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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/NIFI-1257?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=15122805#comment-15122805
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Andy LoPresto edited comment on NIFI-1257 at 1/29/16 2:32 AM:
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I have implemented {{PBKDF2}}, {{Bcrypt}}, and {{Scrypt}} and have extensive
unit tests for each. Due to the structure of our encryptors and the way that
ciphers are used in conjunction with legacy code, I have designed a hierarchy
of {{CipherProviders}} to allow for password-based encryption or keyed
encryption [NIFI-1259]. I am working to make these drop-in replacements for the
current encryptor model and to expose them for other usage throughout the
application.
was (Author: alopresto):
I have implemented {{PBKDF2}}, {{Bcrypt}}, and {{Scrypt}} and have extensive
unit tests for each. Due to the structure of our encryptors and the way that
ciphers are used in conjunction with legacy code, I have designed a hierarchy
of {{CipherProvider}}s to allow for password-based encryption or keyed
encryption [NIFI-1259]. I am working to make these drop-in replacements for the
current encryptor model and to expose them for other usage throughout the
application.
> Provide additional KDFs for EncryptContent
> ------------------------------------------
>
> Key: NIFI-1257
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/NIFI-1257
> Project: Apache NiFi
> Issue Type: Improvement
> Components: Core Framework
> Affects Versions: 0.4.0
> Reporter: Andy LoPresto
> Assignee: Andy LoPresto
> Priority: Critical
> Labels: encryption, security
> Fix For: 0.5.0
>
>
> Currently, the two key derivation functions (KDF) supported are NiFi Legacy
> (1000 iterations of MD5 digest over a password and optional salt) and OpenSSL
> PKCS#5 v1.5 (a single iteration of MD5 digest over a password and optional
> salt).
> Both of these are very weak -- they use a deprecated cryptographic hash
> function (CHF) with known weakness and susceptibility to collisions (with
> demonstrated attacks) and a non-configurable and tightly coupled iteration
> count to derive the key and IV.
> Current best practice KDFs (with work factor recommendations) are as follows:
> * PBKDF2 with variable hash function (SHA1, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, or
> ideally HMAC variants of these functions) and variable iteration count (in
> the 10k - 1M range).
> * bcrypt with work factor of 12 - 16
> * scrypt with work factor of (2^14 - 2^20, 8, 1)
> The salt and iteration count should be stored alongside the hashed record
> (bcrypt handles this natively).
> Notes:
> * http://wildlyinaccurate.com/bcrypt-choosing-a-work-factor/
> * http://blog.ircmaxell.com/2012/12/seven-ways-to-screw-up-bcrypt.html
> *
> http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17207/recommended-of-rounds-for-bcrypt
> *
> http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/3959/recommended-of-iterations-when-using-pkbdf2-sha256/3993#3993
> *
> http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/4781/do-any-security-experts-recommend-bcrypt-for-password-storage/6415
>
> *
> http://web.archive.org/web/20130407190430/http://chargen.matasano.com/chargen/2007/9/7/enough-with-the-rainbow-tables-what-you-need-to-know-about-s.html
> *
> https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2015/march/enough-with-the-salts-updates-on-secure-password-schemes/
> * http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt.html
> * http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf
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