Author: engelen
Date: Fri Jun  5 16:56:44 2026
New Revision: 1935041

Log:
security model: describe Java deserialization

as discussed in https://lists.apache.org/thread/dwrom69bbkm839ppozh7t4fq8qsns890

Modified:
   commons/cms-site/trunk/content/xdoc/security.xml

Modified: commons/cms-site/trunk/content/xdoc/security.xml
==============================================================================
--- commons/cms-site/trunk/content/xdoc/security.xml    Fri Jun  5 16:54:38 
2026        (r1935040)
+++ commons/cms-site/trunk/content/xdoc/security.xml    Fri Jun  5 16:56:44 
2026        (r1935041)
@@ -74,7 +74,18 @@
           Therefore, don't report a behavior as a Commons component's 
vulnerability if the same behavior would be considered legitimate for the JDK.
           We welcome suggestions for hardening the code base.
         </p>  
-
+        <p>  
+          When applications applications use Java serialization to deserialize 
untrusted
+          input, we consider this a vulnerability in that application. To 
exploit such a
+          vulnerability, the attacker needs to find a 'gadget' class on the 
classpath.
+          Several Commons libraries contain classes that can be used as such a 
'gadget'.
+          We do not consider this a vulnerability in Commons, but we do welcome
+          contributions that make Commons classes unusable for such attacks. 
If you want
+          to safely deserialize untrusted input in your application, consider 
using
+          <a 
href="https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-io/description.html#Safe_Deserialization";>Commons
 IO</a>.
+          Also refer to <a 
href="https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/25/core/addressing-serialization-vulnerabilities.html";>Addressing
 Deserialization Vulnerabilities</a>
+          in the Java SE Core Libraries documentation.
+        </p>  
       </section>
 
       <section name="Known Security Vulnerabilities">

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