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Hello community,

here is the log from the commit of package python39 for openSUSE:Factory 
checked in at 2022-11-12 17:39:58
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/python39 (Old)
 and      /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.python39.new.1597 (New)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Package is "python39"

Sat Nov 12 17:39:58 2022 rev:37 rq:1034968 version:3.9.15

Changes:
--------
--- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/python39/python39.changes        2022-11-05 
14:46:34.310524814 +0100
+++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.python39.new.1597/python39.changes      
2022-11-12 17:39:59.473747246 +0100
@@ -1,0 +2,7 @@
+Wed Nov  9 18:31:23 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl <mc...@suse.com>
+
+- Add CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch to avoid
+  CVE-2022-45061 (bsc#1205244) allowing DoS by IDNA decoding
+  extremely long domain names.
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------

New:
----
  CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Other differences:
------------------
++++++ python39.spec ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.BoYCPc/_old  2022-11-12 17:40:00.881755628 +0100
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.BoYCPc/_new  2022-11-12 17:40:00.889755676 +0100
@@ -167,6 +167,9 @@
 # PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2022-42919-loc-priv-mulitproc-forksrv.patch 
bsc#1204886 mc...@suse.com
 # Avoid Linux specific local privilege escalation via the multiprocessing 
forkserver start method
 Patch38:        CVE-2022-42919-loc-priv-mulitproc-forksrv.patch
+# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch bsc#1205244 
mc...@suse.com
+# Avoid DoS by decoding IDNA for too long domain names
+Patch39:        CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch
 BuildRequires:  autoconf-archive
 BuildRequires:  automake
 BuildRequires:  fdupes
@@ -428,6 +431,7 @@
 %patch36 -p1
 %patch37 -p1
 %patch38 -p1
+%patch39 -p1
 
 # drop Autoconf version requirement
 sed -i 's/^AC_PREREQ/dnl AC_PREREQ/' configure.ac

++++++ CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch ++++++
>From b8f89940de09a51fdbd8fe4705d3d1d7f1bb0c6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
 <31488909+miss-isling...@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2022 18:57:10 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] [3.11] gh-98433: Fix quadratic time idna decoding. (GH-99092)
 (GH-99222)

There was an unnecessary quadratic loop in idna decoding. This restores
the behavior to linear.

(cherry picked from commit d315722564927c7202dd6e111dc79eaf14240b0d)

(cherry picked from commit a6f6c3a3d6f2b580f2d87885c9b8a9350ad7bf15)

Co-authored-by: Miss Islington (bot) 
<31488909+miss-isling...@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <g...@krypto.org>
---
 Lib/encodings/idna.py                                                   |   32 
++++------
 Lib/test/test_codecs.py                                                 |    6 
+
 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst |    6 
+
 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst

--- a/Lib/encodings/idna.py
+++ b/Lib/encodings/idna.py
@@ -39,23 +39,21 @@ def nameprep(label):
 
     # Check bidi
     RandAL = [stringprep.in_table_d1(x) for x in label]
-    for c in RandAL:
-        if c:
-            # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further
-            # tests:
-            # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited.
-            # This is table C.8, which was already checked
-            # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string
-            # MUST NOT contain any LCat character.
-            if any(stringprep.in_table_d2(x) for x in label):
-                raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2")
-
-            # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a
-            # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the
-            # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last
-            # character of the string.
-            if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]:
-                raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3")
+    if any(RandAL):
+        # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further
+        # tests:
+        # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited.
+        # This is table C.8, which was already checked
+        # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string
+        # MUST NOT contain any LCat character.
+        if any(stringprep.in_table_d2(x) for x in label):
+            raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2")
+        # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a
+        # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the
+        # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last
+        # character of the string.
+        if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]:
+            raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3")
 
     return label
 
--- a/Lib/test/test_codecs.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_codecs.py
@@ -1532,6 +1532,12 @@ class IDNACodecTest(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual("pyth\xf6n.org".encode("idna"), b"xn--pythn-mua.org")
         self.assertEqual("pyth\xf6n.org.".encode("idna"), 
b"xn--pythn-mua.org.")
 
+    def test_builtin_decode_length_limit(self):
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(UnicodeError, "too long"):
+            (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*1100).decode("idna")
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(UnicodeError, "too long"):
+            (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*70).decode("idna")
+
     def test_stream(self):
         r = codecs.getreader("idna")(io.BytesIO(b"abc"))
         r.read(3)
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+The IDNA codec decoder used on DNS hostnames by :mod:`socket` or :mod:`asyncio`
+related name resolution functions no longer involves a quadratic algorithm.
+This prevents a potential CPU denial of service if an out-of-spec excessive
+length hostname involving bidirectional characters were decoded. Some protocols
+such as :mod:`urllib` http ``3xx`` redirects potentially allow for an attacker
+to supply such a name.

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