jbonofre opened a new pull request, #3057: URL: https://github.com/apache/karaf/pull/3057
## Problem Karaf has no written security model: `SECURITY.md` only lists the supported versions and how to report a vulnerability. Operators can't tell what Karaf guarantees, and there is no shared basis to decide whether a report is a vulnerability or a hardening request. The ASF recommends documenting one: https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/SECURITY/Documenting+your+security+model ## Change Add a "Security Model" section to `SECURITY.md`, next to the reporting instructions as the ASF guide suggests. It covers: - what Karaf trusts: the installation directories, the local console, and the code you install; - the network endpoints, with their default addresses and authentication; - the default roles, and how command and JMX ACLs work (including commands that have no ACL); - what we treat as a vulnerability, as hardening, and as not a vulnerability. The facts come from the shipped defaults (`users.properties`, `system.properties`, `org.apache.karaf.shell.cfg`, `org.apache.karaf.management.cfg`, the ACLs in the standard and enterprise feature descriptors) and from the user guide. ## Decisions to review Two points set policy rather than describe the code. Please check them: 1. **`manager` is trusted, not a boundary below `admin`.** With the shipped ACLs, a manager can already run code, for example by installing a bundle over JMX (`install = manager` in `jmx.acl.org.apache.karaf.bundle`) or by updating a bundle from a URL (`bundle:update`). The model says to give `manager` only to users trusted like admins, and treats a manager reaching admin capabilities as hardening. Restrictions such as #2861 stay useful as defense in depth. 2. **Argument rules in the shipped ACLs are a boundary, custom ones are best effort.** The argument rules Karaf ships (ACL configuration PIDs, `-f` on bundle commands) must hold. Rules that operators add are matched against the raw text of each argument (`ACLConfigurationParser`), and many commands accept the same resource as an id, a name, an alias or a pattern, so Karaf can't promise that such a rule covers every form. Unauthenticated access, the ACL check itself, the `viewer` role and system bundle protection are treated as security boundaries, in line with recent fixes such as #2864 and #2883. ## Testing Documentation only. -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the URL above to go to the specific comment. To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For queries about this service, please contact Infrastructure at: [email protected]
