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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SENTRY-191?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13997093#comment-13997093
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Sravya Tirukkovalur commented on SENTRY-191:
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Also would like to add that the current approach has no problem from security
stand point, as Sentry service selectively allows connections using
"sentry.service.allow.connect". So only trusted users are allowed to connect
and modify policy meta data.
> Sentry Policy Service should not require passing the RPC requestor's
> user/group information
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: SENTRY-191
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SENTRY-191
> Project: Sentry
> Issue Type: Bug
> Affects Versions: 1.3.0
> Reporter: Lenni Kuff
> Priority: Blocker
>
> Sentry Policy Service should not require passing the RPC requestor's
> user/group information. Currently this is done to "authorize" whether a user
> can execute a GRANT/REVOKE statement since only pre-selected set of admin
> users run grant/revoke statements. This does not seem very secure and also
> couples "authorization" with the storing of policy metadata.
> I propose that instead of this model, a default "admin" role be introduced.
> On Sentry Service startup the the role be populated with set of valid admin
> users as specified in the sentry-service.xml configuration file.
> When GRANT/REVOKE statements are run they should be treated the same as any
> other SQL statement and authorized at the binding layer (if the give user
> isn't part of the "admin" role then fail the request).
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