ThePassionate opened a new pull request, #21957:
URL: https://github.com/apache/nuttx/pull/21957

   ## Summary
   
   Four symmetric-crypto capabilities that the software crypto driver is 
missing, plus a style cleanup:
   
   * **crypto/cryptosoft: add AES-192/256-CBC support** - the CBC session 
selects the `CRYPTO_AES_192_CBC` / `CRYPTO_AES_256_CBC` variant by key length, 
so 24/32-byte keys stop being created as AES-128-CBC sessions.
   * **crypto: make COP_FLAG_UPDATE reach the cipher descriptor** - 
`cryptodev_op()` only set `CRD_F_UPDATE` on the hash descriptor, so a cipher 
session re-initialized its key stream/IV on every request and streaming a 
cipher through `/dev/crypto` was impossible. The flag now reaches the cipher 
descriptor, AES-CTR keeps a byte-level keystream tail across requests (8-byte 
chunks of a block work), and CBC/OFB/CFB carry the IV in the key schedule 
between update steps. Split requests must keep passing the IV, as the existing 
blfcbc test already does.
   * **crypto: support any GCM IV length and split AAD/payload** - 
`CRYPTO_AES_GCM_16` was never accepted by `CIOCGSESSION` (the CTR session ABI 
carves a nonce out of the key). GCM now takes a plain 16/24/32-byte key, 
derives the pre-counter block through GHASH for non-96-bit IVs, and the authenc 
path is reworked to the three-step `UPDATE_AAD` / `UPDATE` / final flow with 
the MAC context kept in the session. The old prepended-IV adjustment in 
`swcr_authenc()` (the region guarded in #21930) is removed entirely; if #21930 
lands first the rebase here is trivial. A zero-length update is a no-op instead 
of faulting.
   * **crypto/cryptosoft: add AES-256-CMAC** - new `CRYPTO_AES_256_CMAC` id 
(45) with the 256-bit CMAC variant; the 128/256 selection follows the key 
length.
   * **crypto: fix nxstyle errors in chachapoly.c and xform.c** - long-standing 
issues in the two files this series touches (required by the whole-file style 
check).
   
   ## Impact
   
   * `crypto/`, `include/crypto/` only. New algorithm id 45 
(`CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX` 44 -> 45); no existing id or ABI changes. CTR keeps its 
nonce-in-key session ABI, so existing users (aes_alt, aesctr test) are 
unaffected.
   * The GCM-16 key format changes from "key + nonce" to a plain key - GCM-16 
sessions could not be created before, so there is no existing user to break.
   
   ## Testing
   
   Board sim:sim/crypto (nuttx master e9eefaa0e9a), with the companion test PR 
in nuttx-apps:
   
   * `aescbc`: 6 vectors (4x RFC 3602 AES-128 + NIST SP 800-38A 192/256), each 
as one-shot and as a 16-byte-block update chain - `aescbc test vector 0..5 ok`
   * `aesctr`: 9 vectors, each as one-shot and as an 8-byte-chunk update chain 
(keystream tail across block boundaries) - all OK
   * `aesgcm`: round trip plus known-answer check of ciphertext and tag for a 
96-bit and an 8-byte IV (GCM spec test case 4 parameters; the 8-byte IV 
exercises the GHASH pre-counter block). The expected values match an 
independent host implementation (python cryptography) and the published spec 
values for the 96-bit case.
   * `aescmac`: 8/8 - the four 128-bit and four 256-bit NIST vectors (the 
128-bit 16-byte case also passes here because the authenc rework removes the 
one-byte truncation that #21930 fixes)
   
   Regression: des3cbc, aesxts, chacha20, chachapoly, hmac (35 vectors), hash 
(incl. huge-block and unaligned), crc32, pbkdf2, poly1305, castcbc, blfcbc, 
ecdsa (p256 keygen/sign/verify), dhm all pass unchanged. The `rsa` test does 
not finish on sim within 25 minutes - that is pre-existing master behavior 
(bn-based modular exponentiation), unchanged by this series and fixed by #21939.
   
   `tools/checkpatch.sh -c -u -m -g <base>..HEAD` passes; `tools/refresh.sh 
--silent sim:sim/crypto` reports no defconfig change.
   


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