Copilot commented on code in PR #26154:
URL: https://github.com/apache/pulsar/pull/26154#discussion_r3537101050
##########
pulsar-common/src/main/java/org/apache/pulsar/common/util/KeyManagerProxy.java:
##########
@@ -96,7 +96,17 @@ private void updateKeyManager()
final CertificateFactory cf =
CertificateFactory.getInstance("X.509");
final List<X509Certificate> certificateList =
cf.generateCertificates(publicCertStream)
.stream().map(o -> (X509Certificate)
o).collect(Collectors.toList());
- keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("JKS");
+ // In-memory keystore holding the PEM-loaded key and cert chain.
JKS is preferred
+ // because it accepts certificate lists that do not form a linked
chain (which
+ // PKCS12 rejects); fall back to the platform default type on JVMs
where the JKS
+ // keystore type is unavailable, e.g. under a FIPS-restricted
security configuration.
+ KeyStore selectedKeyStore;
+ try {
+ selectedKeyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("JKS");
+ } catch (KeyStoreException e) {
+ selectedKeyStore =
KeyStore.getInstance(KeyStore.getDefaultType());
+ }
+ keyStore = selectedKeyStore;
Review Comment:
If the fallback KeyStore type also fails, the original JKS failure is lost,
which makes diagnosing provider/FIPS issues harder. Consider rethrowing the
fallback exception with the original JKS exception added as suppressed (or vice
versa).
##########
pulsar-client-messagecrypto-bc/src/main/java/org/apache/pulsar/client/impl/crypto/MessageCryptoBc.java:
##########
@@ -124,7 +124,16 @@ private static Provider bcProvider() {
static {
SecureRandom rand;
try {
- rand = SecureRandom.getInstance("NativePRNGNonBlocking");
+ Provider bcfips = Security.getProvider("BCFIPS");
+ if (bcfips != null) {
+ // When the BC-FIPS provider is registered, source randomness
from its SP 800-90A
+ // DRBG so data-key and IV generation stays within the
FIPS-validated module.
+ // Only registered providers are consulted here to avoid
triggering BouncyCastle
+ // classpath resolution during class loading (see
BcProviderHolder above).
+ rand = SecureRandom.getInstance("DEFAULT", bcfips);
+ } else {
+ rand = SecureRandom.getInstance("NativePRNGNonBlocking");
+ }
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException nsa) {
Review Comment:
When the BCFIPS provider is present, a failure to obtain its "DEFAULT" DRBG
currently falls back to `new SecureRandom()`, which may select a non-FIPS
provider depending on provider order. If the intent is to keep key/IV
generation within the FIPS-validated module when BCFIPS is registered, it’s
safer to fail fast (or otherwise ensure a BCFIPS-backed SecureRandom) rather
than silently falling back.
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