 2>&1 | egrep '(invalid|unknown) curve';
then
continue
fi
openssl genpkey -algorithm EC -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:${curve} -out
key.priv && \
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tpm2-common.c
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tpm2-common.c
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tpm2-common.c 2021-04-04 22:47:14.000000000
+0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tpm2-common.c 2022-02-17 00:15:34.000000000
+0100
@@ -29,6 +29,25 @@
#include "tpm2-asn.h"
#include "tpm2-common.h"
+static struct {
+ const char *hash;
+ TPM_ALG_ID alg;
+} tpm2_hashes[] = {
+ { "sha1", TPM_ALG_SHA1 },
+ { "sha256", TPM_ALG_SHA256 },
+ { "sha384", TPM_ALG_SHA384 },
+#ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA512
+ { "sha512", TPM_ALG_SHA512 },
+#endif
+#ifdef TPM_ALG_SM3_256
+ { "sm3", TPM_ALG_SM3_256 },
+#endif
+ { NULL, 0 }
+};
+
+#define MAX_TPM_PCRS 24
+const int MAX_TPM_PCRS_ARRAY = (MAX_TPM_PCRS + 7)/8;
+
struct myTPM2B {
UINT16 s;
BYTE *const b;
@@ -1470,7 +1489,7 @@
rc = tpm2_create(&tssContext, ad->dir);
if (rc) {
reason="tpm2_create";
- goto import_err;
+ goto import_no_flush_err;
}
parentHandle = tpm2_handle_int(tssContext, ad->parent);
@@ -1512,6 +1531,7 @@
import_err:
tpm2_flush_srk(tssContext, parentHandle);
+ import_no_flush_err:
TSS_Delete(tssContext);
if (rc) {
tpm2_error(rc, reason);
@@ -1891,6 +1911,240 @@
sk_TSSOPTPOLICY_free(sk);
}
+static const char *get_hash_by_alg(TPM_ALG_ID alg)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; tpm2_hashes[i].hash; i++)
+ if (tpm2_hashes[i].alg == alg)
+ break;
+
+ return tpm2_hashes[i].hash;
+}
+
+static int add_pcrs_hash(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrs, char *bank)
+{
+ int i;
+ TPM_ALG_ID alg;
+
+ for (i = 0; tpm2_hashes[i].hash; i++)
+ if (strcmp(tpm2_hashes[i].hash, bank) == 0)
+ break;
+
+ if (!tpm2_hashes[i].hash) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "unknown bank in pcrs list %s\n", bank);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ alg = tpm2_hashes[i].alg;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pcrs->count; i++)
+ if (pcrs->pcrSelections[i].hash == alg) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "hash bank %s was already specified\n",
bank);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ pcrs->pcrSelections[i].hash = alg;
+ pcrs->pcrSelections[i].sizeofSelect = MAX_TPM_PCRS_ARRAY;
+ pcrs->count++;
+
+ return i;
+}
+
+static void update_pcrs(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrs, int bank, char *str)
+{
+ char *sep = strchr(str, '-');
+ char *endptr;
+ long from, to;
+ int i;
+
+ if (sep)
+ *sep = '\0';
+ from = to = strtol(str, &endptr, 10);
+ if (*endptr != '\0' || from < 0 || from >= MAX_TPM_PCRS)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (sep) {
+ str = sep + 1;
+ to = strtol(str, &endptr, 10);
+
+ if (*endptr != '\0' || to < 0 || to >= MAX_TPM_PCRS)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (to < from) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Incorrect PCR range specified %ld-%ld\n",
+ from, to);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ for (i = from; i <= to; i++)
+ pcrs->pcrSelections[bank].pcrSelect[i/8] |= (1 << (i%8));
+
+ return;
+ err:
+ fprintf(stderr, "incorrect PCR specification %s\n", str);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+void tpm2_get_pcr_lock(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrs, char *arg)
+{
+ char *sep = strchr(arg, ':');
+ char *bankstr = arg;
+ int bank;
+
+ if (sep) {
+ *sep = '\0';
+ arg = sep + 1;
+ } else {
+ bankstr = "sha256";
+ }
+ bank = add_pcrs_hash(pcrs, bankstr);
+ for (sep = strchr(arg, ','); sep; arg = sep + 1, sep = strchr(arg,
',')) {
+ *sep = '\0';
+ update_pcrs(pcrs, bank, arg);
+ }
+ update_pcrs(pcrs, bank, arg);
+}
+
+static int hash_print(const char *hash, int start, BYTE val, int k,
+ TPML_DIGEST *dl, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ TPM2B_DIGEST *d;
+ BYTE *db;
+
+ if ((val & (1 << i)) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ d = &dl->digests[k++];
+ db = VAL_2B_P(d, buffer);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, VAL_2B_P(d, buffer), VAL_2B_P(d, size));
+ printf("%s: %02d: ", hash, start + i);
+ for (j = 0; j < VAL_2B_P(d, size); j++) {
+ printf("%02x", db[j]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+ return k;
+}
+
+static void pcr_digests_process(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *in, TPML_PCR_SELECTION
*out,
+ TPML_DIGEST *d, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i, j, k = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < in->count; i++) {
+ const char *hash = get_hash_by_alg(out->pcrSelections[i].hash);
+
+ for (j = 0; j < MAX_TPM_PCRS_ARRAY; j++) {
+ in->pcrSelections[i].pcrSelect[j] &=
+ ~out->pcrSelections[i].pcrSelect[j];
+
+ k = hash_print(hash, j * 8,
+ out->pcrSelections[i].pcrSelect[j],
+ k, d, ctx);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+TPM_RC tpm2_pcr_lock_policy(TSS_CONTEXT *tssContext,
+ TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrs,
+ STACK_OF(TSSOPTPOLICY) *sk,
+ TPMT_HA *digest)
+{
+ TSSOPTPOLICY *policy = TSSOPTPOLICY_new();
+ TPM_RC rc;
+ BYTE buf[1024];
+ UINT16 written = 0;
+ INT32 size = sizeof(buf);
+ const TPM_CC cc = TPM_CC_PolicyPCR;
+ DIGEST_2B pcrDigest;
+ BYTE *buffer = buf;
+ TPML_PCR_SELECTION pcrread, pcrreturn;
+ TPML_DIGEST pcr_digests;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+
+ switch (digest->hashAlg) {
+ case TPM_ALG_SHA1:
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+ break;
+ case TPM_ALG_SHA256:
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+ break;
+ case TPM_ALG_SHA384:
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_sha384(), NULL);
+ break;
+#ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA512
+ case TPM_ALG_SHA512:
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_sha512(), NULL);
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef TPM_ALG_SM3_256
+ case TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_sm3(), NULL);
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unknown TPM hash algorithm 0x%x\n",
+ digest->hashAlg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ pcrread = *pcrs;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ rc = tpm2_PCR_Read(tssContext, &pcrread, &pcrreturn,
&pcr_digests);
+ if (pcr_digests.count == 0 || rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
+ break;
+
+ pcr_digests_process(&pcrread, &pcrreturn, &pcr_digests, ctx);
+ }
+
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, pcrDigest.buffer, NULL);
+ pcrDigest.size = TSS_GetDigestSize(digest->hashAlg);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(policy->CommandCode, cc);
+ TSS_TPM_CC_Marshal(&cc, &written, &buffer, &size);
+ TSS_TPML_PCR_SELECTION_Marshal(pcrs, &written, &buffer, &size);
+ memcpy(buffer, pcrDigest.buffer, pcrDigest.size);
+ written += pcrDigest.size;
+ ASN1_STRING_set(policy->CommandPolicy, buf + 4, written - 4);
+ sk_TSSOPTPOLICY_push(sk, policy);
+
+ TSS_Hash_Generate(digest,
+ TSS_GetDigestSize(digest->hashAlg),
+ (uint8_t *)&digest->digest,
+ written, buf, 0, NULL);
+
+ return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void tpm2_add_auth_policy(STACK_OF(TSSOPTPOLICY) *sk, TPMT_HA *digest)
+{
+ TSSOPTPOLICY *policy = TSSOPTPOLICY_new();
+ BYTE buf[4];
+ BYTE *buffer = buf;
+ UINT16 written = 0;
+ INT32 size = sizeof(buf);
+ const TPM_CC cc = TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue;
+
+ TSS_TPM_CC_Marshal(&cc, &written, &buffer, &size);
+
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(policy->CommandCode, cc);
+ ASN1_STRING_set(policy->CommandPolicy, "", 0);
+ sk_TSSOPTPOLICY_push(sk, policy);
+
+ TSS_Hash_Generate(digest,
+ TSS_GetDigestSize(digest->hashAlg),
+ (uint8_t *)&digest->digest,
+ written, buf, 0, NULL);
+}
+
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(TSSOPTPOLICY)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(TSSLOADABLE)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(TSSPRIVKEY)
diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn'
'--exclude=.svnignore' old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tpm2-common.h
new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tpm2-common.h
--- old/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.0.1/tpm2-common.h 2021-04-04 22:47:14.000000000
+0200
+++ new/openssl_tpm2_engine-3.1.0/tpm2-common.h 2022-02-17 00:15:34.000000000
+0100
@@ -88,4 +88,10 @@
STACK_OF(TSSOPTPOLICY) *sk,
char *auth, TPMT_HA *digest);
void tpm2_free_policy(STACK_OF(TSSOPTPOLICY) *sk);
+void tpm2_get_pcr_lock(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrs, char *arg);
+TPM_RC tpm2_pcr_lock_policy(TSS_CONTEXT *tssContext,
+ TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrs,
+ STACK_OF(TSSOPTPOLICY) *sk,
+ TPMT_HA *digest);
+void tpm2_add_auth_policy(STACK_OF(TSSOPTPOLICY) *sk, TPMT_HA *digest);
#endif
