winterhazel commented on code in PR #13821:
URL: https://github.com/apache/cloudstack/pull/13821#discussion_r3797346357
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server/src/main/java/org/apache/cloudstack/dns/DnsProviderManagerImpl.java:
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@@ -162,14 +163,29 @@ private DnsProvider getProviderByType(DnsProviderType
type) {
throw new CloudRuntimeException("No plugin found for DNS provider
type: " + type);
}
+ /**
+ * Rejects a DNS provider URL that resolves to an illegal address before
any provider client is given
+ * the chance to connect to it. See {@link UriUtils#validateUrl(String)}
for the exact rules enforced
+ * (including the requirement that the URL declares an {@code http}/{@code
https} scheme).
+ * Expects {@code url} to already be trimmed.
+ */
+ private void validateDnsServerUrl(String url) {
+ if (StringUtils.isBlank(url)) {
+ throw new IllegalArgumentException("URL cannot be blank.");
+ }
+ UriUtils.validateUrl(url);
Review Comment:
@sudo87 I know that they can be valid DNS servers. I do agree that it might
make sense to allow root admins to register these DNS servers. However, my
point is regarding whether we should allow non-root admin accounts, which we
typically assume that do not have knowledge about the cloud provider's internal
infrastructure, to register a DNS server (or any other internal address)
belonging to the cloud provider's internal infrastructure. Could this be
considered a security concern?
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