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commit 6fe5892ae0263147aea0de702f481d5675bdc73c
Author: Andrea Cosentino <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Fri Sep 4 09:09:41 2026 +0200

    Added CVE-2026-85243
    
    Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
    Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013qz9ir11vuQYfQApzwHAHD
    Signed-off-by: Andrea Cosentino <[email protected]>
---
 content/security/CVE-2026-85243.md      | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++
 content/security/CVE-2026-85243.txt.asc | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+)

diff --git a/content/security/CVE-2026-85243.md 
b/content/security/CVE-2026-85243.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3e60622d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/security/CVE-2026-85243.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+title: "Apache Camel Security Advisory - CVE-2026-85243"
+date: 2026-08-31T10:00:00+02:00
+url: /security/CVE-2026-85243.html
+draft: false
+type: security-advisory
+cve: CVE-2026-85243
+severity: MEDIUM
+summary: "Camel-Crypto-PGP: integrity verification downgrade - the 
modification detection code was verified only when the message used the 
integrity protected packet, so a sender choosing the legacy packet skipped the 
check entirely"
+description: "unmarshal() verified the modification detection code only when 
the message was an OpenPGP symmetrically encrypted integrity protected data 
packet. The older symmetrically encrypted data packet carries no such code, and 
OpenPGP's CFB mode is malleable without one, so a message using that packet 
skipped the check altogether. The packet type is chosen by whoever produced the 
message, which left the sender - or anyone able to rewrite the message in 
transit - deciding whether th [...]
+mitigation: "Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on 
the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x 
LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. A requireIntegrityProtection 
option, defaulting to true, now rejects a message that is not integrity 
protected. Note that signatureVerificationOption still defaults to optional, so 
a message carrying no signature is accepted; the two options together are what 
give a decrypted message authent [...]
+credit: "This issue was discovered by Claude Security Scan Tool"
+affected: "From 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1."
+fixed: 4.18.5, 4.22.1 and 4.23.0
+---
+
+The JIRA ticket: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24441 refers to 
the various commits that resolved the issue, and has more details.
+
+The fix was merged on main in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25848 
(commit 9d3108def6e8344f65a70ee86832b8f5237bc82d), backported to camel-4.22.x 
in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25944 (commit 
95b4c1500001bc32877df5b8fca0bc7bdd080666) and to camel-4.18.x in 
https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25946 (commit 
4ec9b37d70b08c478966000fb1bd653abfe410e3).
+
+The issue is classified as CWE-354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check 
Value. The camel-4.14.x line reached end of life before this fix and does not 
receive it; deployments on 4.14.x should move to 4.18.5 or later.
diff --git a/content/security/CVE-2026-85243.txt.asc 
b/content/security/CVE-2026-85243.txt.asc
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..00bf1702
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/security/CVE-2026-85243.txt.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+- ---
+title: "Apache Camel Security Advisory - CVE-2026-85243"
+date: 2026-08-31T10:00:00+02:00
+url: /security/CVE-2026-85243.html
+draft: false
+type: security-advisory
+cve: CVE-2026-85243
+severity: MEDIUM
+summary: "Camel-Crypto-PGP: integrity verification downgrade - the 
modification detection code was verified only when the message used the 
integrity protected packet, so a sender choosing the legacy packet skipped the 
check entirely"
+description: "unmarshal() verified the modification detection code only when 
the message was an OpenPGP symmetrically encrypted integrity protected data 
packet. The older symmetrically encrypted data packet carries no such code, and 
OpenPGP's CFB mode is malleable without one, so a message using that packet 
skipped the check altogether. The packet type is chosen by whoever produced the 
message, which left the sender - or anyone able to rewrite the message in 
transit - deciding whether th [...]
+mitigation: "Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on 
the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x 
LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. A requireIntegrityProtection 
option, defaulting to true, now rejects a message that is not integrity 
protected. Note that signatureVerificationOption still defaults to optional, so 
a message carrying no signature is accepted; the two options together are what 
give a decrypted message authent [...]
+credit: "This issue was discovered by Claude Security Scan Tool"
+affected: "From 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1."
+fixed: 4.18.5, 4.22.1 and 4.23.0
+- ---
+
+The JIRA ticket: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24441 refers to 
the various commits that resolved the issue, and has more details.
+
+The fix was merged on main in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25848 
(commit 9d3108def6e8344f65a70ee86832b8f5237bc82d), backported to camel-4.22.x 
in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25944 (commit 
95b4c1500001bc32877df5b8fca0bc7bdd080666) and to camel-4.18.x in 
https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25946 (commit 
4ec9b37d70b08c478966000fb1bd653abfe410e3).
+
+The issue is classified as CWE-354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check 
Value. The camel-4.14.x line reached end of life before this fix and does not 
receive it; deployments on 4.14.x should move to 4.18.5 or later.
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