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The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/asf-site by this push: new c3d11e54c5 Deploying to asf-site from @ apache/cordova-docs@6bd4ffa0f3ebf61f84744e7566e3902391ad689b π c3d11e54c5 is described below commit c3d11e54c5e24c4a6bf4a7710b73937e3823d159 Author: erisu <er...@users.noreply.github.com> AuthorDate: Tue Mar 18 02:10:36 2025 +0000 Deploying to asf-site from @ apache/cordova-docs@6bd4ffa0f3ebf61f84744e7566e3902391ad689b π --- docs/en/dev/guide/appdev/allowlist/index.html | 69 +++++++++++- docs/en/dev/guide/appdev/security/index.html | 153 +++++++++++++++++++------- feed.xml | 4 +- 3 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/en/dev/guide/appdev/allowlist/index.html b/docs/en/dev/guide/appdev/allowlist/index.html index 39e9c8846c..e46947aee7 100644 --- a/docs/en/dev/guide/appdev/allowlist/index.html +++ b/docs/en/dev/guide/appdev/allowlist/index.html @@ -2425,7 +2425,7 @@ to the host, or as a suffix to the path --></span> <span class="nt"><allow-navigation</span> <span class="na">href=</span><span class="s">"*://*.example.com/*"</span> <span class="nt">/></span> -<span class="c"><!-- +<span class="c"><!-- A wildcard can be used to allow the entire network, over HTTP and HTTPS. This is *NOT RECOMMENDED* --></span> @@ -2480,10 +2480,63 @@ <h2>Content Security Policy (CSP)</h2> -<p>Controls which network requests (images, XHRs, etc) are allowed to be made (via webview directly).</p> +<p>The <a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP"><strong>Content Security Policy (CSP)</strong></a> <code><meta></code> tag is a very powerful mechanism that allows you to control trusted sources of content. You can restrict various content types and domains from which content can be loaded from. Unsafe and risky HTML and JavaScript can also be disabled to further increase the security of your app.</p> + +<p>The CSP <code><meta></code> tag should be placed in your app's index.html file.</p> <p>On Android and iOS, the network request allow list (see above) is not able to filter all types of requests (e.g. <code><video></code> & WebSockets are not blocked). So, in addition to the allow list, you should use a <a href="http://content-security-policy.com/">Content Security Policy</a> <code><meta></code> tag on all of your pages.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Note</strong>: If your app has multiple HTML files and navigates between them using the browser's navigation features, you should include the CSP in each file. If your app is a single-page application, you only need to include the CSP on <code>index.html</code>.</p> +</blockquote> + +<h3>Cordova's Default Template Content Security Policy</h3> + +<p>The CSP that Cordova's default template uses looks like this (indented for clarity):</p> + +<div class="language-html highlighter-rouge"><div class="highlight"><pre class="highlight"><code><span class="nt"><meta</span> <span class="na">http-equiv=</span><span class="s">"Content-Security-Policy"</span> + <span class="na">content=</span><span class="s">"default-src 'self' data: https://ssl.gstatic.com 'unsafe-eval'; + style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; + media-src *; + img-src 'self' data: content:;"</span><span class="nt">></span> +</code></pre></div></div> + +<p>The above snippet enforces the following:</p> + +<p><strong>Default Source (<code>default-src</code>):</strong></p> + +<p>As a fallback, all other network requests are restricted to:</p> + +<ul> + <li>The same origin as the app itself (<code>'self'</code>).</li> + <li>Resources loaded via <code>data:</code> URIs.</li> + <li>Resources from the specified external domain <code>https://ssl.gstatic.com</code>.</li> + <li>JavaScript methods such as <code>eval()</code> (and similar) are permitted with <code>'unsafe-eval'</code>.</li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>Style Source (<code>style-src</code>):</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li>Styles can only be loaded from the same origin (<code>'self'</code>).</li> + <li>Inline styles (<code>'unsafe-inline'</code>) are also allowed, meaning styles can be directly applied using the <code>style</code> attribute on elements or within <code><style></code> tags.</li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>Media Source (<code>media-src</code>):</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li>Media can be loaded from any source.</li> +</ul> + +<p><strong>Image Source (<code>img-src</code>):</strong></p> + +<ul> + <li>Images can only be loaded from the same origin (<code>'self'</code>).</li> + <li>Allows loading images from <code>data:</code> URIs.</li> + <li>Allows loading images from <code>content:</code> URIs, typically used within the Android ecosystem.</li> +</ul> + +<h3>Example Content Security Policy Declarations</h3> + <p>Here are some example CSP declarations for your <code>.html</code> pages:</p> <div class="language-html highlighter-rouge"><div class="highlight"><pre class="highlight"><code><span class="c"><!-- Good default declaration: @@ -2497,7 +2550,7 @@ <span class="c"><!-- Allow everything but only from the same origin and foo.com --></span> <span class="nt"><meta</span> <span class="na">http-equiv=</span><span class="s">"Content-Security-Policy"</span> <span class="na">content=</span><span class="s">"default-src 'self' foo.com"</span><span class="nt">></span> -<span class="c"><!-- This policy allows everything (eg CSS, AJAX, object, frame, media, etc) except that +<span class="c"><!-- This policy allows everything (eg CSS, AJAX, object, frame, media, etc) except that * CSS only from the same origin and inline styles, * scripts only from the same origin and inline styles, and eval() --></span> @@ -2510,6 +2563,16 @@ <span class="nt"><meta</span> <span class="na">http-equiv=</span><span class="s">"Content-Security-Policy"</span> <span class="na">content=</span><span class="s">"default-src 'self'; frame-src 'self' https://cordova.apache.org"</span><span class="nt">></span> </code></pre></div></div> +<p>You should fully understand the CSP tag and the various directives that can be specified. More documentation is available at <a href="https://web.dev/articles/csp">Content Security Policy</a> (via Google Developers) and Mozilla's <a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP">Content Security Policy (CSP)</a> article.</p> + +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Tip</strong>: If you're using web sockets, include <code>ws:</code> (<code>wss:</code> if using SSL) in the <code>connect-src</code> directive.</p> +</blockquote> + +<h3>Debugging Content Security Policy</h3> + +<p>When adding a CSP to your app, it's likely you'll encounter some issues. Fortunately, both Google Chrome's Developer Tools and Safari's Web Inspector make it very clear when a CSP violation occurs. Watch the console for any violation messages, which are typically quite detailed, specifying exactly which resource was blocked and why. Address each violation as they appear to ensure your CSP is properly configured.</p> + <h2>Other Notes</h2> <p><a href="https://developer.apple.com/library/prerelease/ios/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/CocoaKeys.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40009251-SW33">Application Transport Security (ATS)</a> is new in iOS 9 (Xcode 7). This new feature acts as an allow list for your app. Cordova CLI will automatically convert the <code><access></code> and <code><allow-navigation></code> tags to the appropriate ATS directives.</p> diff --git a/docs/en/dev/guide/appdev/security/index.html b/docs/en/dev/guide/appdev/security/index.html index e5aed977ee..a1ef68e63f 100644 --- a/docs/en/dev/guide/appdev/security/index.html +++ b/docs/en/dev/guide/appdev/security/index.html @@ -2369,28 +2369,85 @@ <h2>This guide discusses the following topics:</h2> <ul> + <li>General Tips</li> + <li>Plugins and Security</li> <li>Allow List</li> - <li>Iframes and the Callback Id Mechanism</li> + <li>Content Security Policy</li> <li>Certificate Pinning</li> - <li>Self-signed Certificates</li> + <li>Using TLS/SSL</li> + <li>Avoid Self-signed Certificates</li> + <li>Wrapping external sites and hot code push</li> <li>Encrypted storage</li> - <li>General Tips</li> <li>Recommended Articles and Other Resources</li> </ul> +<h2>General Tips</h2> + +<h3>Use InAppBrowser for outside links</h3> + +<p>Use the <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/cordova-plugin-inappbrowser">InAppBrowser</a> when opening links to any outside website. This is much safer than allow listing a domain name and including the content directly in your application because the InAppBrowser will use the native browser's security features and will not give the website access to your Cordova environment. Even if you trust the third party website and include it directly in your application, that third party [...] + +<h3>Validate all user input</h3> + +<p>Always validate any and all input that your application accepts. This includes usernames, passwords, dates, uploaded media, etc. Because an attacker could manipulate your HTML and JS assets (either by decompiling your application or using debugging tools like <code>chrome://inspect</code>), this validation should also be performed on your server, especially before handing the data off to any backend service.</p> + +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Tip</strong>: Other sources where data should be validated: user documents, contacts, push notifications</p> +</blockquote> + +<h3>Do not store sensitive data</h3> + +<p>If usernames, password, geolocation information, and other sensitive data is stored, then it could potentially be retrieved later by an unauthorized user or application.</p> + +<h3>Don't use <code>eval()</code></h3> + +<p>The JavaScript function <code>eval()</code> has a long history of being abused. Using it incorrectly can open your code up for injection attacks, debugging difficulties, and slower code execution.</p> + +<h3>Do not assume that your source code is secure</h3> + +<p>Since a Cordova application is built from HTML and JavaScript assets that get packaged in a native container, you should not consider your code to be secure. It is possible for an iOS or Android application to be unpacked and unzipped to reveal its web assets such as HTML and JS.</p> + +<p>A sampling of what you should not include in your code:</p> + +<ul> + <li>Authentication information (usernames, passwords, keys, etc.)</li> + <li>Encryption keys</li> + <li>Trade secrets</li> +</ul> + +<h3>Do not assume storage containers are secure</h3> + +<p>Even if a device itself is encrypted, if someone has access to the device and can unlock it, you should not assume that data stored in various formats and containers is safe. Even SQLite databases are easily human readable once access is gained.</p> + +<p>As long as you're storing non-sensitive information, this isn't a big deal. But if you were storing passwords, keys, and other sensitive information, the data could be easily extracted, and depending on what was stored, could be used against your app and remote servers.</p> + +<p>For example, on iOS, if you store data in <code>localStorage</code>, the data itself is easily readable to anyone who has access to the device. This is because <code>localStorage</code> is backed by an unencrypted SQLite database. The underlying storage of the device may in fact be encrypted (and so it would be inaccessible while the device is locked), but once the device decrypts the file, the contents themselves are mostly in the clear. As such, the contents of <code>localStorage</c [...] + +<h2>Plugins and Security</h2> + +<p>Due to the way the native portion of Cordova communicates with your web code, it is possible for any code executing within the main webview context to communicate with any installed plugins. This means that you should <em>never</em> permit untrusted content within the primary webview. This can include third-party advertisements, sites within an <code>iframe</code>, and even content injected via <code>innerHTML</code>.</p> + +<p>If you must inject content into the primary webview, be certain that it has been properly sanitized so that no JavaScript can be executed. <em>Do not try to sanitize content on your own; use a vetted third-party library instead!</em></p> + +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Tip</strong>: If you need to include advertising, use any of the many third-party plugins for Cordova. These are safer than executing arbitrary JavaScript from advertisers.</p> +</blockquote> + <h2>Allow List</h2> <p>By default the app's navigation is unrestricted. It's recommended to restrict the navigation only to trusted domains. Learn more by reading the <a href="../allowlist/index.html">Allow List Guide</a></p> -<h2>Iframes and the Callback Id Mechanism</h2> +<h2>Content Security Policy (CSP)</h2> -<p>If content is served in an iframe from a allow listed domain, that domain will have access to the native Cordova bridge. This means that if you allow a third-party advertising network and serve those ads through an iframe, it is possible that a malicious ad will be able to break out of the iframe and perform malicious actions. Because of this, you should generally not use iframes unless you control the server that hosts the iframe content. Also note that there are third party plugins [...] +<p>Cordovaβs default template includes a basic Content Security Policy (CSP). Itβs recommended to review and customize this CSP to fit your app's specific needs. For more information, refer to the <a href="../allowlist/index.html#content-security-policy-csp">Allow List Guide - Content Security Policy (CSP)</a>.</p> <h2>Certificate Pinning</h2> -<p>Cordova does not support true certificate pinning. The main barrier to this is a lack of native APIs in Android for intercepting SSL connections to perform the check of the server's certificate. (Although it is possible to do certificate pinning on Android in Java using JSSE, the webview on Android is written in C++, and server connections are handled for you by the webview, so it is not possible to use Java and JSSE there.) Since Apache Cordova is meant to offer consistent APIs a [...] +<p>It is important to ensure that you trust any hosts with which there are communications. Typically, one would do this using certificate pinning. The app would double check any certificates and only communicate over channels where the certificate check passed. This helps mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately, Cordova does not support true certificate pinning. The main barrier to this is a lack of native APIs in Android for intercepting SSL connections to perform the check of the server's certificate. (Although it is possible to do certificate pinning on Android in Java using JSSE, the webview on Android is written in C++, and server connections are handled for you by the webview, so it is not possible to use Java and JSSE there.) Since Apache Cordova is meant to offer co [...] -<p>There are ways to approximate certificate pinning, such as checking the server's public key (fingerprint) is the expected value when your application starts or at other various times during your application's lifetime. There are third-party plugins available for Cordova that can do that. However, this is not the same as true certificate pinning which automatically verifies the expected value on every connection to the server.</p> +<p>There are ways to approximate certificate pinning, such as checking that the server's public key (fingerprint) is the expected value when your application starts or at other various times during your application's lifetime. There are third-party plugins available for Cordova that can do that. However, this is not the same as true certificate pinning which automatically verifies the expected value on every connection to the server.</p> <p>There are also plugins that can do true certificate pinning for some platforms, assuming your app is able to do all of its network requests using the plugin (i.e.: no traditional XHR/AJAX requests, etc).</p> @@ -2398,66 +2455,86 @@ <p>If your app communicates to an external server, it should be communicating using modern encryption standards. Use <code>https</code> protocol whenever possible.</p> -<p><a href="https://letsencrypt.org/">Let's Encrypt</a> is a free, automated, and open certificate authority provided by the nonprofit <a href="https://www.abetterinternet.org/">Internet Security Research Group</a>. Let's Encrypt will offer free standard certificates, which will be sufficient for most developers. Enterprise organizations may still want to use a traditional certificate authority that offers more advanced features such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publ [...] +<p><a href="https://letsencrypt.org/">Let's Encrypt</a> is a free, automated, and open certificate authority provided by the nonprofit <a href="https://www.abetterinternet.org/">Internet Security Research Group</a>. Let's Encrypt will offer free standard certificates, which will be sufficient for most developers. Enterprise organizations may still want to use a traditional certificate authority that offers more advanced features such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publ [...] <p>It is also important to keep up to date with security standards as they change over time. What might be acceptable SSL/TLS configuration today may not be acceptable years in the future. Using tools to test your certificate and SSL/TLS configuration should be done regularly. <a href="https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/">SSL Labs</a> is a free online service provided by Qualys, Inc to test your server's SSL/TLS configuration and encryption strength, in addition to supported platforms.</p> -<h2>Self-signed Certificates</h2> +<h2>Avoid Self-signed Certificates</h2> -<p>Using self-signed certificates on your server is not recommended. If you desire SSL, then it is highly recommended that your server have a certificate that has been properly signed by a well-known CA (certificate authority). The inability to do true certificate pinning makes this important.</p> +<p>Using self-signed certificates on your server is not recommended. If you desire SSL, then it is highly recommended that your server have a certificate that has been properly signed by a well-known CA (certificate authority). The inability to do true certificate pinning makes this even more important.</p> -<p>The reason is that accepting self-signed certificates bypasses the certificate chain validation, which allows any server certificate to be considered valid by the device. This opens up the communication to man-in-the-middle attacks. It becomes very easy for a hacker to not only intercept and read all communication between the device and the server, but also to modify the communication. The device will never know this is happening because it doesn't verify that the server's cer [...] +<p>The reason is that accepting self-signed certificates bypasses the certificate chain validation, which allows any server certificate to be considered valid by the device. This opens up the communication to man-in-the-middle attacks. It becomes very easy for a hacker to not only intercept and read all communication between the device and the server, but also to modify the communication. The device will never know this is happening because it doesn't verify that the server's cer [...] -<p>If the application is to be used only within a trusted network, such as an internal corporate network. Using self-signed certificates may be acceptable, however the public certificate should be pre-installed on the device(s) that will be running the application. A trusted third-party certificate authority will always be preferable.</p> +<p>Because of the ease of doing a man-in-the-middle attack, accepting self-signed certificates is only marginally better than just running <code>http</code> instead of <code>https</code> on an untrusted network. While the traffic would be encrypted, it could be encrypted with the key from a man-in-the-middle, so the man-in-the-middle would have access everything, making the encryption useless except to passive observers. Users trust SSL to be secure, and this would be deliberately making [...] -<p>The principles described here are not specific to Apache Cordova, they apply to all client-server communication.</p> +<p>If the app will be used on a trusted network (i.e., you are entirely inside a controlled enterprise), then self-signed certs are still not recommended. The two recommendations in a trusted network are to just use http because the network itself is trusted, or to get a certificate signed by a trusted CA (not self-signed). Either the network is trusted or it is not.</p> -<p>When running Cordova on Android, using <code>android:debuggable="true"</code> in the application manifest will permit SSL errors such as certificate chain validation errors on self-signed certs. So you can use self-signed certs in this configuration, but this is not a configuration that should be used when your application is in production. It is meant to be used only during application development.</p> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Note</strong>: The principles described here are not specific to Apache Cordova, they apply to all client-server communication.</p> +</blockquote> -<h2>Encrypted storage</h2> +<blockquote> + <p><strong>Android Tip</strong>: When running Cordova on Android, using <code>android:debuggable="true"</code> in the application manifest will permit SSL errors such as certificate chain validation errors on self-signed certs. So you can use self-signed certs in this configuration, but this is not a configuration that should be used when your application is in production. It is meant to be used only during application development.</p> +</blockquote> -<p>(TBD)</p> +<h2>Wrapping external sites and hot code push</h2> -<h2>General Tips</h2> +<p>Cordova's implementation allows you to redirect to an external site instead of using local content. This is <strong>not</strong> suggested for most apps, even though it might avoid a rewrite of the app or can make code updates faster. You should avoid this for any apps destined to any app store, but in general, it's risky regardless, for many reasons:</p> -<h3>Do not use Android Gingerbread!</h3> <ul> - <li>Set your min-target-sdk level higher than 10. API 10 is Gingerbread, and Gingerbread is no longer supported by Google or device manufacturers, and is therefore not recommend by the Cordova team.</li> - <li>Gingerbread has been shown to be insecure and one of the most targeted mobile OSs <a href="https://bgr.com/2012/11/06/android-security-gingerbread-malware/">https://www.mobilemag.com/2012/11/06/andriod-2-3-gingerbread-security/</a>.</li> - <li>The Allowlist on Android does not work with Gingerbread or lower. This means an attacker can load malicious code in an iframe that would then have access to all of the Cordova APIs and could use that access to steal personal data, send SMS messages to premium-rate numbers, and perform other malicious acts.</li> + <li>No local code to detect no route to host. Apple <em>requires</em> apps to detect no network connection (and other connectivity issues) and display a user-friendly error message. If there's no local code to detect this, the app will generally remain blank, and Apple will reject it.</li> + <li>No local code to verify the downloaded content. The content could be incomplete or corrupted, especially if being downloaded over a poor network connection. Incomplete or corrupt content is not going to render particularly well, leaving your user frustrated.</li> + <li>No local code to detect and remove malicious intent. Local code has a chance to sanitize content and verify that there are no spurious or unexpected <code>script</code> tags or event handlers. Without local code, the app is at the server's mercy.</li> + <li>No local code to check certificates. See <strong>Certificate Pinning</strong> above.</li> </ul> -<h3>Use InAppBrowser for outside links</h3> -<ul> - <li>Use the InAppBrowser when opening links to any outside website. This is much safer than allow listing a domain name and including the content directly in your application because the InAppBrowser will use the native browser's security features and will not give the website access to your Cordova environment. Even if you trust the third party website and include it directly in your application, that third party website could link to malicious web content.</li> -</ul> +<p>Hot code push solutions improve matters a bit, since they will download code and store it locally on the device. This means that in the event of a network failure, the code still has a chance to run and display any appropriate messages, and that same code can verify any future downloads. You should, however, verify that any hot code push service you use does the following:</p> -<h3>Validate all user input</h3> <ul> - <li>Always validate any and all input that your application accepts. This includes usernames, passwords, dates, uploaded media, etc. Because an attacker could manipulate your HTML and JS assets (either by decompiling your application or using debugging tools like chrome://inspect), this validation should also be performed on your server, especially before handing the data off to any backend service.</li> - <li>Other sources where data should be validated: user documents, contacts, push notifications</li> + <li>Validate checksums to ensure complete and accurate downloads</li> + <li>Certificate checking to ensure that the download is from a trusted server</li> + <li>Falls back to last downloaded code in the event something goes wrong</li> </ul> -<h3>Do not cache sensitive data</h3> -<ul> - <li>If usernames, password, geolocation information, and other sensitive data is cached, then it could potentially be retrieved later by an unauthorized user or application.</li> -</ul> +<h2>Encrypted Storage</h2> + +<p>Both <strong>Android</strong> and <strong>iOS</strong> offer various secure storage options. While <strong>Apache Cordova</strong> does not provide these mechanisms natively at the platform core or plugin level, third-party plugins may be available or can be created to implement such features.</p> + +<p><strong>Android:</strong></p> -<h3>Don't use eval() unless you know what you're doing</h3> <ul> - <li>The JavaScript function eval() has a long history of being abused. Using it incorrectly can open your code up for injection attacks, debugging difficulties, and slower code execution.</li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://developer.android.com/reference/androidx/security/crypto/EncryptedSharedPreferences"><strong>Encrypted Shared Preferences</strong></a></p> + + <p><strong>Encrypted SharedPreferences</strong> is an encrypted version of SharedPreferences, where both the keys and values are encrypted. This is ideal for storing small amounts of data, such as user settings, preferences, or other sensitive information.</p> + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://developer.android.com/reference/androidx/security/crypto/EncryptedFile"><strong>Encrypted File Storage</strong></a></p> + + <p><strong>Encrypted File Storage</strong> is suitable for securely storing files, perfect for large data. By using the <code>EncryptedFile</code> class, you can create and read encrypted files, ensuring that the file contents remain protected.</p> + </li> </ul> -<h3>Do not assume that your source code is secure</h3> +<p><strong>iOS:</strong></p> + <ul> - <li>Since a Cordova application is built from HTML and JavaScript assets that get packaged in a native container, you should not consider your code to be secure. It is possible to reverse engineer a Cordova application.</li> + <li> + <p><strong>File Protection</strong></p> + + <p>Using <a href="https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/nsfilemanager"><code>NSFileManager</code></a>, which provides an interface for managing the file system, you can define a file's protection level with the <a href="https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/nsfileprotectiontype"><code>NSFileProtectionType</code></a> attribute. This allows you to store files on disk with protection based on the device's lock state. Files are encrypted and accessib [...] + </li> + <li> + <p><a href="https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain-services?language=objc"><strong>Keychain Services</strong></a></p> + + <p><strong>Keychain Services</strong> is a secure method for storing small pieces of sensitive data, such as passwords or tokens. Data in the keychain is encrypted and protected by the device's security mechanisms.</p> + </li> </ul> <h2>Recommended Articles and Other Resources</h2> <ul> - <li><a href="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/HTML5_Security_Cheat_Sheet">HTML5 Security cheat sheet, detailing how to secure your HTML5 application</a></li> - <li><a href="http://www.cis.syr.edu/~wedu/Research/paper/webview_acsac2011.pdf">Whitepaper about well known security flaws in Webview based hybrid applications</a></li> + <li><a href="https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTML5_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html">OWASP Cheat Sheet Series - HTML5 Security Cheat Sheet</a></li> + <li><a href="https://www.cs.ucr.edu/~heng/pubs/webview_acsac2011.pdf">Research Paper - Attacks on WebView in the Android System</a></li> </ul> diff --git a/feed.xml b/feed.xml index 5b7bb1d6ea..4a43643ee8 100644 --- a/feed.xml +++ b/feed.xml @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ </description> <link>https://cordova.apache.org/</link> <atom:link href="https://cordova.apache.org/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/> - <pubDate>Tue, 18 Mar 2025 02:06:12 +0000</pubDate> - <lastBuildDate>Tue, 18 Mar 2025 02:06:12 +0000</lastBuildDate> + <pubDate>Tue, 18 Mar 2025 02:09:44 +0000</pubDate> + <lastBuildDate>Tue, 18 Mar 2025 02:09:44 +0000</lastBuildDate> <generator>Jekyll v4.4.1</generator> <item> --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: commits-unsubscr...@cordova.apache.org For additional commands, e-mail: commits-h...@cordova.apache.org