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commit 15cceba57560f6fcf1e899105b3dba41e528051e
Author: Andrea Cosentino <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Mon Oct 19 10:36:37 2026 +0200

    Added CVE-2026-94386
    
    Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
    Signed-off-by: Andrea Cosentino <[email protected]>
---
 content/security/CVE-2026-94386.md      | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++
 content/security/CVE-2026-94386.txt.asc | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+)

diff --git a/content/security/CVE-2026-94386.md 
b/content/security/CVE-2026-94386.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b2708fba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/security/CVE-2026-94386.md
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+---
+title: "Apache Camel Security Advisory - CVE-2026-94386"
+date: 2026-10-19T10:00:00+02:00
+url: /security/CVE-2026-94386.html
+draft: false
+type: security-advisory
+cve: CVE-2026-94386
+severity: MEDIUM
+summary: "Camel-OAuth: Cross-scope token reuse via an under-keyed JVM-global 
client credentials token cache"
+description: "OAuthClientCredentialsTokenResolver obtains OAuth 2.0 bearer 
tokens through the client credentials grant on behalf of the components that 
authenticate their outbound calls with a named OAuth profile, such as 
camel-openai, camel-langchain4j-agent, camel-huggingface, camel-docling, 
camel-a2a, camel-spring-ai-chat and the IBM watsonx components, and of 
applications that call the OAuthClientAuthenticationFactory SPI directly. It 
kept the tokens it obtained in a static cache sha [...]
+mitigation: "Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes 
the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested 
to upgrade to 4.22.2. The 4.19.x to 4.21.x release lines reached end of life 
before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on 
them must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade 
immediately, disable token caching on every OAuth profile that shares a token 
endpoint and client ID with a [...]
+credit: "This issue was discovered by Andrea Cosentino from Apache Software 
Foundation"
+affected: "From 4.19.0 before 4.22.2."
+fixed: 4.22.2 and 4.23.0
+---
+
+The JIRA ticket: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24872 refers to 
the commits that resolved the issue, and has more details.
+
+The fix was merged on main in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/26681 
(commit 5e896b2df24bf80ad4a78be1f8a708f71d91aa16), and backported to 
camel-4.22.x in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/27779 (commit 
b2d9957bcbcf87bd5e59992fec45231876c645ed).
+
+The cache key now holds every input of the token request: the token endpoint, 
the client ID, a SHA-256 fingerprint of the client secret, so that the raw 
secret is not kept in the static cache, and the requested scope. An absent, 
empty or blank scope counts as one value, because each of them leaves the scope 
parameter out of the request; any other scope is matched exactly. Profiles that 
agree on all four still share a token across resolver instances, while profiles 
that differ in credenti [...]
+
+The client credentials token resolver and its cache were added in 4.19.0 by 
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-23093, which let other components 
obtain bearer tokens through camel-oauth with a named profile, and the cache 
was keyed on the token endpoint and client ID from the start, so the affected 
range begins at that release. The 4.18.x line and earlier do not contain the 
resolver and are not affected, although camel-oauth itself is older.
+
+This is the same class of defect as CVE-2026-85317, in which the OAuth2 client 
token cache of camel-http was keyed on fewer fields than shape the token. The 
two caches are separate code and that fix did not touch camel-oauth; here, 
unlike in camel-http, token caching is enabled by default, and the key also 
left out the client secret. The issue is also distinct from CVE-2026-80312 and 
CVE-2026-84178, which concerned the inbound processors of camel-oauth: 4.22.1, 
which fixes those two, is  [...]
diff --git a/content/security/CVE-2026-94386.txt.asc 
b/content/security/CVE-2026-94386.txt.asc
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9389761f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/security/CVE-2026-94386.txt.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+- ---
+title: "Apache Camel Security Advisory - CVE-2026-94386"
+date: 2026-10-19T10:00:00+02:00
+url: /security/CVE-2026-94386.html
+draft: false
+type: security-advisory
+cve: CVE-2026-94386
+severity: MEDIUM
+summary: "Camel-OAuth: Cross-scope token reuse via an under-keyed JVM-global 
client credentials token cache"
+description: "OAuthClientCredentialsTokenResolver obtains OAuth 2.0 bearer 
tokens through the client credentials grant on behalf of the components that 
authenticate their outbound calls with a named OAuth profile, such as 
camel-openai, camel-langchain4j-agent, camel-huggingface, camel-docling, 
camel-a2a, camel-spring-ai-chat and the IBM watsonx components, and of 
applications that call the OAuthClientAuthenticationFactory SPI directly. It 
kept the tokens it obtained in a static cache sha [...]
+mitigation: "Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes 
the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested 
to upgrade to 4.22.2. The 4.19.x to 4.21.x release lines reached end of life 
before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on 
them must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade 
immediately, disable token caching on every OAuth profile that shares a token 
endpoint and client ID with a [...]
+credit: "This issue was discovered by Andrea Cosentino from Apache Software 
Foundation"
+affected: "From 4.19.0 before 4.22.2."
+fixed: 4.22.2 and 4.23.0
+- ---
+
+The JIRA ticket: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24872 refers to 
the commits that resolved the issue, and has more details.
+
+The fix was merged on main in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/26681 
(commit 5e896b2df24bf80ad4a78be1f8a708f71d91aa16), and backported to 
camel-4.22.x in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/27779 (commit 
b2d9957bcbcf87bd5e59992fec45231876c645ed).
+
+The cache key now holds every input of the token request: the token endpoint, 
the client ID, a SHA-256 fingerprint of the client secret, so that the raw 
secret is not kept in the static cache, and the requested scope. An absent, 
empty or blank scope counts as one value, because each of them leaves the scope 
parameter out of the request; any other scope is matched exactly. Profiles that 
agree on all four still share a token across resolver instances, while profiles 
that differ in credenti [...]
+
+The client credentials token resolver and its cache were added in 4.19.0 by 
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-23093, which let other components 
obtain bearer tokens through camel-oauth with a named profile, and the cache 
was keyed on the token endpoint and client ID from the start, so the affected 
range begins at that release. The 4.18.x line and earlier do not contain the 
resolver and are not affected, although camel-oauth itself is older.
+
+This is the same class of defect as CVE-2026-85317, in which the OAuth2 client 
token cache of camel-http was keyed on fewer fields than shape the token. The 
two caches are separate code and that fix did not touch camel-oauth; here, 
unlike in camel-http, token caching is enabled by default, and the key also 
left out the client secret. The issue is also distinct from CVE-2026-80312 and 
CVE-2026-84178, which concerned the inbound processors of camel-oauth: 4.22.1, 
which fixes those two, is  [...]
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