sollhui commented on PR #66484: URL: https://github.com/apache/doris/pull/66484#issuecomment-6035357462
Thanks @cyriltovena for working on this. I compared the current implementations: #68540 covers the core keyless GCS storage-vault use case here, including GKE Workload Identity. In #68540, `provider=GCP` with `gs.credential_provider_type=DEFAULT` uses Google Application Default Credentials. On a GKE workload configured for Workload Identity, ADC can obtain short-lived credentials through the GKE metadata server, without HMAC keys. This is the [documented GKE credential flow](https://docs.cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/concepts/workload-identity#credential_flow). The vault credential is carried through FE/MetaService to both BE and recycler, which use the shared OAuth bearer-authenticated GCS XML client. `COMPUTE_ENGINE` and optional service-account impersonation are also supported. So the configuration corresponding to this PR's `s3.credentials_provider_type=gcp_workload_identity` is `gs.credential_provider_type=DEFAULT` in #68540, with no `s3.access_key` / `s3.secret_key` or AWS credential-provider properties. This is functional overlap, rather than identical changes: this PR also has endpoint restrictions and vault-refresh/connectivity hardening that #68540 does not reproduce in the same way. Any still-needed pieces could be carried over separately. #68540 is still open, and live GKE validation is still needed. @cyriltovena @SLoeuillet, could you validate that implementation against your GKE setup? I suggest consolidating the native authentication work in #68540 and tracking any remaining gaps there. -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the URL above to go to the specific comment. To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For queries about this service, please contact Infrastructure at: [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For additional commands, e-mail: [email protected]
