Copilot commented on code in PR #1353:
URL: https://github.com/apache/airflow-site/pull/1353#discussion_r2649081066
##########
sphinx_airflow_theme/sphinx_airflow_theme/layout.html:
##########
@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset={{
encoding }}" />
{%- endif %}
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+ <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://www.apachecon.com
https://www.communityovercode.org https://*.apache.org https://*.scarf.sh;
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self'
https://fonts.gstatic.com data:; img-src 'self' data: https://*.apache.org
https://*.scarf.sh; connect-src 'self' https://*.apache.org https://*.scarf.sh;
frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action
'self';">
Review Comment:
The Content Security Policy includes 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval' in
the default-src directive, which significantly weakens the security protection.
These directives allow inline scripts and eval() usage, making the application
vulnerable to XSS attacks. Consider removing these directives and using nonces
or hashes for inline scripts, or refactoring to eliminate the need for inline
scripts and eval().
```suggestion
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://www.apachecon.com
https://www.communityovercode.org https://*.apache.org https://*.scarf.sh;
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self'
https://fonts.gstatic.com data:; img-src 'self' data: https://*.apache.org
https://*.scarf.sh; connect-src 'self' https://*.apache.org https://*.scarf.sh;
frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action
'self';">
```
##########
sphinx_airflow_theme/sphinx_airflow_theme/layout.html:
##########
@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset={{
encoding }}" />
{%- endif %}
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+ <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://www.apachecon.com
https://www.communityovercode.org https://*.apache.org https://*.scarf.sh;
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self'
https://fonts.gstatic.com data:; img-src 'self' data: https://*.apache.org
https://*.scarf.sh; connect-src 'self' https://*.apache.org https://*.scarf.sh;
frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action
'self';">
Review Comment:
The CSP meta tag content attribute is extremely long (over 200 characters)
and difficult to read. Consider breaking this into multiple directives or
adding line breaks for better maintainability. Alternatively, consider
implementing the CSP via HTTP headers in the server configuration, which allows
for better formatting and separation of concerns.
```suggestion
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://www.apachecon.com
https://www.communityovercode.org https://*.apache.org https://*.scarf.sh;
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com;";>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="font-src 'self'
https://fonts.gstatic.com data:; img-src 'self' data: https://*.apache.org
https://*.scarf.sh;";>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="connect-src 'self'
https://*.apache.org https://*.scarf.sh; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src
'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self';">
```
##########
sphinx_airflow_theme/sphinx_airflow_theme/layout.html:
##########
@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset={{
encoding }}" />
{%- endif %}
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+ <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://www.apachecon.com
https://www.communityovercode.org https://*.apache.org https://*.scarf.sh;
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self'
https://fonts.gstatic.com data:; img-src 'self' data: https://*.apache.org
https://*.scarf.sh; connect-src 'self' https://*.apache.org https://*.scarf.sh;
frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action
'self';">
Review Comment:
The CSP directive 'https://*.apache.org/' is redundant because
'https://apache.org/' is already included separately. The wildcard subdomain
directive already covers the apex domain, so the separate 'https://apache.org/'
entry can be removed.
##########
sphinx_airflow_theme/sphinx_airflow_theme/layout.html:
##########
@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset={{
encoding }}" />
{%- endif %}
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+ <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://www.apachecon.com
https://www.communityovercode.org https://*.apache.org https://*.scarf.sh;
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self'
https://fonts.gstatic.com data:; img-src 'self' data: https://*.apache.org
https://*.scarf.sh; connect-src 'self' https://*.apache.org https://*.scarf.sh;
frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action
'self';">
Review Comment:
The CSP default-src directive combines multiple resource types with
'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval', which applies these permissive settings to
all resource types. Consider using more specific directives (script-src,
style-src, img-src, etc.) to apply stricter policies to different resource
types. For example, 'unsafe-eval' is likely only needed for script-src, not for
images or fonts.
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