gnodet-bot commented on code in PR #26725:
URL: https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/26725#discussion_r4080055134


##########
components/camel-crypto/src/main/java/org/apache/camel/converter/crypto/CryptoDataFormat.java:
##########
@@ -166,8 +186,20 @@ public Object unmarshal(final Exchange exchange, final 
InputStream encryptedStre
                 byte[] buffer = new byte[bufferSize];
                 hmac.attachStream(osb);
                 int read;
-                while ((read = cipherStream.read(buffer)) >= 0) {
-                    hmac.decryptUpdate(buffer, read);
+                try {
+                    while ((read = cipherStream.read(buffer)) >= 0) {
+                        hmac.decryptUpdate(buffer, read);
+                    }
+                } catch (IOException e) {
+                    if (e.getCause() instanceof GeneralSecurityException) {
+                        // CipherInputStream surfaces bad padding as an 
IOException wrapping
+                        // BadPaddingException, while a bad MAC surfaces from 
validate() below. Reporting the two
+                        // differently is exactly what lets a caller who can 
submit ciphertext and watch the
+                        // outcome tell them apart, which is the 
padding-oracle distinguisher. Report the same
+                        // authentication failure for both.
+                        throw new 
IllegalStateException(HMACAccumulator.AUTHENTICATION_FAILED);

Review Comment:
   🔴 **`AUTHENTICATION_FAILED` is thrown even when `shouldAppendHMAC=false` — 
davsclaus's finding is still open.**
   
   This catch block is unconditional. When `shouldAppendHMAC=false`, the 
anonymous HMACAccumulator's `decryptUpdate` just writes to the output stream — 
no MAC verification happens. A `BadPaddingException` surfacing here is 
corruption or a key mismatch, not an authentication failure. Reporting it as 
`AUTHENTICATION_FAILED` misdescribes the error and discards the original cause 
entirely.
   
   Gate on `shouldAppendHMAC`:
   ```suggestion
                   } catch (IOException e) {
                       if (shouldAppendHMAC && e.getCause() instanceof 
GeneralSecurityException) {
                           // CipherInputStream surfaces bad padding as an 
IOException wrapping
                           // BadPaddingException, while a bad MAC surfaces 
from validate() below. Reporting the two
                           // differently is exactly what lets a caller who can 
submit ciphertext and watch the
                           // outcome tell them apart, which is the 
padding-oracle distinguisher. Report the same
                           // authentication failure for both.
                           throw new 
IllegalStateException(HMACAccumulator.AUTHENTICATION_FAILED);
                       }
                       throw e;
   ```



##########
components/camel-crypto/src/main/java/org/apache/camel/converter/crypto/CryptoDataFormat.java:
##########
@@ -121,9 +126,24 @@ private Cipher initializeCipher(int mode, Key key, byte[] 
iv) throws Exception {
         return cipher;
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Upper bound on the length of an inlined initialization vector read from 
the stream. A JCE initialization vector
+     * is at most a cipher block, so this is generous; the bound exists 
because the length is read from the message and
+     * used directly to size an allocation.
+     */
+    private static final int MAX_INLINE_IV_LENGTH = 1024;
+
+    private static final SecureRandom SECURE_RANDOM = new SecureRandom();
+
     @Override
     public void marshal(Exchange exchange, Object graph, OutputStream 
outputStream) throws Exception {
         byte[] iv = getInitializationVector(exchange);
+        if (iv == null && inline) {

Review Comment:
   🔴 **`algorithmParameterSpec` + `inline`: IV is generated and written but 
never used in the cipher — davsclaus's finding is still open.**
   
   `if (iv == null && inline)` generates a fresh IV, but `initializeCipher` 
gives `algorithmParameterSpec` priority:
   ```java
   if (algorithmParameterSpec != null) {
       cipher.init(mode, key, algorithmParameterSpec);  // iv is ignored
   } else if (iv != null) {
       cipher.init(mode, key, new IvParameterSpec(iv));
   }
   ```
   The result is identical ciphertext on every call — the IV written into the 
message is window dressing. Before this PR, that configuration threw `Inlining 
cannot be performed, as no initialization vector was specified`, which at least 
told the caller something was wrong.
   
   The fix is to guard IV generation against `algorithmParameterSpec`:
   ```suggestion
           if (iv == null && inline && algorithmParameterSpec == null) {
   ```
   Alternatively, make `algorithmParameterSpec` + `inline` a hard error: if the 
caller has set `algorithmParameterSpec`, they are managing the IV externally 
and inlining is not meaningful.



##########
components/camel-crypto/src/test/java/org/apache/camel/converter/crypto/CryptoDataFormatIvAndFailureTest.java:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/*
+ * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
+ * contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file distributed with
+ * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
+ * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
+ * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+package org.apache.camel.converter.crypto;
+
+import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
+import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
+import java.security.Key;
+
+import javax.crypto.KeyGenerator;
+
+import org.apache.camel.Exchange;
+import org.apache.camel.impl.DefaultCamelContext;
+import org.apache.camel.support.DefaultExchange;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
+
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertArrayEquals;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
+
+class CryptoDataFormatIvAndFailureTest {
+
+    private static final String PAYLOAD = "the quick brown fox jumps over the 
lazy dog";
+
+    /**
+     * Inlining exists so the initialization vector travels with the message. 
Requiring a statically configured one as
+     * well is what pushed routes into reusing a single vector for every 
message.
+     */
+    @Test
+    void inliningGeneratesAFreshInitializationVectorPerMessage() throws 
Exception {
+        Key key = key();
+        try (DefaultCamelContext context = new DefaultCamelContext()) {
+            context.start();
+            CryptoDataFormat encryptor = new 
CryptoDataFormat("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding", key);
+            encryptor.setShouldInlineInitializationVector(true);
+
+            byte[] first = marshal(context, encryptor, PAYLOAD);
+            byte[] second = marshal(context, encryptor, PAYLOAD);
+
+            assertFalse(java.util.Arrays.equals(first, second),

Review Comment:
   🟠 **FQCN — still present, OpenRewrite will rewrite it and CI will fail.**
   
   Add `import java.util.Arrays;` to the import section and use the simple name:
   ```suggestion
               assertFalse(Arrays.equals(first, second),
   ```



##########
components/camel-crypto/src/test/java/org/apache/camel/converter/crypto/CryptoDataFormatIvAndFailureTest.java:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/*
+ * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
+ * contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file distributed with
+ * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
+ * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
+ * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+package org.apache.camel.converter.crypto;
+
+import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
+import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
+import java.security.Key;
+
+import javax.crypto.KeyGenerator;
+
+import org.apache.camel.Exchange;
+import org.apache.camel.impl.DefaultCamelContext;
+import org.apache.camel.support.DefaultExchange;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
+
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertArrayEquals;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
+
+class CryptoDataFormatIvAndFailureTest {
+
+    private static final String PAYLOAD = "the quick brown fox jumps over the 
lazy dog";
+
+    /**
+     * Inlining exists so the initialization vector travels with the message. 
Requiring a statically configured one as
+     * well is what pushed routes into reusing a single vector for every 
message.
+     */
+    @Test
+    void inliningGeneratesAFreshInitializationVectorPerMessage() throws 
Exception {
+        Key key = key();
+        try (DefaultCamelContext context = new DefaultCamelContext()) {
+            context.start();
+            CryptoDataFormat encryptor = new 
CryptoDataFormat("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding", key);
+            encryptor.setShouldInlineInitializationVector(true);
+
+            byte[] first = marshal(context, encryptor, PAYLOAD);
+            byte[] second = marshal(context, encryptor, PAYLOAD);
+
+            assertFalse(java.util.Arrays.equals(first, second),
+                    "the same plaintext must not produce identical ciphertext 
twice");
+
+            CryptoDataFormat decryptor = new 
CryptoDataFormat("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding", key);
+            decryptor.setShouldInlineInitializationVector(true);
+            assertEquals(PAYLOAD, unmarshal(context, decryptor, first));
+            assertEquals(PAYLOAD, unmarshal(context, decryptor, second));
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * A caller who can submit ciphertext and observe the outcome must not be 
able to tell a padding failure from a MAC
+     * failure - telling them apart is what turns CBC decryption into a 
padding oracle.
+     */
+    @Test
+    void badPaddingAndBadMacAreReportedIdentically() throws Exception {
+        Key key = key();
+        try (DefaultCamelContext context = new DefaultCamelContext()) {
+            context.start();
+            // a static vector, not inlining, so this exercises the failure 
reporting and nothing else
+            CryptoDataFormat format = new 
CryptoDataFormat("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding", key);
+            format.setInitVector(new byte[16]);
+
+            byte[] ciphertext = marshal(context, format, PAYLOAD);
+
+            // The MAC is written through the CipherOutputStream during 
marshal, so it is encrypted inside the
+            // ciphertext, not appended in the clear. The last wire byte is 
therefore the final ciphertext block, and
+            // flipping it makes that block no longer decrypt to valid PKCS5 
padding - the BadPaddingException path,
+            // distinct from the bad-MAC path exercised just below.
+            byte[] badPadding = ciphertext.clone();
+            badPadding[badPadding.length - 1] ^= 0x01;
+
+            // corrupt a byte in the middle: padding still validates, the 
appended MAC does not
+            byte[] badMac = ciphertext.clone();
+            badMac[badMac.length / 2] ^= 0x01;
+
+            String paddingFailure = failureMessage(context, format, 
badPadding);
+            String macFailure = failureMessage(context, format, badMac);
+
+            assertEquals(macFailure, paddingFailure, "the two failures must be 
indistinguishable");
+            assertTrue(paddingFailure.contains("authentication failed"), 
"unexpected message: " + paddingFailure);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * The inlined length is read from the message and used to size an 
allocation, so it has to be bounded.
+     */
+    @Test
+    void anOversizedInlinedInitializationVectorLengthIsRejected() throws 
Exception {
+        Key key = key();
+        try (DefaultCamelContext context = new DefaultCamelContext()) {
+            context.start();
+            CryptoDataFormat decryptor = new 
CryptoDataFormat("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding", key);
+            decryptor.setShouldInlineInitializationVector(true);
+
+            // a four byte length of 0x7FFFFFFF followed by nothing
+            byte[] hostile = { 0x7F, (byte) 0xFF, (byte) 0xFF, (byte) 0xFF };
+
+            Exception e = assertThrows(Exception.class, () -> 
unmarshal(context, decryptor, hostile));
+            assertTrue(rootMessage(e).contains("is not between 0 and"), 
"unexpected message: " + rootMessage(e));
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void aRoundTripWithAStaticVectorStillWorks() throws Exception {
+        Key key = key();
+        byte[] iv = new byte[16];
+        try (DefaultCamelContext context = new DefaultCamelContext()) {
+            context.start();
+            CryptoDataFormat format = new 
CryptoDataFormat("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding", key);
+            format.setInitVector(iv);
+
+            byte[] ciphertext = marshal(context, format, PAYLOAD);
+            assertEquals(PAYLOAD, unmarshal(context, format, ciphertext));
+            assertArrayEquals(iv, format.getInitVector());
+        }
+    }
+
+    private static String failureMessage(DefaultCamelContext context, 
CryptoDataFormat format, byte[] body) {
+        Exception e = assertThrows(Exception.class, () -> unmarshal(context, 
format, body));
+        return rootMessage(e);
+    }
+
+    private static String rootMessage(Throwable t) {
+        while (t.getCause() != null) {
+            t = t.getCause();
+        }
+        return String.valueOf(t.getMessage());
+    }
+
+    private static byte[] marshal(DefaultCamelContext context, 
CryptoDataFormat format, String payload)
+            throws Exception {
+        Exchange exchange = new DefaultExchange(context);
+        ByteArrayOutputStream out = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
+        format.marshal(exchange, payload.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8), 
out);
+        return out.toByteArray();
+    }
+
+    private static String unmarshal(DefaultCamelContext context, 
CryptoDataFormat format, byte[] body)
+            throws Exception {
+        Exchange exchange = new DefaultExchange(context);
+        Object result = format.unmarshal(exchange, new 
java.io.ByteArrayInputStream(body));

Review Comment:
   🟠 **FQCN — same issue.**
   
   Add `import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;` and use the simple name:
   ```suggestion
           Object result = format.unmarshal(exchange, new 
ByteArrayInputStream(body));
   ```



-- 
This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service.
To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the
URL above to go to the specific comment.

To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected]

For queries about this service, please contact Infrastructure at:
[email protected]

Reply via email to