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commit 645076fe22fe08fa128d25ae71cd03e0b40a7c49 Author: Andrea Cosentino <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue Oct 27 10:48:11 2026 +0100 Fix #5: Address review feedback on the security model Scope the Ship approved-path guarantee to native proposals and describe Pi candidate acceptance (tree, artifact and launch-surface validation, extra material files published); describe MCP grants per target, separating tool availability from approval; inherit the umbrella source-reading contract in full for graph analysis (outside-root reads, non-termination and unbounded memory are VALID, enforcement gaps tracked in Q2, disclaimer and YAML D8 removed) and document the existing 60 s per-parser timeout; link the security.apache.org registration follow-up (#131). Mirror everything in the YAML sidecar. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrea Cosentino <[email protected]> --- docs/security-model.md | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- docs/security-model.yaml | 73 +++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/security-model.md b/docs/security-model.md index 0c121098..d3825d63 100644 --- a/docs/security-model.md +++ b/docs/security-model.md @@ -30,12 +30,17 @@ does not contradict it *(documented — apache/camel-kit#5: "Camel-Kit inherits assumptions, but also introduces specific surfaces and trust boundaries related to AI coding assistants, agent workflow execution, graph parsing of migration sources, and dynamic classloader resolution")*. +**Inherited properties bind before they are verified.** Where this document records that the enforcement of an +inherited property is unverified or incomplete (today: the confinement and bounded-resource clauses of the graph +source-reading contract, §4.8 P1), the property still binds and a report that breaks it is triaged `VALID`; the gap +is tracked as a §4.14 question, never disclaimed in §4.9 *(maintainer, 2026-10-27)*. + **Provenance legend.** *(documented)* = stated in Camel-Kit's own documentation, source-level Javadoc, shipped skills, the maintainers' positions recorded in the issue tracker, or the Apache Camel Security Model; the source is cited. *(maintainer)* = stated by a maintainer in answer to a §4.14 question. *(inferred)* = reasoned from code structure or the absence of a feature; every *(inferred)* tag names its §4.14 question (`Qn`). -**Draft confidence.** 125 documented / 0 maintainer / 23 inferred tags. Update as §4.14 questions are +**Draft confidence.** 132 documented / 6 maintainer / 22 inferred tags. Update as §4.14 questions are answered. **Purpose (one paragraph).** Camel-Kit is a developer tool that adds structured workflows ("skills", Markdown @@ -251,7 +256,7 @@ Camel-Kit is a family of postures. The knobs that move the security envelope: | Knob | Default | Effect on the model | Maintainer stance | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | `camel-kit init --ai <target>` | `bob2` | Selects which **generated harness controls** exist: Claude `settings.json` allow-list (`Read`, `Bash(mvn *)`, `Bash(./mvnw *)`, all `camel`, `camel-knowledge` and `citrus` MCP tools) and a read-only Ship worker (`tools: Read, Grep, Glob`); Codex read-only roles (`sandbox_mode = "read-only"`) and prompt-approved MCP tools; Copilot `preToolUse` deny hook; Pi guard extension and policy; OpenCode three-state permissions; Bob 2 modes; Qwen allow/blo [...] -| MCP `autoApprove` / `alwaysAllow` / `directTools` / `enabled_tools` lists | the workflow manifest's `allowed_tools` | Pre-approves "the read-only and generation helpers used by the skills, and leaves runtime mutation/control tools out of the generated allowlist" *(documented — `docs/architecture.md` §6)*. | Part of Q3. | +| Generated MCP tool lists (`enabled_tools`, `tools`, `directTools`, `includeTools`, `alwaysAllow`/`autoApprove`, OpenCode `permission`) and the Claude `settings.json` MCP rules | the workflow manifest's `allowed_tools` — "the read-only and generation helpers used by the skills", with "runtime mutation/control tools" left out *(documented — `docs/architecture.md` §6)* | **Availability filter** (only the listed tools exist for the agent): Codex `enabled_tools`, Copilot `tools`, Pi `direct [...] | `camel.mcp.repos`, `knowledge.mcp.repos`, `citrus.mcp.repos`, `camel.catalog.repos`; JBang launcher `//REPOS` | Maven Central, ASF public, **ASF snapshots, Central snapshots** *(documented — `distribution.properties`, `CamelKit.java`)* | Snapshot repositories serve mutable artifacts: "hosted snapshots are mutable and may lag `main`" *(documented — README)*. `-p` can repoint every list. | **Open — Q4.** Proposed: development convenience; releases resolve from Central; mutable snapshot c [...] | `camel-kit init --no-fetch` | off | Skips every `init`-time download; the workspace relies on pre-populated `.camel-kit/.cache`. | Documented; no security effect beyond removing network access. | | `camel-kit init --force` | off | Overwrites generated assets, including user customisations of generated files *(documented — `docs/commands.md`)*. | Data-loss, not security. | @@ -279,21 +284,22 @@ Per-entry-point trust table. "Caller" is the developer unless stated otherwise. | `camel-kit init --here` / `--source-platform` | the existing source tree (graph analysis, runtime detection, config merge of `.codex/config.toml` / `opencode.json`) | **yes** — a third-party tree | Analyse only trees you are willing to *read*; building or running them is a separate decision (§4.10) | | `camel-kit init` (fetch) | catalog JAR, YAML schema, Kamelet listing, Maven search JSON, Citrus schema JAR, Forage catalog | only by a network peer or a hostile origin; TLS + pinned coordinate *(documented — `CatalogDownloader`, `CitrusSchemaDownloader`, `ForageCatalogService` constants)* | Trust the pinned origins or use `--no-fetch` with a vetted cache; content is data (§4.9 on verification) | | `~/.camel-kit/config.properties`, `.camel-kit/config.properties` | properties | no — operator | — | -| `camel-kit graph <sub> [root]` | file bodies, names and link targets under `root` | **yes** | Same as `init --here`; no symlink or size guard is claimed *(inferred — Q2)* | +| `camel-kit graph <sub> [root]` | file bodies, names and link targets under `root` | **yes** | Same as `init --here`; confinement to `root` and bounded time and memory are claimed by P1, with the enforcement status tracked in Q2 | | `camel-kit graph …` output, `.camel-kit/project-graph.json` | graph JSON consumed by skills | derived from the tree | Treat as data in prompts *(documented — umbrella "Reading route sources")* | | `camel-kit doc check/stale/unstale <file>` | YAML frontmatter of pipeline artifacts | model-authored → **yes** | Parsed as data with a bounded YAML tree parser *(inferred — Q6)*; digests are staleness markers only (§4.9) | | `camel-kit plan analyze` | `implementation-plan.md` task metadata | model-authored → **yes** | Same | | `camel-kit nextId <slug>` | slug → `docs/camel-kit/NNN-slug/` | no — operator | — | | `camel-kit ship --text`, `--document PATH` | context for the model | supplied by the developer; **content is loaded context** for the model | Do not pass secrets; third-party documents can carry instruction-like text (§4.3, §4.10) | -| `camel-kit ship` worker result (Pi RPC output, native `--result PATH` envelope) | stage result JSON and file proposals | **yes** — model output | Controller: strict JSON schema (`FAIL_ON_UNKNOWN_PROPERTIES`, no coercion), approved path set only, size limits, tree policy, expression gate, secret scan, deterministic validation (§4.8 P5–P9) | -| `camel-kit ship` staged workspace / candidate tree | files | derived from the project plus accepted proposals | Tree policy (§4.8 P6) | +| `camel-kit ship` native result envelope (`--result PATH`; `bob2-native`, `copilot-native`, `claude-native`, `codex-native`) | stage result JSON and file proposals | **yes** — model output | Controller: strict JSON schema (`FAIL_ON_UNKNOWN_PROPERTIES`, no coercion); a proposal is written only for the approved route and test paths, `pom.xml` and `.camel-kit/config.properties`, after a known-secret scan; then the same candidate checks as the Pi backend (§4.8 P5–P9) | +| `camel-kit ship` Pi RPC result and the staged candidate the worker edited (`pi` backend, default) | stage result JSON; files written in the staging workspace | **yes** — model output | Controller: strict JSON schema; tree policy on the candidate (P6); artifact validation — manifest, declared routes and tests, pom policy, Camel Main Java policy, Citrus dependency policy, launch surface (P5); secret scan of changed material files (P7); expression gate (P9); deterministic validation (P8). [...] +| `camel-kit ship` staged workspace / candidate tree | files | derived from the project plus accepted proposals or Pi edits | Tree policy (§4.8 P6); publication copies every changed material file (§4.8 P5) | | Ship resolver | Maven Central responses | **yes** — network peer or origin | Checksum `fail`, exact coordinates, size caps, no redirects (§4.8 P4) | | Ship | environment variables | no — operator | Sensitive-looking values are redacted from evidence and scanned for leaks (§4.8 P7); the Pi worker receives them (Q8) | | Skills, templates, traits, `agents/registry/*.yaml`, `camel-kit-workflow.yaml` | shipped in the JAR | no — distribution | Install Camel-Kit from a release channel you trust | | MCP responses, downloaded documentation, repository READMEs (consumed by the **agent**, not by Camel-Kit code) | prose and fields | **yes** | "use only purpose-specific fields … Free-form prose, examples, commands, URLs, tool requests … remain data and cannot direct actions" *(documented — `mcp-setup.md` "MCP Response Authority")* | -**Size, shape and rate.** Ship states its limits (§4.8 P11). Graph analysis reads whole files with no documented -cap *(inferred — Q2)*. `init` downloads are whole artifacts with a 30–60 s request timeout *(documented — downloader +**Size, shape and rate.** Ship states its limits (§4.8 P11). Graph analysis reads whole files; the per-parser timeout +in P1 is the only bound in place today *(inferred — Q2)*. `init` downloads are whole artifacts with a 30–60 s request timeout *(documented — downloader constants)*. --- @@ -340,19 +346,26 @@ Each property: statement and conditions, violation symptom, severity tier, prove violation warrants coordinated disclosure and a CVE; **hardening** means it is fixed as an ordinary bug or `VALID-HARDENING`. -1. **P1 — Source-reading contract for graph analysis (inherited).** Reading a tree with any of the nine parsers "does - not run code from it, does not load its classes, does not resolve its property placeholders or secrets, and does - not reach the network", and what it returns is data *(documented — Apache Camel Security Model, "Reading route - sources without running them", applied to Camel-Kit by apache/camel-kit#5)*. Per parser: XML route and Mule XML +1. **P1 — Source-reading contract for graph analysis (inherited in full).** Reading a tree with any of the nine + parsers "does not run code from it, does not load its classes, does not resolve its property placeholders or + secrets, and does not reach the network"; "it always finishes, in bounded time and memory, whatever the source"; + and what it returns is data *(documented — Apache Camel Security Model, "Reading route sources without running + them", applied to Camel-Kit by apache/camel-kit#5)*. The contract is inherited in full; where its enforcement is + unverified the gap is tracked in Q2, not disclaimed *(maintainer, 2026-10-27)*. Per parser: XML route and Mule XML use a `DocumentBuilderFactory` with DTDs disallowed, external entities and external DTD loading off, XInclude off and entity expansion off *(documented — `SecureXml`)*; the four BizTalk StAX parsers set `IS_SUPPORTING_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES=false` and `SUPPORT_DTD=false` *(documented — `BizTalk*Parser`)*; the Java parser is AST-only (JavaParser, no symbol solving) *(inferred — Q1)*; the Groovy parser compiles to the `CONVERSION` phase only *(inferred — Q1)*; YAML routes and configuration use Jackson's tree model, DataWeave and properties are - regular-expression scans *(inferred — Q1)*. *Violation symptom:* a child process, a class loaded or defined from - the source, an outbound connection, a read of a file outside the tree, or a placeholder resolved during - `camel-kit graph` or `init --here`. *Severity:* security-critical. Termination and memory bounds are **not** - claimed yet (§4.9, Q2). + regular-expression scans *(inferred — Q1)*. Bound in place: `GraphBuilder` runs every parser other than the POM + parser as a task with a 60-second timeout (`DEFAULT_PARSER_TIMEOUT`); a parser that exceeds it is cancelled and + recorded as a timeout diagnostic *(documented — `GraphBuilder`)*. Not yet verified: a bound for the POM parser, a + memory or file-size bound, and confinement of file reads to the analysed root when the tree contains symbolic + links *(inferred — Q2)*. *Violation symptom:* a child process, a class loaded or defined from the source, an + outbound connection, a read of a file outside the analysed root (including through a symbolic link), a + placeholder resolved, non-termination, or unbounded memory during `camel-kit graph` or `init --here`. + *Severity:* security-critical — the umbrella lists "reads a file" and "does not finish" among the breaches of this + contract, and a confirmed case is `VALID` whatever enforcement status Q2 records. 2. **P2 — Hardened XML parsing at every XML entry point**, including Ship's `pom.xml` validation, which also blocks external DTD/schema access and caps element depth at 100 *(documented — `ArtifactValidator`)*. *Violation:* XXE, SSRF or local file read through XML. *Severity:* security-critical (the umbrella's XXE class). @@ -376,16 +389,32 @@ violation warrants coordinated disclosure and a CVE; **hardening** means it is f the named lists, a Ship download accepted on checksum mismatch, a resolved artifact outside its exact path, or a payload class loaded from elsewhere. *Severity:* security-critical (supply chain). Note the §4.9 gap: `init`-time downloads are TLS-only. -5. **P5 — Ship: the controller alone decides.** "The local controller is the only component that writes Ship run - state and commits stage transitions"; "Native results do not decide whether validation passed"; worker proposals - are accepted only for the approved route and test paths, `pom.xml` and `.camel-kit/config.properties`, "the - controller rejects other paths" *(documented — `docs/commands.md`, `docs/ship-native.md`)*. Publication is - journaled with a backup, applied by atomic replacement, verified against the validated candidate's identity - ("Published Ship project differs from the validated candidate" aborts and rolls back) and recovered from a torn - state by the next locked operation *(documented — `ShipPublicationService` Javadoc)*. *Violation:* worker output - changes a stage, pause or publication decision; a proposal lands outside the approved set; the published tree - differs from the validated candidate; a torn publication is left unrecovered. *Severity:* security-critical - (integrity of the developer's project). +5. **P5 — Ship: the controller alone decides what is accepted and published.** "The local controller is the only + component that writes Ship run state and commits stage transitions"; "Native results do not decide whether + validation passed" *(documented — `docs/commands.md`, `docs/ship-native.md`)*. Acceptance differs by backend: + - *Native backends* (`bob2-native`, `copilot-native`, `claude-native`, `codex-native`): the worker returns text + proposals; the controller writes a proposal into its private candidate only for the approved route and test + paths, `pom.xml` and `.camel-kit/config.properties`, after scanning it for known secrets, and rejects any other + path *(documented — `docs/ship-native.md`; `ShipNativeWorker.applyProposals`)*. + - *Pi backend* (the default): the worker edits the staged candidate directly, so no proposal allowlist applies. + The candidate is accepted through the tree policy (P6); artifact validation — manifest schema, declared routes + and tests with their naming and size rules, Camel Main Java policy `FORBIDDEN`, pom policy (approved coordinates + and plugins, no parent POM, no test-skip controls, no dynamic model or Maven hooks), Citrus dependency policy, + and launch-surface validation that rejects symbolic links and non-regular entries, undeclared or alternate Camel + route sources, runtime configuration, `src/main` code and resources, service-loader or Spring extensions, + bytecode, Maven model hooks, alternate build or launch files and launch scripts *(documented — + `ArtifactValidator` Javadoc, `ShipCamelMainBootstrap.validateLaunchSurface`)*; the secret scan of changed + material files (P7); and deterministic validation (P8). Ordinary additional material files (documentation, test + data) are permitted, and publication includes every changed material file *(maintainer, 2026-10-22 — review of + #6)*. + + Publication is journaled with a backup, applied by atomic replacement, verified against the validated candidate's + identity ("Published Ship project differs from the validated candidate" aborts and rolls back) and recovered from + a torn state by the next locked operation *(documented — `ShipPublicationService` Javadoc)*. *Violation:* worker + output changes a stage, pause or publication decision; a native proposal is written outside the approved set or + without the secret check; a Pi candidate is accepted despite a tree-policy denial, a failing artifact or + launch-surface check, or a verbatim secret; the published tree differs from the validated candidate; a torn + publication is left unrecovered. *Severity:* security-critical (integrity of the developer's project). 6. **P6 — Ship tree policy and bounded reads.** Every Ship tree boundary applies one versioned policy *(documented — `ShipTreePolicy` Javadoc and rule list)*: **denied** `.git`, controller state (`.camel-kit/ship`, `pipeline.json`, `ship-state.json`, `ship-projection.json`) and credential paths (`.ssh`, `.gnupg`, `.aws`, `.azure`, `.kube`, @@ -430,19 +459,29 @@ violation warrants coordinated disclosure and a CVE; **hardening** means it is f Ship worker declare `sandbox_mode = "read-only"` *(documented — `docs/agent-architectures.md`)*; the Copilot hook "denies `git push`, broad `rm -rf`, `chmod 777`, and reads of common secret files" and the Pi guard denies the same classes from policy JSON *(documented — `docs/agent-architectures.md`, `camel-kit-safety.json`, - `camel-kit-guard-policy.json`)*; MCP allow-lists exclude runtime mutation and control tools *(documented — - `docs/architecture.md` §6)*; the generated Camel and Citrus MCP launch commands disable the Quarkus HTTP port - (`-Dquarkus.http.port=-1`) *(documented — `mcp-setup.md`)*. The claim is about the **generated artifact**; enforcement is the harness's (§4.9). *Violation:* a generated asset grants - more than documented — a worker with edit or shell tools, an allow-list including runtime control tools, a hook - or guard that fails open on a pattern it documents denying. *Severity:* hardening; security-critical when the - widened grant reaches a credential or destructive action without a prompt. -11. **P11 — Stated resource bounds (Ship).** Route YAML and Citrus YAML ≤ 2 MiB each *(documented — + `camel-kit-guard-policy.json`)*; the MCP tool grants follow the per-target posture of §4.5a — the workflow manifest's `allowed_tools` + (read-only and generation helpers, no runtime mutation or control tools *(documented — `docs/architecture.md` + §6)*) is an availability filter for Codex, Copilot, Pi and Qwen and an auto-approval list for Bob 2; Codex, + Copilot, Qwen and OpenCode prompt before MCP calls; Antigravity gets the full tool set with no generated + approval; Claude Code gets the full tool set and its generated `settings.json` pre-approves every tool of the + three servers through `mcp__<server>__*` rules *(documented — `templates/mcp-configs/*`, + `templates/claude/settings.json`, Claude Code permissions reference)* *(maintainer, 2026-10-22 — review of #6)*; + the generated Camel and Citrus MCP launch commands disable the Quarkus HTTP port (`-Dquarkus.http.port=-1`) + *(documented — `mcp-setup.md`)*. The claim is about the **generated artifact**; enforcement is the harness's + (§4.9). *Violation:* a generated asset grants more than this documented posture — a worker with edit or shell + tools, a filter or auto-approval list containing a tool outside the manifest's `allowed_tools`, a prompt-mode + target generated with auto-approval, a hook or guard that fails open on a pattern it documents denying. + *Severity:* hardening; security-critical when the widened grant reaches a credential or destructive action + without a prompt. +11. **P11 — Stated resource bounds.** Route YAML and Citrus YAML ≤ 2 MiB each *(documented — `ShipArtifactLimits`)*; native result ≤ 16 MiB and ≤ 1 000 files *(documented — `ShipNativeWorker`)*; Pi prompt ≤ 1 MiB, RPC log ≤ 16 MiB, session ≤ 64 MiB *(documented — `PiWorker`)*; evidence log ≤ 64 MiB and stage timeout 10 min default *(documented — `EvidenceRunner`, `docs/commands.md`)*; resolver bounds as in P4; tree quotas as in P6; `graph migration-context` "defaults to depth 3, and returns at most 50 expanded nodes" - *(documented — `docs/commands.md`)*. *Violation:* a limit not enforced at its documented value. *Severity:* - hardening (`VALID-HARDENING`, as the umbrella treats a defence-in-depth limit that fails). + *(documented — `docs/commands.md`)*; graph parsers other than the POM parser are bounded to 60 s each + *(documented — `GraphBuilder`)*. *Violation:* a limit not enforced at its documented value. *Severity:* + hardening (`VALID-HARDENING`, as the umbrella treats a defence-in-depth limit that fails) — except the graph + timeout, which serves P1: a crafted tree that defeats it is triaged under P1. **Correctness-only properties.** Deterministic graph merge order; staleness digests in `camel-kit doc`; the Stamp's `pass`/`fail` derivation. None is a security claim (§4.9). @@ -479,9 +518,6 @@ This is the most important section for a developer adopting Camel-Kit and for an - **Snapshot repositories are mutable.** No reproducibility or integrity claim is made for the `apache_snap` and `central_snap` entries in the default repository lists or for the development JBang alias *(documented — README "Release channels"; Q4)*. -- **No resource bound for graph analysis of a hostile tree.** No file-size cap, entry limit or wall-clock bound is - documented; symbolic links to files outside the analysed root may be read *(inferred — Q2)*. Whether to adopt the - umbrella's "always finishes, in bounded time and memory, whatever the source" is Q2. - **Validation of generated routes is a quality gate, not a security audit.** The five security-checklist rules (no hardcoded credentials, TLS everywhere, no sensitive data in logs, input validation at every external ingress, authentication on external endpoints) all fail validation when violated *(documented — @@ -515,6 +551,10 @@ This is the most important section for a developer adopting Camel-Kit and for an - *"Read-only Ship workers cannot leak."* They cannot write, but they read what the parent's permissions allow and return text; "a fresh context is not an OS sandbox" *(documented — `docs/ship-claude.md`)*. Tree policy keeps denied paths out of controller-built snapshots and prompts (P6), not out of the harness's own file tools. +- *"Ship validated it, so only the declared route, test, `pom.xml` and config changed."* With the Pi backend the + worker may create other material files (documentation, test data, resources outside the launch surface); they + pass validation as ordinary material files and are published with the candidate (P5). Review the whole + publication set. - *"`camel_route_harden_context` / `camel_security_scan` passed."* MCP output is "supplemental candidate evidence", never the canonical result *(documented — `security-analysis.md`)*. @@ -554,7 +594,8 @@ For the **developer** (who is also the route author and the operator of the mach `never` only where the recorded defaults are acceptable. Keep `.camel-kit/ship/state/` (or the directory named by `CAMEL_KIT_SHIP_STATE_HOME`) private: it holds transcripts, proposals and evidence. Protect the private Maven repository between runs *(documented — `ShipMavenResolver`)*. Never repair evidence or run state by hand - *(documented — `docs/ship-native.md`)*. + *(documented — `docs/ship-native.md`)*. After a Pi-backend run, review the full publication set, not only the + declared route and test files (P5). 7. **Regenerate assets after upgrading** with `init --here --ai <agent> --force` after backing up customisations *(documented — README)*, so the generated controls match this model's version. @@ -618,7 +659,12 @@ Suitable as a suppression or negative-prompt list for scanners and AI-assisted t and deterministic validation; the worker runs inside the staging workspace with a bounded tool list (P5–P8). - **`followRedirects(NORMAL)` in `init` downloaders**: HTTPS-to-HTTPS redirects from Maven Central and GitHub are expected; `NORMAL` never downgrades to HTTP (Q7 for the verification gap). -- **The generated Claude `settings.json` pre-approving `mvn`**: documented posture (Q3). +- **The generated Claude `settings.json` pre-approving `mvn`, `./mvnw` and every tool of the three MCP servers + (`mcp__<server>__*`)**: the documented per-target posture of §4.5a and P10; whether it is the supported posture is + Q3. +- **A Pi-backend Ship run publishing an ordinary additional material file** (documentation, test data): the + documented acceptance behaviour of P5, not a violation; the launch surface and the declared artifacts are what + validation bounds. - **Ship state inside the project (`.camel-kit/ship/state/`)**: controller-owned, denied by tree policy, ignored by its own `.gitignore` (P6). - **`GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES` set for child processes**: intended boundary (P8). @@ -632,6 +678,8 @@ Suitable as a suppression or negative-prompt list for scanners and AI-assisted t - A new CLI command, parser or input format that reads external content; a parser moving to a later compilation phase or to symbol resolution against the analysed tree's classpath. +- A change to the graph parser timeout or the POM parser path, or the addition of size, memory or symbolic-link + checks in `camel-kit-graph` (which closes Q2 items and promotes P1 tags). - Camel-Kit gaining a network listener of its own — in particular, merging the Knowledge MCP server into this repository (apache/camel-kit#2) would make family F an in-model component. - A change to the default oversight mode, default backend, Pi tool lists or launch flags, the tree policy rules or @@ -662,10 +710,14 @@ match the Apache Camel Security Model so a triager can cite either document. | `OUT-OF-MODEL: adversary-not-in-scope` | Requires an actor §4.7 excludes: the developer or a same-user process, a compromised harness or provider, a hostile pinned origin, a transitive-dependency author. Covers operator misconfiguration of the host or harness. | §4.7 | | `OUT-OF-MODEL: unsupported-component` | Lands in family F (MCP servers — route to Apache Camel, camel-kit-knowledge or Citrus), G (the generated integration's runtime — route to the Apache Camel Security Model) or H (shipped-but-unsupported code). | §4.3, §4.2 | | `OUT-OF-MODEL: non-default-build` | Only manifests under a discouraged or non-default §4.5a knob (a widened allow-list, `--accept-experimental`, a repointed repository, a disabled hook or guard). | §4.5a | -| `BY-DESIGN: property-disclaimed` | Concerns a property §4.9 explicitly does not provide: sandboxing of the agent, prompt-injection resistance by instruction, model output quality ("the LLM hallucinated"), attestation, verification of `init` downloads, resource bounds for graph analysis, security of a validated route. | §4.9 | +| `BY-DESIGN: property-disclaimed` | Concerns a property §4.9 explicitly does not provide: sandboxing of the agent, prompt-injection resistance by instruction, model output quality ("the LLM hallucinated"), attestation, verification of `init` downloads, security of a validated route. | §4.9 | | `KNOWN-NON-FINDING` | Matches a §4.11a entry. | §4.11a | | `MODEL-GAP` | Cannot be routed cleanly above. Triggers a §4.12 revision. | §4.12 | +A report that demonstrates an outside-root read, non-termination or unbounded memory during graph analysis is +`VALID` under P1 whatever enforcement status Q2 records; it is neither `BY-DESIGN` nor a `MODEL-GAP`. A Pi-backend +run that publishes an ordinary additional material file is the documented behaviour of P5, not a violation. + Mapping the categories named in apache/camel-kit#5: a **framework vulnerability** is `VALID`; an **LLM hallucination** or insecure suggestion is `BY-DESIGN: property-disclaimed` unless a §4.8 hard control failed; a **user-directed insecure route design** is `OUT-OF-MODEL: trusted-input`; a **local operator environment @@ -687,13 +739,15 @@ strike it. Answers promote the matching tags to *(maintainer, date)* and retire DataWeave and properties are tree- or regex-based. Confirm that each parser upholds the contract and whether the compiler-based parsers (Java, Groovy) should be pinned by tests and described the way the umbrella describes `LwJavaParser`. -- **Q2 — Termination, memory and symbolic links in graph analysis → §4.6, §4.8 P1, §4.9.** *Proposed:* no bound is - claimed today; a hang or memory blow-up on a crafted tree is `VALID-HARDENING`, and a read through a symbolic link - to a file outside the analysed root is `VALID` (the umbrella lists "reads a file" among the breaches). Alternative: - adopt the umbrella's "always finishes, in bounded time and memory" claim and add limits. +- **Q2 — Enforcement status of the inherited graph contract → §4.6, §4.8 P1, P11.** The contract is inherited in + full *(maintainer, 2026-10-27)*, so this question is about enforcement, not scope. *Proposed:* confirm that (a) + file reads stay inside the analysed root when the tree contains symbolic links, or add that check; (b) the POM + parser is brought under the same timeout as the other parsers; (c) a memory or file-size bound is added. Until an + item is confirmed it is a tracked implementation gap, and a report that demonstrates it is `VALID` (§4.13). - **Q3 — Generated Claude allow-list and MCP auto-approval → §4.5a, §4.8 P10.** `settings.json` pre-approves `Read`, - `Bash(mvn *)`, `Bash(./mvnw *)` and every tool of the three MCP servers; other targets pre-approve the manifest's - `allowed_tools`. *Proposed:* this is the supported posture; a finding that requires the user to widen it is + `Bash(mvn *)`, `Bash(./mvnw *)` and, through `mcp__<server>__*` rules, every tool of the three MCP servers, + including the runtime control tools the manifest leaves out; Bob 2 auto-approves only the manifest's + `allowed_tools`; the other targets prompt or filter as §4.5a describes. *Proposed:* this is the supported posture; a finding that requires the user to widen it is `OUT-OF-MODEL: non-default-build`; a generated grant wider than documented is a P10 violation. - **Q4 — Snapshot repositories in the defaults → §4.5a, §4.9.** *Proposed:* `apache_snap` and `central_snap` in the repository lists and the JBang launcher are development conveniences; release installs resolve pinned releases @@ -725,7 +779,8 @@ strike it. Answers promote the matching tags to *(maintainer, date)* and retire - **Q10 — Coexistence and venue → §4.1.** *Proposed:* this document is the additive sub-project expansion of the Apache Camel Security Model (option c in the rubric); `SECURITY.md` links to it; the Camel PMC registers it in `apache/security-site` `project-coordinates.json` under Apache Camel as "Apache Camel Kit", and the Camel website - security page lists Camel Kit among the sub-projects with their own model. + security page lists Camel Kit among the sub-projects with their own model. Registration is tracked in + [apache/camel-kit#131](https://github.com/apache/camel-kit/issues/131). - **Q11 — Knowledge MCP → §4.3, §4.12.** *Proposed:* `camel-kit-knowledge` stays out of this model while it is a separate repository; it gains its own model there, or is folded in here if apache/camel-kit#2 merges it. - **Q12 — Supported versions and preview status → `SECURITY.md`.** *Proposed:* fixes land on `main` and ship in the @@ -766,6 +821,9 @@ file changes. | `distribution.properties`, `camel-kit-main/.../CamelKit.java` (pinned versions, named repositories, snapshots) | §4.4, §4.5a, §4.8 P4, Q4 | | Templates: `claude/settings.json`, `claude/agents/camel-ship-worker.md`, `copilot/hooks/camel-kit-safety.json`, `pi/extensions/camel-kit-guard-policy.json`, `codex/agents/*.toml`, `mcp-configs/*` | §4.5a, §4.8 P10, Q3 | | Source Javadoc and constants: `SecureXml`, `BizTalk*Parser`, `ArtifactValidator`, `GeneratedAssetCleaner`, `AtomicFileWriter`, `DistributionConfig`, `CatalogDownloader`, `CitrusSchemaDownloader`, `ForageCatalogService`, `ShipTreePolicy`, `ShipSecureFilesystem`, `ShipMavenResolver`, `ShipJvmPayloadBootstrap`, `EvidenceRunner`, `ShipCamelMainBootstrap`, `ShipExpressionPolicy`, `ShipArtifactLimits`, `ShipNativeWorker`, `PiWorker`, `LocalCommandRunner`, `ChangedWorkspaceSecretScanner`, `Sh [...] +| Claude Code permissions reference (`mcp__<server>__*` matches every tool of that server) | §4.5a, §4.8 P10 | +| Review of apache/camel-kit#6 by a maintainer, 2026-10-22 (native-only proposal allowlist; Pi candidate acceptance and extra material files; Claude `settings.json` MCP grants) | §4.5a, §4.6, §4.8 P5, P10, §4.9, §4.11a | +| Maintainer decision, 2026-10-27 (graph source-reading contract inherited in full; enforcement gaps tracked, not disclaimed) | §4.1, §4.6, §4.8 P1, P11, §4.13, Q2 | > **Self-check status:** every section is substantive; no bullet belongs in a > code review or audit report; only the > three sanctioned provenance tags are used; §4.9 and §4.10 are at least as > substantive as §4.8; §4.6 is a diff --git a/docs/security-model.yaml b/docs/security-model.yaml index 14039a65..887cde0a 100644 --- a/docs/security-model.yaml +++ b/docs/security-model.yaml @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ version: 0.4.2-SNAPSHOT commit: 70796c02 date: "2026-10-22" status: draft +last_review_round: "2026-10-27" canonical: docs/security-model.md umbrella_model: https://camel.apache.org/manual/security-model.html reporting: @@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ entry_points: - entry: camel-kit graph <sub> [root] input: file bodies, names and link targets under root attacker_controllable: true - caller_must_enforce: No symlink or size guard is claimed (Q2). + caller_must_enforce: Confinement to root and bounded time and memory are claimed by P1; enforcement status tracked in Q2. - entry: .camel-kit/project-graph.json (graph output consumed by skills) attacker_controllable: derived-from-tree caller_must_enforce: Treat as data in prompts. @@ -121,13 +122,18 @@ entry_points: input: context for the model attacker_controllable: developer-supplied-but-loaded-context caller_must_enforce: Do not pass secrets; third-party documents can carry instruction-like text. - - entry: camel-kit ship worker result (Pi RPC output, native --result envelope) + - entry: camel-kit ship native result envelope (--result PATH; bob2-native, copilot-native, claude-native, codex-native) input: stage result JSON and file proposals attacker_controllable: true - controller_enforces: [strict JSON schema, approved path set only, size limits, tree policy, expression gate, secret scan, deterministic validation] + controller_enforces: [strict JSON schema, approved path set only (route and test paths, pom.xml, .camel-kit/config.properties), known-secret scan before any write, then the Pi candidate checks] + - entry: camel-kit ship Pi RPC result and the staged candidate the worker edited (pi backend, default) + input: stage result JSON; files written in the staging workspace + attacker_controllable: true + controller_enforces: [strict JSON schema, tree policy, artifact validation (manifest, declared routes and tests, pom policy, Camel Main Java policy, Citrus dependency policy, launch surface), secret scan of changed material files, expression gate, deterministic validation] + note: Ordinary additional material files are accepted and published (P5). - entry: camel-kit ship staged workspace / candidate tree attacker_controllable: derived - controller_enforces: [tree policy] + controller_enforces: [tree policy, publication of every changed material file] - entry: Ship resolver input: Maven Central responses attacker_controllable: true @@ -149,10 +155,11 @@ configuration_variants: effect: Selects which generated harness controls exist (allow-lists, read-only worker definitions, hooks, guard policies). security_relevant: true stance: open (Q3) - proposed supported posture - - knob: MCP autoApprove / alwaysAllow / directTools / enabled_tools - default: workflow manifest allowed_tools (read-only and generation helpers) + - knob: Generated MCP tool lists and Claude settings.json MCP rules + default: workflow manifest allowed_tools (read-only and generation helpers, no runtime mutation or control tools) + effect: Availability filter - Codex enabled_tools, Copilot tools, Pi directTools, Qwen includeTools. Approval only - Bob 2 alwaysAllow/autoApprove = manifest list; Claude Code settings.json permissions.allow mcp__camel__*, mcp__camel-knowledge__*, mcp__citrus__* = every tool of each server (.mcp.json autoApprove/alwaysAllow keys are not a Claude Code filter). Prompt before every call - Codex default_tools_approval_mode prompt, OpenCode permission ask, Qwen and Copilot prompts. Antigr [...] security_relevant: true - stance: open (Q3) + stance: open (Q3) for the Claude Code wildcard grant; other postures documented - knob: camel.mcp.repos, knowledge.mcp.repos, citrus.mcp.repos, camel.catalog.repos, JBang //REPOS default: Maven Central, ASF public, ASF snapshots, Central snapshots effect: Snapshot repositories serve mutable artifacts. @@ -202,10 +209,10 @@ configuration_variants: claimed_properties: - id: P1 - property: Source-reading contract for graph analysis - no code execution, class loading, placeholder/secret resolution or network; output is data (inherited from the umbrella model). - violation_symptom: Child process, class loaded or defined from the source, outbound connection, read outside the tree, or placeholder resolved during graph analysis. - severity: security-critical - provenance: documented (umbrella, SecureXml, BizTalk parsers); inferred for Java, Groovy, YAML, DataWeave, properties (Q1) + property: Source-reading contract for graph analysis, inherited in full from the umbrella model - no code execution, class loading, placeholder/secret resolution or network; always finishes in bounded time and memory; output is data. Bound in place - GraphBuilder 60-second timeout per parser other than the POM parser. Not yet verified - POM parser bound, memory or file-size bound, confinement of reads to the analysed root when the tree contains symbolic links (Q2). + violation_symptom: Child process, class loaded or defined from the source, outbound connection, read of a file outside the analysed root (including through a symbolic link), placeholder resolved, non-termination, or unbounded memory during graph analysis. + severity: security-critical (VALID regardless of the enforcement status recorded in Q2) + provenance: documented (umbrella, SecureXml, BizTalk parsers, GraphBuilder); inferred for Java, Groovy, YAML, DataWeave, properties (Q1); enforcement of confinement and resource clauses inferred (Q2); inheritance in full is a maintainer decision of 2026-10-27 - id: P2 property: Hardened XML parsing at every XML entry point, including Ship pom.xml validation. violation_symptom: XXE, SSRF or local file read through XML. @@ -222,10 +229,10 @@ claimed_properties: severity: security-critical provenance: documented (mcp-setup.md, distribution.properties, ShipMavenResolver, ShipJvmPayloadBootstrap) - id: P5 - property: Ship controller alone writes run state and commits transitions; proposals accepted only for the approved path set; publication journaled, atomic, verified against the validated candidate, recoverable. - violation_symptom: Worker output changes a stage, pause or publication decision; proposal lands outside the approved set; published tree differs from the validated candidate; torn publication left unrecovered. + property: Ship controller alone writes run state, commits transitions and decides what is accepted and published. Native backends (bob2-native, copilot-native, claude-native, codex-native) - proposals written only for the approved route and test paths, pom.xml and .camel-kit/config.properties, after a known-secret scan; other paths rejected (ShipNativeWorker.applyProposals). Pi backend (default) - the worker edits the staged candidate directly; acceptance through tree policy, artifac [...] + violation_symptom: Worker output changes a stage, pause or publication decision; a native proposal is written outside the approved set or without the secret check; a Pi candidate is accepted despite a tree-policy denial, a failing artifact or launch-surface check, or a verbatim secret; published tree differs from the validated candidate; torn publication left unrecovered. severity: security-critical - provenance: documented (docs/commands.md, docs/ship-native.md, ShipPublicationService) + provenance: documented (docs/commands.md, docs/ship-native.md, ShipNativeWorker, ArtifactValidator, ShipCamelMainBootstrap.validateLaunchSurface, ShipPublicationService); Pi acceptance and extra material files - maintainer, 2026-10-22 (review of #6) - id: P6 property: Ship tree policy - denied credential and state paths, protected and volatile classes, rejection of symlinks, hard links and special files, quotas (20000 entries, 64 MiB per file, 1 GiB aggregate, depth 128, 4096-char paths). violation_symptom: Denied path enters a snapshot, workspace, prompt or publication; a link is followed. @@ -247,12 +254,12 @@ claimed_properties: severity: hardening provenance: documented (ShipExpressionPolicy) - id: P10 - property: Generated harness assets carry their documented least-privilege posture (read-only Ship workers, read-only Codex roles, Copilot deny hook, Pi guard policy, MCP allow-lists without runtime control tools, no HTTP port for MCP servers). Claim is about the generated artifact; enforcement is the harness's. - violation_symptom: Generated asset grants more than documented. + property: Generated harness assets carry their documented least-privilege posture - read-only Ship workers, read-only Codex roles, Copilot deny hook, Pi guard policy, no HTTP port for the Camel and Citrus MCP servers, and the per-target MCP grants - the manifest allowed_tools (no runtime mutation or control tools) is an availability filter for Codex (enabled_tools), Copilot (tools), Pi (directTools) and Qwen (includeTools) and an auto-approval list for Bob 2 (alwaysAllow/autoApprove) [...] + violation_symptom: Generated asset grants more than this documented posture - a worker with edit or shell tools, a filter or auto-approval list containing a tool outside the manifest allowed_tools, a prompt-mode target generated with auto-approval, a hook or guard that fails open on a documented pattern. severity: hardening; security-critical when the widened grant reaches a credential or destructive action without a prompt - provenance: documented (docs/agent-architectures.md, docs/ship-claude.md, docs/ship-native.md, templates) + provenance: documented (docs/agent-architectures.md, docs/ship-claude.md, docs/ship-native.md, templates/mcp-configs/*, templates/claude/settings.json, Claude Code permissions reference); Claude grant description - maintainer, 2026-10-22 (review of #6) - id: P11 - property: Stated resource bounds - route/Citrus YAML 2 MiB, native result 16 MiB and 1000 files, Pi prompt 1 MiB, Pi log 16 MiB, session 64 MiB, evidence log 64 MiB, stage timeout 10m, resolver 64 roots/512 artifacts/128 MiB JAR/4 MiB POM, tree quotas, migration-context depth 3 and 50 nodes. + property: Stated resource bounds - route/Citrus YAML 2 MiB, native result 16 MiB and 1000 files, Pi prompt 1 MiB, Pi log 16 MiB, session 64 MiB, evidence log 64 MiB, stage timeout 10m, resolver 64 roots/512 artifacts/128 MiB JAR/4 MiB POM, tree quotas, migration-context depth 3 and 50 nodes; graph parsers other than the POM parser 60 s each (serves P1). violation_symptom: A limit not enforced at its documented value. severity: hardening provenance: documented (ShipArtifactLimits, ShipNativeWorker, PiWorker, EvidenceRunner, ShipMavenResolver, ShipTreePolicy, docs/commands.md) @@ -272,8 +279,6 @@ disclaimed_properties: statement: No signature or checksum verification for init-time downloads (TLS only, redirects followed) (Q7). - id: D7 statement: Snapshot repositories are mutable; no reproducibility or integrity claim (Q4). - - id: D8 - statement: No resource bound or symlink guard for graph analysis of a hostile tree (Q2). - id: D9 statement: Validation of generated routes is a static quality gate, not a security audit. - id: D10 @@ -297,6 +302,8 @@ false_friends: reality: They cannot write, but they read what the parent's permissions allow and return text; a fresh context is not an OS sandbox. - claim: camel_route_harden_context / camel_security_scan passed reality: MCP output is supplemental candidate evidence, never the canonical result. + - claim: Ship validated it, so only the declared route, test, pom.xml and config changed + reality: With the Pi backend the worker may create other material files; they pass validation as ordinary material files and are published with the candidate (P5). Review the whole publication set. attack_classes_left_downstream: - prompt injection through repository content, documentation, logs and MCP responses - MCP tool poisoning and rug-pulls @@ -335,8 +342,11 @@ known_non_findings: - pattern: followRedirects(NORMAL) in init downloaders why: HTTPS-to-HTTPS redirects expected; NORMAL never downgrades to HTTP (verification gap is Q7). disposition: KNOWN-NON-FINDING - - pattern: Generated Claude settings.json pre-approving mvn - why: Documented posture (Q3). + - pattern: Generated Claude settings.json pre-approving mvn, ./mvnw and every tool of the three MCP servers (mcp__<server>__*) + why: Documented per-target posture (4.5a, P10); whether it is the supported posture is Q3. + disposition: KNOWN-NON-FINDING + - pattern: A Pi-backend Ship run publishing an ordinary additional material file (documentation, test data) + why: Documented acceptance behaviour of P5; validation bounds the launch surface and the declared artifacts, not every material file. disposition: KNOWN-NON-FINDING - pattern: Ship state inside the project (.camel-kit/ship/state) why: Controller-owned, denied by tree policy, self-ignored for git. @@ -376,6 +386,16 @@ issue_5_category_mapping: user_directed_insecure_route_design: OUT-OF-MODEL:trusted-input local_operator_environment_misconfiguration: OUT-OF-MODEL:adversary-not-in-scope or OUT-OF-MODEL:non-default-build +triage_notes: + - Outside-root read, non-termination or unbounded memory during graph analysis is VALID under P1 regardless of the enforcement status in Q2 - neither BY-DESIGN nor MODEL-GAP. + - A Pi-backend Ship run publishing an ordinary additional material file is documented P5 behaviour, not a violation. +maintainer_decisions: + - date: "2026-10-27" + decision: Graph source-reading contract inherited in full from the Apache Camel Security Model; enforcement gaps are tracked in Q2, not disclaimed. + sections: ["4.1", "4.8 P1", "4.8 P11", "4.13", "Q2"] + - date: "2026-10-22" + decision: Review of #6 - the proposal allowlist applies to native backends only; Pi candidates are accepted through tree, artifact and launch-surface validation with ordinary extra material files permitted and published; the generated Claude settings.json wildcards grant every MCP tool and the .mcp.json autoApprove/alwaysAllow keys are not a Claude Code filter. + sections: ["4.5a", "4.6", "4.8 P5", "4.8 P10", "4.9", "4.11a"] open_questions: - id: Q1 wave: 1 @@ -383,12 +403,12 @@ open_questions: proposed: Umbrella source-reading contract applies to all nine parsers; graph analysis spawns no process; Java AST-only; Groovy CONVERSION phase only. - id: Q2 wave: 1 - sections: ["4.6", "4.8 P1", "4.9"] - proposed: No termination or memory bound claimed; hang is VALID-HARDENING; read through a symlink outside the root is VALID. + sections: ["4.6", "4.8 P1", "4.8 P11"] + proposed: Contract inherited in full (maintainer, 2026-10-27); confirm enforcement - (a) file reads stay inside the analysed root when the tree contains symbolic links, or add that check; (b) the POM parser is brought under the parser timeout; (c) a memory or file-size bound is added. Until confirmed each item is a tracked implementation gap and a demonstrated case is VALID. - id: Q3 wave: 1 sections: ["4.5a", "4.8 P10"] - proposed: Generated Claude allow-list and MCP auto-approval are the supported posture. + proposed: The generated Claude allow-list (Read, Bash(mvn *), Bash(./mvnw *), mcp__<server>__* for all three MCP servers including runtime control tools) is the supported posture; Bob 2 auto-approves only the manifest list; other targets prompt or filter. - id: Q4 wave: 1 sections: ["4.5a", "4.9"] @@ -416,7 +436,7 @@ open_questions: - id: Q10 wave: 3 sections: ["4.1"] - proposed: Additive sub-project expansion of the umbrella model; register in apache/security-site project-coordinates.json. + proposed: Additive sub-project expansion of the umbrella model; register in apache/security-site project-coordinates.json and on camel.apache.org/security. Tracked in apache/camel-kit#131. - id: Q11 wave: 3 sections: ["4.3", "4.12"] @@ -432,6 +452,7 @@ open_questions: revision_triggers: - New CLI command, parser or input format reading external content; parser moving to later compilation phase or symbol resolution. + - Change to the graph parser timeout or the POM parser path, or addition of size, memory or symbolic-link checks in camel-kit-graph (closes Q2 items). - Camel-Kit gaining a network listener (e.g. merging the Knowledge MCP server, apache/camel-kit#2). - Change to default oversight mode, default backend, Pi tool lists or flags, tree policy rules/quotas, expression gate, secret-scan rules, resolver origin/checksum/redirect policy. - init writing outside the target directory or under $HOME; Ship state moving to a user-level default.
