Script 'mail_helper' called by obssrc
Hello community,
here is the log from the commit of package python39 for openSUSE:Factory
checked in at 2022-09-03 23:18:32
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/python39 (Old)
and /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.python39.new.2083 (New)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Package is "python39"
Sat Sep 3 23:18:32 2022 rev:33 rq:1000771 version:3.9.13
Changes:
--------
--- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/python39/python39.changes 2022-07-29
16:47:00.854505135 +0200
+++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.python39.new.2083/python39.changes
2022-09-03 23:18:36.199740946 +0200
@@ -1,0 +2,7 @@
+Thu Sep 1 03:48:37 UTC 2022 - Steve Kowalik <steven.kowa...@suse.com>
+
+- Add patch CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch:
+ * http.server: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server
+ when an URI path starts with //. (bsc#1202624, CVE-2021-28861)
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
New:
----
CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Other differences:
------------------
++++++ python39.spec ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.qVFdQX/_old 2022-09-03 23:18:37.099743299 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.qVFdQX/_new 2022-09-03 23:18:37.107743320 +0200
@@ -161,6 +161,9 @@
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2015-20107-mailcap-unsafe-filenames.patch bsc#1198511
mc...@suse.com
# avoid the command injection in the mailcap module.
Patch36: CVE-2015-20107-mailcap-unsafe-filenames.patch
+# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2021-28861 bsc#1202624 gh#python/cpython#94093
+# Coerce // to / in Lib/http/server.py
+Patch37: CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch
BuildRequires: autoconf-archive
BuildRequires: automake
BuildRequires: fdupes
@@ -420,6 +423,7 @@
%endif
%patch35 -p1
%patch36 -p1
+%patch37 -p1
# drop Autoconf version requirement
sed -i 's/^AC_PREREQ/dnl AC_PREREQ/' configure.ac
++++++ CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch ++++++
>From 31dbe663f6c9ae68595dde9420381e065016ad6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Gregory P. Smith" <g...@krypto.org>
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 13:16:57 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] gh-87389: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in
http.server. (GH-93879)
Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when
an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header
with a misleading target. Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix
proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan).
Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google].
(cherry picked from commit 4abab6b603dd38bec1168e9a37c40a48ec89508e)
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <g...@krypto.org>
---
Lib/http/server.py | 7 +++
Lib/test/test_httpservers.py | 53 ++++++++++++++++++-
...2-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst | 3 ++
3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
diff --git a/Lib/http/server.py b/Lib/http/server.py
index 2d2300c2aeab..6bf9084341a6 100644
--- a/Lib/http/server.py
+++ b/Lib/http/server.py
@@ -330,6 +330,13 @@ def parse_request(self):
return False
self.command, self.path = command, path
+ # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect
+ # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts
+ # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI
+ # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path.
+ if self.path.startswith('//'):
+ self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/') # Reduce to a single /
+
# Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive.
try:
self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile,
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
index c1494d29ca87..4acf7a6fea44 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ class request_handler(NoLogRequestHandler,
SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
pass
def setUp(self):
- BaseTestCase.setUp(self)
+ super().setUp()
self.cwd = os.getcwd()
basetempdir = tempfile.gettempdir()
os.chdir(basetempdir)
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ def tearDown(self):
except:
pass
finally:
- BaseTestCase.tearDown(self)
+ super().tearDown()
def check_status_and_reason(self, response, status, data=None):
def close_conn():
@@ -415,6 +415,55 @@ def test_undecodable_filename(self):
self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK,
data=support.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE)
+ def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self):
+ """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location.
+
+ //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host.
+ https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389
+
+ This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot
+ resolve into a redirect to another server.
+ """
+ os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory'))
+ url =
f'/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory'
+ expected_location = f'{url}/' # /python.org.../ single slash single
prefix, trailing slash
+ # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does
+ # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic.
+ response = self.request(url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ location = response.getheader('Location')
+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!')
+
+ # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash
+ attack_url = f'/{url}'
+ response = self.request(attack_url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ location = response.getheader('Location')
+ self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location)
+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location,
+ msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and '
+ 'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.')
+
+ # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash
+ attack3_url = f'//{url}'
+ response = self.request(attack3_url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location)
+
+ # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http
+ # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed
+ # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head
+ # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen.
+ attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = f'https://pypi.org/{url}'
+ expected_scheme_netloc_location = f'{attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url}/'
+ response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ location = response.getheader('Location')
+ # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if
+ # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that
+ # follows that isn't important in this Location: header.
+ self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location)
+
def test_get(self):
#constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer
response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test')
diff --git
a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..029d437190de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+:mod:`http.server`: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server
+when an URI path starts with ``//``. Vulnerability discovered, and initial
+fix proposed, by Hamza Avvan.
