Script 'mail_helper' called by obssrc
Hello community,
here is the log from the commit of package python38 for openSUSE:Factory
checked in at 2022-09-03 23:18:33
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/python38 (Old)
and /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.python38.new.2083 (New)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Package is "python38"
Sat Sep 3 23:18:33 2022 rev:25 rq:1000772 version:3.8.13
Changes:
--------
--- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/python38/python38.changes 2022-07-29
16:46:59.758502088 +0200
+++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.python38.new.2083/python38.changes
2022-09-03 23:18:37.531744428 +0200
@@ -1,0 +2,16 @@
+Thu Sep 1 04:20:04 UTC 2022 - Steve Kowalik <steven.kowa...@suse.com>
+
+- Add patch CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch:
+ * http.server: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server
+ when an URI path starts with //. (bsc#1202624, CVE-2021-28861)
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Wed Aug 31 08:47:57 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl <mc...@suse.com>
+
+- Add bpo34990-2038-problem-compileall.patch making compileall.py
+ compliant with year 2038 (bsc#1202666, gh#python/cpython#79171),
+ backport of fix to Python 3.8.
+- Add conditional for requiring rpm-build-python, so we should be
+ compilable on SLE/Leap.
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
New:
----
CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch
bpo34990-2038-problem-compileall.patch
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Other differences:
------------------
++++++ python38.spec ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.E1ZZGd/_old 2022-09-03 23:18:38.455746844 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.E1ZZGd/_new 2022-09-03 23:18:38.463746865 +0200
@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@
# Use of 'complex' as a C variable name confuses Sphinx; change it to 'num'
# The same goes for 'default', which I had to change to 'def_size'
Patch33: bpo44426-complex-keyword-sphinx.patch
+# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM bpo34990-2038-problem-compileall.patch
gh#python/cpython#79171 mc...@suse.com
+# Make compileall.py compatible with year 2038
+Patch34: bpo34990-2038-problem-compileall.patch
+# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2021-28861 bsc#1202624 gh#python/cpython#94094
+# Coerce // to / in Lib/http/server.py
+Patch35: CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch
BuildRequires: autoconf-archive
BuildRequires: automake
BuildRequires: fdupes
@@ -172,8 +178,10 @@
BuildRequires: netcfg
BuildRequires: openssl-devel
BuildRequires: pkgconfig
+%if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1550
# The provider for python(abi) is in rpm-build-python
BuildRequires: rpm-build-python
+%endif
BuildRequires: xz
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(bzip2)
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(expat)
@@ -426,6 +434,8 @@
%patch29 -p1
%patch32 -p1
%patch33 -p1
+%patch34 -p1
+%patch35 -p1
# drop Autoconf version requirement
sed -i 's/^AC_PREREQ/dnl AC_PREREQ/' configure.ac
++++++ CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch ++++++
>From d01648738934922d413b65f2f97951cbab66e0bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Gregory P. Smith" <g...@krypto.org>
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 13:16:57 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] gh-87389: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in
http.server. (GH-93879)
Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when
an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header
with a misleading target. Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix
proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan).
Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google].
(cherry picked from commit 4abab6b603dd38bec1168e9a37c40a48ec89508e)
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <g...@krypto.org>
---
Lib/http/server.py | 7 +++
Lib/test/test_httpservers.py | 53 ++++++++++++++++++-
...2-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst | 3 ++
3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
diff --git a/Lib/http/server.py b/Lib/http/server.py
index 38f7accad7a3..39de35458c38 100644
--- a/Lib/http/server.py
+++ b/Lib/http/server.py
@@ -332,6 +332,13 @@ def parse_request(self):
return False
self.command, self.path = command, path
+ # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect
+ # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts
+ # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI
+ # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path.
+ if self.path.startswith('//'):
+ self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/') # Reduce to a single /
+
# Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive.
try:
self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile,
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
index 87d4924a34b3..fb026188f0b4 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ class request_handler(NoLogRequestHandler,
SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
pass
def setUp(self):
- BaseTestCase.setUp(self)
+ super().setUp()
self.cwd = os.getcwd()
basetempdir = tempfile.gettempdir()
os.chdir(basetempdir)
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ def tearDown(self):
except:
pass
finally:
- BaseTestCase.tearDown(self)
+ super().tearDown()
def check_status_and_reason(self, response, status, data=None):
def close_conn():
@@ -414,6 +414,55 @@ def test_undecodable_filename(self):
self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK,
data=support.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE)
+ def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self):
+ """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location.
+
+ //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host.
+ https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389
+
+ This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot
+ resolve into a redirect to another server.
+ """
+ os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory'))
+ url =
f'/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory'
+ expected_location = f'{url}/' # /python.org.../ single slash single
prefix, trailing slash
+ # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does
+ # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic.
+ response = self.request(url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ location = response.getheader('Location')
+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!')
+
+ # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash
+ attack_url = f'/{url}'
+ response = self.request(attack_url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ location = response.getheader('Location')
+ self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location)
+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location,
+ msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and '
+ 'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.')
+
+ # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash
+ attack3_url = f'//{url}'
+ response = self.request(attack3_url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location)
+
+ # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http
+ # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed
+ # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head
+ # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen.
+ attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = f'https://pypi.org/{url}'
+ expected_scheme_netloc_location = f'{attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url}/'
+ response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ location = response.getheader('Location')
+ # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if
+ # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that
+ # follows that isn't important in this Location: header.
+ self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location)
+
def test_get(self):
#constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer
response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test')
diff --git
a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..029d437190de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+:mod:`http.server`: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server
+when an URI path starts with ``//``. Vulnerability discovered, and initial
+fix proposed, by Hamza Avvan.
++++++ bpo34990-2038-problem-compileall.patch ++++++
>From 9d3b6b2472f7c7ef841e652825de652bc8af85d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-isling...@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2021 08:07:31 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] [3.9] bpo-34990: Treat the pyc header's mtime in compileall
as an unsigned int (GH-19708)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
(cherry picked from commit bb21e28fd08f894ceff2405544a2f257d42b1354)
Co-authored-by: Ammar Askar <am...@ammaraskar.com>
Co-authored-by: St??phane Wirtel <steph...@wirtel.be>
---
Lib/compileall.py | 4 -
Lib/test/test_compileall.py | 23
+++++++++-
Lib/test/test_zipimport.py | 17
++++---
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-04-24-20-39-38.bpo-34990.3SmL9M.rst | 2
4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
create mode 100644
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-04-24-20-39-38.bpo-34990.3SmL9M.rst
--- a/Lib/compileall.py
+++ b/Lib/compileall.py
@@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ def compile_file(fullname, ddir=None, fo
if not force:
try:
mtime = int(os.stat(fullname).st_mtime)
- expect = struct.pack('<4sll', importlib.util.MAGIC_NUMBER,
- 0, mtime)
+ expect = struct.pack('<4sLL', importlib.util.MAGIC_NUMBER,
+ 0, mtime & 0xFFFF_FFFF)
with open(cfile, 'rb') as chandle:
actual = chandle.read(12)
if expect == actual:
--- a/Lib/test/test_compileall.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_compileall.py
@@ -54,9 +54,28 @@ class CompileallTestsBase:
with open(self.bc_path, 'rb') as file:
data = file.read(12)
mtime = int(os.stat(self.source_path).st_mtime)
- compare = struct.pack('<4sll', importlib.util.MAGIC_NUMBER, 0, mtime)
+ compare = struct.pack('<4sLL', importlib.util.MAGIC_NUMBER, 0,
+ mtime & 0xFFFF_FFFF)
return data, compare
+ def test_year_2038_mtime_compilation(self):
+ # Test to make sure we can handle mtimes larger than what a 32-bit
+ # signed number can hold as part of bpo-34990
+ try:
+ os.utime(self.source_path, (2**32 - 1, 2**32 - 1))
+ except (OverflowError, OSError):
+ self.skipTest("filesystem doesn't support timestamps near 2**32")
+ self.assertTrue(compileall.compile_file(self.source_path))
+
+ def test_larger_than_32_bit_times(self):
+ # This is similar to the test above but we skip it if the OS doesn't
+ # support modification times larger than 32-bits.
+ try:
+ os.utime(self.source_path, (2**35, 2**35))
+ except (OverflowError, OSError):
+ self.skipTest("filesystem doesn't support large timestamps")
+ self.assertTrue(compileall.compile_file(self.source_path))
+
def recreation_check(self, metadata):
"""Check that compileall recreates bytecode when the new metadata is
used."""
@@ -75,7 +94,7 @@ class CompileallTestsBase:
def test_mtime(self):
# Test a change in mtime leads to a new .pyc.
- self.recreation_check(struct.pack('<4sll', importlib.util.MAGIC_NUMBER,
+ self.recreation_check(struct.pack('<4sLL', importlib.util.MAGIC_NUMBER,
0, 1))
def test_magic_number(self):
--- a/Lib/test/test_zipimport.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_zipimport.py
@@ -34,14 +34,9 @@ raise_src = 'def do_raise(): raise TypeE
def make_pyc(co, mtime, size):
data = marshal.dumps(co)
- if type(mtime) is type(0.0):
- # Mac mtimes need a bit of special casing
- if mtime < 0x7fffffff:
- mtime = int(mtime)
- else:
- mtime = int(-0x100000000 + int(mtime))
pyc = (importlib.util.MAGIC_NUMBER +
- struct.pack("<iii", 0, int(mtime), size & 0xFFFFFFFF) + data)
+ struct.pack("<iLL", 0,
+ int(mtime) & 0xFFFF_FFFF, size & 0xFFFF_FFFF) + data)
return pyc
def module_path_to_dotted_name(path):
@@ -253,6 +248,14 @@ class UncompressedZipImportTestCase(Impo
TESTMOD + pyc_ext: (NOW, badtime_pyc)}
self.doTest(".py", files, TESTMOD)
+ def test2038MTime(self):
+ # Make sure we can handle mtimes larger than what a 32-bit signed
number
+ # can hold.
+ twenty_thirty_eight_pyc = make_pyc(test_co, 2**32 - 1, len(test_src))
+ files = {TESTMOD + ".py": (NOW, test_src),
+ TESTMOD + pyc_ext: (NOW, twenty_thirty_eight_pyc)}
+ self.doTest(".py", files, TESTMOD)
+
def testPackage(self):
packdir = TESTPACK + os.sep
files = {packdir + "__init__" + pyc_ext: (NOW, test_pyc),
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-04-24-20-39-38.bpo-34990.3SmL9M.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Fixed a Y2k38 bug in the compileall module where it would fail to compile
+files with a modification time after the year 2038.
