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new deb15cfec Commit build products
deb15cfec is described below
commit deb15cfec551d2ed9994c01440f421dd3b94b3af
Author: Build Pelican (action) <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Sun Jun 21 18:42:42 2026 +0000
Commit build products
---
output/feeds/all.atom.xml | 242 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------
output/feeds/solr/vex.atom.xml | 139 +++++++++++++++++++-
output/security-dependency-cves.html | 45 +++++++
output/solr.vex.json | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
output/vex.html | 239 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 711 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-)
diff --git a/output/feeds/all.atom.xml b/output/feeds/all.atom.xml
index d510e5a36..9a1400f02 100644
--- a/output/feeds/all.atom.xml
+++ b/output/feeds/all.atom.xml
@@ -42,7 +42,144 @@ Explicitly setting <code>blockUnknown</code> to
<code>true<
<p><strong>References</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><a
href="https://solr.apache.org/guide/solr/latest/deployment-guide/jwt-authentication-plugin.html">JWT
Authentication Plugin documentation</a></li>
-</ul></content><category
term="solr/security"/></entry><entry><title>Apache Solr™ 10.0.0
available</title><link href="/apache-solrtm-1000-available.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2026-03-03T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-03-03T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2026-03-03:/apache-solrtm-1000-available.html</id><summary
type="html"><p>The Solr PMC is pleased to announce the release of Apache
Solr 10.0.0.</p>
+</ul></content><category
term="solr/security"/></entry><entry><title>Apache Log4j Core: TLS hostname
verification silently ignored in Socket, SMTP and Syslog appenders</title><link
href="/cve-2026-34477.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2026-04-10:/cve-2026-34477.html</id><summary
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34477 is <strong>not</stro [...]
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration
together with a privileged network position.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to add an
<code>SMTP</code>, <code>Socket</code> or
<code>Syslog</code> appender that ships logs over TLS
…</li></ul></summary><content type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34477
is <strong>not</strong> considered exploitable in typical
deployments of Apache Solr.
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration
together with a privileged network position.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to add an
<code>SMTP</code>, <code>Socket</code> or
<code>Syslog</code> appender that ships logs over TLS through a
nested <code>&lt;Ssl&gt;</code> element.</li>
+<li>That appender relies on the <code>verifyHostName</code>
attribute to authenticate the remote receiver, which was silently ignored
through Log4j Core 2.25.3.</li>
+<li>A man-in-the-middle attacker can intercept the connection and
present a certificate issued by a CA trusted by the configured (or default)
trust store.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>None of the Log4j configuration files shipped in the Solr 9.10.1
binary distribution define such an appender.
+They only use <code>Console</code> and
<code>RollingRandomAccessFile</code> appenders, which open no
network connection,
+so no TLS hostname verification ever takes place.
+The <code>HTTP</code> appender is not affected either, as it uses
a separate <code>verifyHostname</code> attribute that verifies host
names by default.</p>
+<p>A configuration that does meet the conditions above looks like
this:</p>
+<div
class="codehilite"><pre><span></span><code><span
class="nt">&lt;Appenders&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;Socket</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">name=</span><span
class="s">&quot;remote&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">host=</span><span
class="s">&quot;logs.example.com&quot;</span><span
class="w"> </span><span class="na">port=</span><span
class="s">&quot;6514&q [...]
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="cm">&lt;!--
verifyHostName=&quot;true&quot; was silently ignored through 2.25.3
--&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;Ssl</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">verifyHostName=</span><span
class="s">&quot;true&quot;</span><span
class="nt">&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;KeyStore</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">location=</span><span
class="s">&quot;...&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">password=</span><span
class="s">&quot;...&quot;</span><span
class="nt">/&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;TrustStore</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">location=</span><span
class="s">&quot;...&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">password=</span><span
class="s">&quot;...&quot;</span><span
class="nt">/&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;/Ssl&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;PatternLayout</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">pattern=</span><span
class="s">&quot;%m%n&quot;</span><span
class="nt">/&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;/Socket&gt;</span>
+<span class="nt">&lt;/Appenders&gt;</span>
+</code></pre></div>
+
+<p>Operators who do configure TLS network appenders should replace the
vulnerable JAR file
+(<code>server/lib/ext/log4j-core-2.25.3.jar</code>)
+with
<code>log4j-core-2.25.4.jar</code>.</p></content><category
term="solr/vex"/></entry><entry><title>Apache Log4j Core: Log injection via
CRLF sequences in Rfc5424Layout</title><link href="/cve-2026-34478.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2026-04-10:/cve-2026-34478.html</id><summary
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34478 is <strong [...]
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to send logs to a stream-based
(TCP or TLS) syslog service using <code>Rfc5424Layout</code>
directly.</li>
+<li>An attacker is able to …</li></ul></summary><content
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34478 is <strong>not</strong>
considered exploitable in typical deployments of Apache Solr.
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to send logs to a stream-based
(TCP or TLS) syslog service using <code>Rfc5424Layout</code>
directly.</li>
+<li>An attacker is able to inject CRLF sequences into the logged
data.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>Because the <code>newLineEscape</code> and
<code>useTlsMessageFormat</code> attributes were silently renamed
in Log4j Core 2.21.0,
+newline escaping stopped working and TLS framing was downgraded to plain TCP,
+leaving such configurations exposed to CRLF log injection.</p>
+<p>None of the Log4j configuration files shipped in the Solr 9.10.1
binary distribution reference <code>Rfc5424Layout</code>.
+They only use <code>PatternLayout</code>, so the issue cannot be
triggered.
+Users of the <code>Syslog</code> appender are not affected either,
since its attributes were not renamed.</p>
+<p>A configuration that does meet the conditions above looks like
this:</p>
+<div
class="codehilite"><pre><span></span><code><span
class="nt">&lt;Appenders&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;Socket</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">name=</span><span
class="s">&quot;syslog&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">host=</span><span
class="s">&quot;logs.example.com&quot;</span><span
class="w"> </span><span class="na">port=</span><span
class="s">&quot;601&qu [...]
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;Rfc5424Layout</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">appName=</span><span
class="s">&quot;Solr&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">newLineEscape=</span><span
class="s">&quot;\\n&quot;</span><span
class="nt">/&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;/Socket&gt;</span>
+<span class="nt">&lt;/Appenders&gt;</span>
+</code></pre></div>
+
+<p>Operators who do configure <code>Rfc5424Layout</code>
should either:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>replace <code>newLineEscape</code> with
<code>escapeNL</code> and
<code>useTlsMessageFormat</code> with
<code>useTLSMessageFormat</code>
+ (note the capitalization), or</li>
+<li>replace the vulnerable JAR file
+ (<code>server/lib/ext/log4j-core-2.25.3.jar</code>)
+ with <code>log4j-core-2.25.4.jar</code>.</li>
+</ul></content><category term="solr/vex"/></entry><entry><title>Apache
Log4j 1.x bridge: Malformed XML output from Log4j1XmlLayout</title><link
href="/cve-2026-34479.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2026-04-10:/cve-2026-34479.html</id><summary
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34479 is <strong>not</strong>
considered exploitable in typi [...]
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j 1-to-Log4j 2 bridge emits logs through
<code>Log4j1XmlLayout</code>,
+ either configured directly in a Log4j 2 configuration
+ or selected as <code>org.apache.log4j.xml
…</code></li></ul></summary><content
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34479 is <strong>not</strong>
considered exploitable in typical deployments of Apache Solr.
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j 1-to-Log4j 2 bridge emits logs through
<code>Log4j1XmlLayout</code>,
+ either configured directly in a Log4j 2 configuration
+ or selected as <code>org.apache.log4j.xml.XMLLayout</code>
through the Log4j 1 compatibility layer.</li>
+<li>The logged data contains characters forbidden by the XML 1.0
specification.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>The <code>log4j-1.2-api</code> JAR is shipped so that
third-party libraries that still call the Log4j 1 API keep working.
+However, Solr is configured through Log4j 2 configuration files that only use
<code>PatternLayout</code>,
+and the distribution ships no Log4j 1
(<code>log4j.properties</code> or
<code>log4j.xml</code>) configuration file,
+so the vulnerable layout is never instantiated.</p>
+<p>A configuration that does meet the conditions above looks like
this:</p>
+<div
class="codehilite"><pre><span></span><code><span
class="nt">&lt;Appenders&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;File</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">name=</span><span
class="s">&quot;xml&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">fileName=</span><span
class="s">&quot;${sys:solr.log.dir}/solr-events.xml&quot;</span><span
class="nt">&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;Log4j1XmlLayout/&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;/File&gt;</span>
+<span class="nt">&lt;/Appenders&gt;</span>
+</code></pre></div>
+
+<p>Operators who use legacy Log4j 1 configuration files or
<code>Log4j1XmlLayout</code> should replace the vulnerable JAR file
+(<code>server/lib/ext/log4j-1.2-api-2.25.3.jar</code>)
+with <code>log4j-1.2-api-2.25.4.jar</code>.
+Support for <code>Log4j1XmlLayout</code> and legacy Log4j 1
configuration files may be removed in a future Solr release,
+so migrating to a native Log4j 2 configuration is
recommended.</p></content><category
term="solr/vex"/></entry><entry><title>Apache Log4j Core: Invalid XML output
from XmlLayout</title><link href="/cve-2026-34480.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2026-04-10:/cve-2026-34480.html</id><summary
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34480 is <strong>no [...]
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to write events through
<code>XmlLayout</code>.</li>
+<li>A log message or MDC value contains characters forbidden by the XML
1.0 …</li></ul></summary><content
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34480 is <strong>not</strong>
considered exploitable in typical deployments of Apache Solr.
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to write events through
<code>XmlLayout</code>.</li>
+<li>A log message or MDC value contains characters forbidden by the XML
1.0 specification.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>When triggered, the layout produces malformed XML, which downstream
log processors may reject:
+silently with the JRE built-in StAX, or by dropping the event with alternative
implementations such as Woodstox.</p>
+<p>None of the Log4j configuration files shipped in the Solr 9.10.1
binary distribution reference <code>XmlLayout</code>.
+They only use <code>PatternLayout</code>, so the vulnerable code
path is never reached.
+The MDC values that Solr populates (collection, shard, replica, core and node
names, plus a trace id) are not emitted as XML either.</p>
+<p>A configuration that does meet the conditions above looks like
this:</p>
+<div
class="codehilite"><pre><span></span><code><span
class="nt">&lt;Appenders&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;RollingFile</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">name=</span><span
class="s">&quot;xml&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">fileName=</span><span
class="s">&quot;${sys:solr.log.dir}/solr-events.xml&quot;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="na">filePattern=</span><span
class="s">&quot;${sys:solr.log.dir}/solr-events.xml.%i&quot;</span><span
class="nt">&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;XmlLayout/&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;/RollingFile&gt;</span>
+<span class="nt">&lt;/Appenders&gt;</span>
+</code></pre></div>
+
+<p>Operators who do configure <code>XmlLayout</code> should
replace the vulnerable JAR file
+(<code>server/lib/ext/log4j-core-2.25.3.jar</code>)
+with
<code>log4j-core-2.25.4.jar</code>.</p></content><category
term="solr/vex"/></entry><entry><title>Apache Log4j JSON Template Layout:
Invalid JSON for non-finite floating-point values</title><link
href="/cve-2026-34481.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2026-04-10:/cve-2026-34481.html</id><summary
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-344 [...]
+Successful exploitation requires the application to log a
<code>MapMessage</code> (or one of its subclasses)
+carrying a non-finite floating-point value (<code>NaN</code>,
<code>Infinity</code> or <code>-Infinity</code>)
through <code>JsonTemplateLayout</code>,
+which the layout then serializes as invalid JSON, in breach of
…</p></summary><content type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34481 is
<strong>not</strong> considered exploitable in any deployment of
the Apache Solr binary distribution.
+Successful exploitation requires the application to log a
<code>MapMessage</code> (or one of its subclasses)
+carrying a non-finite floating-point value (<code>NaN</code>,
<code>Infinity</code> or <code>-Infinity</code>)
through <code>JsonTemplateLayout</code>,
+which the layout then serializes as invalid JSON, in breach of RFC
8259.</p>
+<p>Producing a <code>MapMessage</code> requires application
code, and users of the binary distribution run only the code shipped by Apache
Solr.
+A scan of the bytecode of all JAR files in the distribution confirms that the
<code>MapMessage</code> family
+(<code>MapMessage</code>,
<code>StringMapMessage</code> and
<code>StructuredDataMessage</code>)
+is referenced only inside Log4j's own JARs.
+Neither Solr nor any of its bundled dependencies ever constructs or logs such
a message.</p>
+<p>Because no shipped code can hand a triggering value to the layout,
+the vulnerable code path cannot be reached regardless of the configured layout,
+and the Solr community considers this vulnerability
<strong>non-exploitable</strong> in the binary
distribution.</p></content><category
term="solr/vex"/></entry><entry><title>Apache Solr™ 10.0.0
available</title><link href="/apache-solrtm-1000-available.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2026-03-03T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-03-03T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2026-03-03:/apache-solrtm-1000-available.html</
[...]
<p>Apache Solr is the blazing-fast, open source, multi-modal search
platform built on the full-text, vector, and geospatial search capabilities of
Apache Lucene. Its major features include powerful full-text search, vector
search, hit highlighting, faceted search …</p></summary><content
type="html"><p>The Solr PMC is pleased to announce the release of Apache
Solr 10.0.0.</p>
<p>Apache Solr is the blazing-fast, open source, multi-modal search
platform built on the full-text, vector, and geospatial search capabilities of
Apache Lucene. Its major features include powerful full-text search, vector
search, hit highlighting, faceted search and analytics, rich document parsing,
geospatial search, extensive REST APIs as well as parallel SQL. Solr is
enterprise grade, secure and highly scalable, providing fault tolerant
distributed search and indexing, and powe [...]
<p>Solr 10.0.0 is available for immediate download at:</p>
@@ -1421,105 +1558,4 @@ See <a
href="https://lists.apache.org/thread/kgh63sncrsm2bls884pg87mnt8vqztmz
<p>A summary of important changes is published in the documentation
at:</p>
<p><a
href="https://apache.github.io/solr-operator/docs/upgrade-notes.html">https://apache.github.io/solr-operator/docs/upgrade-notes.html</a></p>
<p>For the most exhaustive list, see the full release notes in the
Github Releases or by viewing the git history in the solr-operator
repo.</p>
-<p><a
href="https://github.com/apache/solr-operator/releases/tag/v0.3.0">https://github.com/apache/solr-operator/releases/tag/v0.3.0</a></p></content><category
term="solr/operator/news"/></entry><entry><title>Apache Solr™ 8.8.2
available</title><link href="/apache-solrtm-882-available.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2021-04-12T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2021-04-12T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2021-04-1 [...]
-<p>Solr is the popular, blazing fast, open source NoSQL search platform
from the Apache Lucene project. Its major features include powerful full-text
search, hit highlighting, faceted search, dynamic clustering, database
integration, rich document handling, and …</p></summary><content
type="html"><p>The Solr PMC is pleased to announce the release of Apache
Solr 8.8.2.</p>
-<p>Solr is the popular, blazing fast, open source NoSQL search platform
from the Apache Lucene project. Its major features include powerful full-text
search, hit highlighting, faceted search, dynamic clustering, database
integration, rich document handling, and geospatial search. Solr is highly
scalable, providing fault tolerant distributed search and indexing, and powers
the search and navigation features of many of the world's largest internet
sites.</p>
-<p>Solr 8.8.2 is available for immediate download at:</p>
-<p><a
href="https://solr.apache.org/downloads.html">https://solr.apache.org/downloads.html</a></p>
-<h3 id="solr-882-release-highlights">Solr 8.8.2 Release Highlights:<a
class="headerlink" href="#solr-882-release-highlights" title="Permanent
link">&para;</a></h3>
-<ul>
-<li>SOLR-15249: Properly set ZK ACLs on /security.json</li>
-<li>SOLR-15233: Set doAs param in
ConfigurableInternodeAuthHadoopPlugin</li>
-<li>SOLR-15217: Use shardsWhitelist in ReplicationHandler</li>
-<li>SOLR-15288: Hardening NODEDOWN event in collections using
PerReplicaStates</li>
-</ul>
-<p>Please refer to the Upgrade Notes in the Solr Ref Guide for
information on upgrading from previous Solr versions:</p>
-<p><a
href="https://solr.apache.org/guide/8_8/solr-upgrade-notes.html">https://solr.apache.org/guide/8_8/solr-upgrade-notes.html</a></p>
-<p>Please read CHANGES.txt for a full list of bugfixes:</p>
-<p><a
href="https://solr.apache.org/8_8_2/changes/Changes.html">https://solr.apache.org/8_8_2/changes/Changes.html</a></p>
-<p>Solr 8.8.2 also includes bugfixes in the corresponding Apache Lucene
release:</p>
-<p><a
href="https://lucene.apache.org/core/8_8_2/changes/Changes.html">https://lucene.apache.org/core/8_8_2/changes/Changes.html</a></p></content><category
term="solr/news"/></entry><entry><title>CVE-2021-27905: SSRF vulnerability
with the Replication handler</title><link
href="/cve-2021-27905-ssrf-vulnerability-with-the-replication-handler.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2021-04-12T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2021-04-12T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><n
[...]
-High</p>
-<p><strong>Versions Affected:</strong>
-7.0.0 to 7.7.3
-8.0.0 to 8.8.1</p>
-<p><strong>Description:</strong>
-The ReplicationHandler (normally registered at "/replication" under a Solr
core) has a "masterUrl" (also "leaderUrl" alias) parameter that is used to
designate another ReplicationHandler on another Solr core to replicate index
…</p></summary><content
type="html"><p><strong>Severity:</strong>
-High</p>
-<p><strong>Versions Affected:</strong>
-7.0.0 to 7.7.3
-8.0.0 to 8.8.1</p>
-<p><strong>Description:</strong>
-The ReplicationHandler (normally registered at "/replication" under a Solr
core) has a "masterUrl" (also "leaderUrl" alias) parameter that is used to
designate another ReplicationHandler on another Solr core to replicate index
data into the local core.
-To prevent a SSRF vulnerability, Solr ought to check these parameters against
a similar configuration it uses for the "shards" parameter. Prior to this bug
getting fixed, it did not.</p>
-<p><strong>Mitigation:</strong>
-Any of the following are enough to prevent this vulnerability:</p>
-<ul>
-<li>Upgrade to <code>Solr 8.8.2</code> or greater.</li>
-<li>If upgrading is not an option, consider applying the patch in <a
href="https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-15217">SOLR-15217</a></li>
-<li>Ensure that any access to the replication handler is purely internal
to Solr. Typically, it's only accessed externally for diagnostic/informational
purposes.</li>
-</ul>
-<p><strong>Credit:</strong>
-Reported by Caolinhong(Skay) from QI-ANXIN Cert (QI-ANXIN Technology Group
Inc.)</p>
-<p><strong>References:</strong>
-<a
href="https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-15217">SOLR-15217</a>:
CVE-2021-27905: SSRF vulnerability with the Replication
handler</p></content><category
term="solr/security"/></entry><entry><title>CVE-2021-29262: Misapplied
Zookeeper ACLs can result in leakage of configured authentication and
authorization settings</title><link
href="/cve-2021-29262-misapplied-zookeeper-acls-can-result-in-leakage-of-configured-authentication-and-authorization-settings.html"
rel [...]
-High</p>
-<p><strong>Versions Affected:</strong>
-7.0.0 to 7.7.3
-8.0.0 to 8.8.1</p>
-<p><strong>Description:</strong>
-When starting Apache Solr versions prior to 8.8.2, configured with the
SaslZkACLProvider or VMParamsAllAndReadonlyDigestZkACLProvider and no existing
security.json znode, if the optional read-only user is configured then Solr
…</p></summary><content
type="html"><p><strong>Severity:</strong>
-High</p>
-<p><strong>Versions Affected:</strong>
-7.0.0 to 7.7.3
-8.0.0 to 8.8.1</p>
-<p><strong>Description:</strong>
-When starting Apache Solr versions prior to 8.8.2, configured with the
SaslZkACLProvider or VMParamsAllAndReadonlyDigestZkACLProvider and no existing
security.json znode, if the optional read-only user is configured then Solr
would not treat that node as a sensitive path and would allow it to be readable.
-Additionally, with any ZkACLProvider, if the security.json is already present,
Solr will not automatically update the ACLs.</p>
-<p><strong>Mitigation:</strong>
-Any of the following are enough to prevent this vulnerability:</p>
-<ul>
-<li>Manually set appropriate ACLs on /security.json znode.</li>
-<li>Upgrade to <code>Solr 8.8.2</code> or greater.</li>
-<li>If upgrading is not an option, consider applying the patch in <a
href="https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-15249">SOLR-15249</a></li>
-<li>Ensure that any access to zookeeper is only by trusted
application.</li>
-</ul>
-<p><strong>Credit:</strong>
-Timothy Potter and Mike Drob, Apple Cloud Services</p>
-<p><strong>References:</strong>
-<a
href="https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-15249">SOLR-15249</a>:
CVE-2021-29262: Misapplied Zookeeper ACLs can result in leakage of configured
authentication and authorization settings</p></content><category
term="solr/security"/></entry><entry><title>CVE-2021-29943: Apache Solr
Unprivileged users may be able to perform unauthorized read/write to
collections</title><link
href="/cve-2021-29943-apache-solr-unprivileged-users-may-be-able-to-perform-unauthorized-r
[...]
-High</p>
-<p><strong>Versions Affected:</strong>
-7.0.0 to 7.7.3
-8.0.0 to 8.8.1</p>
-<p><strong>Description:</strong>
-When using ConfigurableInternodeAuthHadoopPlugin for authentication, Apache
Solr versions prior to 8.8.2 would forward/proxy distributed requests using
server credentials instead of original client credentials. This would result in
incorrect …</p></summary><content
type="html"><p><strong>Severity:</strong>
-High</p>
-<p><strong>Versions Affected:</strong>
-7.0.0 to 7.7.3
-8.0.0 to 8.8.1</p>
-<p><strong>Description:</strong>
-When using ConfigurableInternodeAuthHadoopPlugin for authentication, Apache
Solr versions prior to 8.8.2 would forward/proxy distributed requests using
server credentials instead of original client credentials. This would result in
incorrect authorization resolution on the receiving hosts.</p>
-<p><strong>Mitigation:</strong>
-Any of the following are enough to prevent this vulnerability:</p>
-<ul>
-<li>Upgrade to <code>Solr 8.8.2</code> or greater.</li>
-<li>If upgrading is not an option, consider applying the patch in <a
href="https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-15233">SOLR-15233</a></li>
-<li>Use a different authentication plugin, such as the KerberosPlugin or
HadoopAuthPlugin</li>
-</ul>
-<p><strong>Credit:</strong>
-Geza Nagy</p>
-<p><strong>References:</strong>
-<a
href="https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-15233">SOLR-15233</a>:
CVE-2021-29943: Apache Solr Unprivileged users may be able to perform
unauthorized read/write to collections </p></content><category
term="solr/security"/></entry><entry><title>Apache Solr™ 8.8.1
available</title><link href="/apache-solrtm-881-available.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2021-02-22T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2021-02-22T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers< [...]
-<p>Solr is the popular, blazing fast, open source NoSQL search platform
from the Apache Lucene project. Its major features include powerful full-text
search, hit highlighting, faceted search, dynamic clustering, database
integration, rich document handling, and …</p></summary><content
type="html"><p>The Lucene PMC is pleased to announce the release of
Apache Solr 8.8.1.</p>
-<p>Solr is the popular, blazing fast, open source NoSQL search platform
from the Apache Lucene project. Its major features include powerful full-text
search, hit highlighting, faceted search, dynamic clustering, database
integration, rich document handling, and geospatial search. Solr is highly
scalable, providing fault tolerant distributed search and indexing, and powers
the search and navigation features of many of the world's largest internet
sites.</p>
-<p>Solr 8.8.1 is available for immediate download at:</p>
-<p><a
href="https://solr.apache.org/downloads.html">https://solr.apache.org/downloads.html</a></p>
-<h3 id="solr-881-release-highlights">Solr 8.8.1 Release Highlights:<a
class="headerlink" href="#solr-881-release-highlights" title="Permanent
link">&para;</a></h3>
-<p><strong>Fix for a SolrJ backwards compatibility issue when
upgrading the server to 8.8.0 without upgrading SolrJ to 8.8.0. Users are
encouraged to use 8.8.1 instead of 8.8.0.</strong></p>
-<p>Please refer to the Upgrade Notes in the Solr Ref Guide for
information on upgrading from previous Solr versions:</p>
-<p><a
href="https://solr.apache.org/guide/8_8/solr-upgrade-notes.html">https://solr.apache.org/guide/8_8/solr-upgrade-notes.html</a></p>
-<p>Please read CHANGES.txt for a full list of bugfixes:</p>
-<p><a
href="https://solr.apache.org/8_8_1/changes/Changes.html">https://solr.apache.org/8_8_1/changes/Changes.html</a></p>
-<p>Solr 8.8.1 also includes bugfixes in the corresponding Apache Lucene
release:</p>
-<p><a
href="https://lucene.apache.org/core/8_8_1/changes/Changes.html">https://lucene.apache.org/core/8_8_1/changes/Changes.html</a></p></content><category
term="solr/news"/></entry></feed>
\ No newline at end of file
+<p><a
href="https://github.com/apache/solr-operator/releases/tag/v0.3.0">https://github.com/apache/solr-operator/releases/tag/v0.3.0</a></p></content><category
term="solr/operator/news"/></entry></feed>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/output/feeds/solr/vex.atom.xml b/output/feeds/solr/vex.atom.xml
index 122049e8f..8bf259b38 100644
--- a/output/feeds/solr/vex.atom.xml
+++ b/output/feeds/solr/vex.atom.xml
@@ -1,5 +1,142 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
-<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><title>Apache Solr -
solr/vex</title><link href="/" rel="alternate"/><link
href="/feeds/solr/vex.atom.xml"
rel="self"/><id>/</id><updated>2025-08-02T00:00:00+00:00</updated><entry><title>protobuf-java:
Potential Denial of Service issue</title><link href="/cve-2024-7254.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2025-08-02T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2025-08-02T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2025-08 [...]
+<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><title>Apache Solr -
solr/vex</title><link href="/" rel="alternate"/><link
href="/feeds/solr/vex.atom.xml"
rel="self"/><id>/</id><updated>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</updated><entry><title>Apache
Log4j Core: TLS hostname verification silently ignored in Socket, SMTP and
Syslog appenders</title><link href="/cve-2026-34477.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>
[...]
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration
together with a privileged network position.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to add an
<code>SMTP</code>, <code>Socket</code> or
<code>Syslog</code> appender that ships logs over TLS
…</li></ul></summary><content type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34477
is <strong>not</strong> considered exploitable in typical
deployments of Apache Solr.
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration
together with a privileged network position.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to add an
<code>SMTP</code>, <code>Socket</code> or
<code>Syslog</code> appender that ships logs over TLS through a
nested <code>&lt;Ssl&gt;</code> element.</li>
+<li>That appender relies on the <code>verifyHostName</code>
attribute to authenticate the remote receiver, which was silently ignored
through Log4j Core 2.25.3.</li>
+<li>A man-in-the-middle attacker can intercept the connection and
present a certificate issued by a CA trusted by the configured (or default)
trust store.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>None of the Log4j configuration files shipped in the Solr 9.10.1
binary distribution define such an appender.
+They only use <code>Console</code> and
<code>RollingRandomAccessFile</code> appenders, which open no
network connection,
+so no TLS hostname verification ever takes place.
+The <code>HTTP</code> appender is not affected either, as it uses
a separate <code>verifyHostname</code> attribute that verifies host
names by default.</p>
+<p>A configuration that does meet the conditions above looks like
this:</p>
+<div
class="codehilite"><pre><span></span><code><span
class="nt">&lt;Appenders&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;Socket</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">name=</span><span
class="s">&quot;remote&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">host=</span><span
class="s">&quot;logs.example.com&quot;</span><span
class="w"> </span><span class="na">port=</span><span
class="s">&quot;6514&q [...]
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="cm">&lt;!--
verifyHostName=&quot;true&quot; was silently ignored through 2.25.3
--&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;Ssl</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">verifyHostName=</span><span
class="s">&quot;true&quot;</span><span
class="nt">&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;KeyStore</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">location=</span><span
class="s">&quot;...&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">password=</span><span
class="s">&quot;...&quot;</span><span
class="nt">/&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;TrustStore</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">location=</span><span
class="s">&quot;...&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">password=</span><span
class="s">&quot;...&quot;</span><span
class="nt">/&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;/Ssl&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;PatternLayout</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">pattern=</span><span
class="s">&quot;%m%n&quot;</span><span
class="nt">/&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;/Socket&gt;</span>
+<span class="nt">&lt;/Appenders&gt;</span>
+</code></pre></div>
+
+<p>Operators who do configure TLS network appenders should replace the
vulnerable JAR file
+(<code>server/lib/ext/log4j-core-2.25.3.jar</code>)
+with
<code>log4j-core-2.25.4.jar</code>.</p></content><category
term="solr/vex"/></entry><entry><title>Apache Log4j Core: Log injection via
CRLF sequences in Rfc5424Layout</title><link href="/cve-2026-34478.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2026-04-10:/cve-2026-34478.html</id><summary
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34478 is <strong [...]
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to send logs to a stream-based
(TCP or TLS) syslog service using <code>Rfc5424Layout</code>
directly.</li>
+<li>An attacker is able to …</li></ul></summary><content
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34478 is <strong>not</strong>
considered exploitable in typical deployments of Apache Solr.
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to send logs to a stream-based
(TCP or TLS) syslog service using <code>Rfc5424Layout</code>
directly.</li>
+<li>An attacker is able to inject CRLF sequences into the logged
data.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>Because the <code>newLineEscape</code> and
<code>useTlsMessageFormat</code> attributes were silently renamed
in Log4j Core 2.21.0,
+newline escaping stopped working and TLS framing was downgraded to plain TCP,
+leaving such configurations exposed to CRLF log injection.</p>
+<p>None of the Log4j configuration files shipped in the Solr 9.10.1
binary distribution reference <code>Rfc5424Layout</code>.
+They only use <code>PatternLayout</code>, so the issue cannot be
triggered.
+Users of the <code>Syslog</code> appender are not affected either,
since its attributes were not renamed.</p>
+<p>A configuration that does meet the conditions above looks like
this:</p>
+<div
class="codehilite"><pre><span></span><code><span
class="nt">&lt;Appenders&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;Socket</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">name=</span><span
class="s">&quot;syslog&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">host=</span><span
class="s">&quot;logs.example.com&quot;</span><span
class="w"> </span><span class="na">port=</span><span
class="s">&quot;601&qu [...]
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;Rfc5424Layout</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">appName=</span><span
class="s">&quot;Solr&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">newLineEscape=</span><span
class="s">&quot;\\n&quot;</span><span
class="nt">/&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;/Socket&gt;</span>
+<span class="nt">&lt;/Appenders&gt;</span>
+</code></pre></div>
+
+<p>Operators who do configure <code>Rfc5424Layout</code>
should either:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>replace <code>newLineEscape</code> with
<code>escapeNL</code> and
<code>useTlsMessageFormat</code> with
<code>useTLSMessageFormat</code>
+ (note the capitalization), or</li>
+<li>replace the vulnerable JAR file
+ (<code>server/lib/ext/log4j-core-2.25.3.jar</code>)
+ with <code>log4j-core-2.25.4.jar</code>.</li>
+</ul></content><category term="solr/vex"/></entry><entry><title>Apache
Log4j 1.x bridge: Malformed XML output from Log4j1XmlLayout</title><link
href="/cve-2026-34479.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2026-04-10:/cve-2026-34479.html</id><summary
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34479 is <strong>not</strong>
considered exploitable in typi [...]
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j 1-to-Log4j 2 bridge emits logs through
<code>Log4j1XmlLayout</code>,
+ either configured directly in a Log4j 2 configuration
+ or selected as <code>org.apache.log4j.xml
…</code></li></ul></summary><content
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34479 is <strong>not</strong>
considered exploitable in typical deployments of Apache Solr.
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j 1-to-Log4j 2 bridge emits logs through
<code>Log4j1XmlLayout</code>,
+ either configured directly in a Log4j 2 configuration
+ or selected as <code>org.apache.log4j.xml.XMLLayout</code>
through the Log4j 1 compatibility layer.</li>
+<li>The logged data contains characters forbidden by the XML 1.0
specification.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>The <code>log4j-1.2-api</code> JAR is shipped so that
third-party libraries that still call the Log4j 1 API keep working.
+However, Solr is configured through Log4j 2 configuration files that only use
<code>PatternLayout</code>,
+and the distribution ships no Log4j 1
(<code>log4j.properties</code> or
<code>log4j.xml</code>) configuration file,
+so the vulnerable layout is never instantiated.</p>
+<p>A configuration that does meet the conditions above looks like
this:</p>
+<div
class="codehilite"><pre><span></span><code><span
class="nt">&lt;Appenders&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;File</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">name=</span><span
class="s">&quot;xml&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">fileName=</span><span
class="s">&quot;${sys:solr.log.dir}/solr-events.xml&quot;</span><span
class="nt">&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;Log4j1XmlLayout/&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;/File&gt;</span>
+<span class="nt">&lt;/Appenders&gt;</span>
+</code></pre></div>
+
+<p>Operators who use legacy Log4j 1 configuration files or
<code>Log4j1XmlLayout</code> should replace the vulnerable JAR file
+(<code>server/lib/ext/log4j-1.2-api-2.25.3.jar</code>)
+with <code>log4j-1.2-api-2.25.4.jar</code>.
+Support for <code>Log4j1XmlLayout</code> and legacy Log4j 1
configuration files may be removed in a future Solr release,
+so migrating to a native Log4j 2 configuration is
recommended.</p></content><category
term="solr/vex"/></entry><entry><title>Apache Log4j Core: Invalid XML output
from XmlLayout</title><link href="/cve-2026-34480.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2026-04-10:/cve-2026-34480.html</id><summary
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34480 is <strong>no [...]
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to write events through
<code>XmlLayout</code>.</li>
+<li>A log message or MDC value contains characters forbidden by the XML
1.0 …</li></ul></summary><content
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34480 is <strong>not</strong>
considered exploitable in typical deployments of Apache Solr.
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to write events through
<code>XmlLayout</code>.</li>
+<li>A log message or MDC value contains characters forbidden by the XML
1.0 specification.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>When triggered, the layout produces malformed XML, which downstream
log processors may reject:
+silently with the JRE built-in StAX, or by dropping the event with alternative
implementations such as Woodstox.</p>
+<p>None of the Log4j configuration files shipped in the Solr 9.10.1
binary distribution reference <code>XmlLayout</code>.
+They only use <code>PatternLayout</code>, so the vulnerable code
path is never reached.
+The MDC values that Solr populates (collection, shard, replica, core and node
names, plus a trace id) are not emitted as XML either.</p>
+<p>A configuration that does meet the conditions above looks like
this:</p>
+<div
class="codehilite"><pre><span></span><code><span
class="nt">&lt;Appenders&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;RollingFile</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">name=</span><span
class="s">&quot;xml&quot;</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">fileName=</span><span
class="s">&quot;${sys:solr.log.dir}/solr-events.xml&quot;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="na">filePattern=</span><span
class="s">&quot;${sys:solr.log.dir}/solr-events.xml.%i&quot;</span><span
class="nt">&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;XmlLayout/&gt;</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="nt">&lt;/RollingFile&gt;</span>
+<span class="nt">&lt;/Appenders&gt;</span>
+</code></pre></div>
+
+<p>Operators who do configure <code>XmlLayout</code> should
replace the vulnerable JAR file
+(<code>server/lib/ext/log4j-core-2.25.3.jar</code>)
+with
<code>log4j-core-2.25.4.jar</code>.</p></content><category
term="solr/vex"/></entry><entry><title>Apache Log4j JSON Template Layout:
Invalid JSON for non-finite floating-point values</title><link
href="/cve-2026-34481.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2026-04-10:/cve-2026-34481.html</id><summary
type="html"><p>CVE-2026-344 [...]
+Successful exploitation requires the application to log a
<code>MapMessage</code> (or one of its subclasses)
+carrying a non-finite floating-point value (<code>NaN</code>,
<code>Infinity</code> or <code>-Infinity</code>)
through <code>JsonTemplateLayout</code>,
+which the layout then serializes as invalid JSON, in breach of
…</p></summary><content type="html"><p>CVE-2026-34481 is
<strong>not</strong> considered exploitable in any deployment of
the Apache Solr binary distribution.
+Successful exploitation requires the application to log a
<code>MapMessage</code> (or one of its subclasses)
+carrying a non-finite floating-point value (<code>NaN</code>,
<code>Infinity</code> or <code>-Infinity</code>)
through <code>JsonTemplateLayout</code>,
+which the layout then serializes as invalid JSON, in breach of RFC
8259.</p>
+<p>Producing a <code>MapMessage</code> requires application
code, and users of the binary distribution run only the code shipped by Apache
Solr.
+A scan of the bytecode of all JAR files in the distribution confirms that the
<code>MapMessage</code> family
+(<code>MapMessage</code>,
<code>StringMapMessage</code> and
<code>StructuredDataMessage</code>)
+is referenced only inside Log4j's own JARs.
+Neither Solr nor any of its bundled dependencies ever constructs or logs such
a message.</p>
+<p>Because no shipped code can hand a triggering value to the layout,
+the vulnerable code path cannot be reached regardless of the configured layout,
+and the Solr community considers this vulnerability
<strong>non-exploitable</strong> in the binary
distribution.</p></content><category
term="solr/vex"/></entry><entry><title>protobuf-java: Potential Denial of
Service issue</title><link href="/cve-2024-7254.html"
rel="alternate"/><published>2025-08-02T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2025-08-02T00:00:00+00:00</updated><author><name>Solr
Developers</name></author><id>tag:None,2025-08-02:/cve-2024-7254.html</id><content
[...]
Successful exploitation requires a very specific and non-standard
configuration.
The following conditions <strong>must all be
met</strong>:</p>
<ul>
diff --git a/output/security-dependency-cves.html
b/output/security-dependency-cves.html
index 3b178b55d..e5f23c9b2 100644
--- a/output/security-dependency-cves.html
+++ b/output/security-dependency-cves.html
@@ -177,6 +177,51 @@ or contact <a
href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>.</p>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
+<a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34481">CVE-2026-34481</a>
</td>
+ <td>9.10.1, 10.0.0</td>
+ <td>
+ log4j-layout-template-json-2.25.3.jar </td>
+ <td>not affected</td>
+ <td><a href="/vex.html#cve-2026-34481">Apache Log4j JSON Template
Layout: Invalid JSON for non-finite floating-point values</a></td>
+ </tr>
+ <tr>
+ <td>
+<a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34480">CVE-2026-34480</a>
</td>
+ <td>9.10.1, 10.0.0</td>
+ <td>
+ log4j-core-2.25.3.jar </td>
+ <td>not affected</td>
+ <td><a href="/vex.html#cve-2026-34480">Apache Log4j Core: Invalid XML
output from XmlLayout</a></td>
+ </tr>
+ <tr>
+ <td>
+<a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34479">CVE-2026-34479</a>
</td>
+ <td>9.10.1, 10.0.0</td>
+ <td>
+ log4j-1.2-api-2.25.3.jar </td>
+ <td>not affected</td>
+ <td><a href="/vex.html#cve-2026-34479">Apache Log4j 1.x bridge:
Malformed XML output from Log4j1XmlLayout</a></td>
+ </tr>
+ <tr>
+ <td>
+<a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34478">CVE-2026-34478</a>
</td>
+ <td>9.10.1, 10.0.0</td>
+ <td>
+ log4j-core-2.25.3.jar </td>
+ <td>not affected</td>
+ <td><a href="/vex.html#cve-2026-34478">Apache Log4j Core: Log injection
via CRLF sequences in Rfc5424Layout</a></td>
+ </tr>
+ <tr>
+ <td>
+<a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34477">CVE-2026-34477</a>
</td>
+ <td>9.10.1, 10.0.0</td>
+ <td>
+ log4j-core-2.25.3.jar </td>
+ <td>not affected</td>
+ <td><a href="/vex.html#cve-2026-34477">Apache Log4j Core: TLS hostname
verification silently ignored in Socket, SMTP and Syslog appenders</a></td>
+ </tr>
+ <tr>
+ <td>
<a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51504">CVE-2024-51504</a>
</td>
<td>9.4.0–9.8.1</td>
<td>
diff --git a/output/solr.vex.json b/output/solr.vex.json
index 67cedf9fa..496b4dbfc 100644
--- a/output/solr.vex.json
+++ b/output/solr.vex.json
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
"name": "solr",
"version": "SNAPSHOT",
"type": "application",
- "bom-ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "bom-ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
},
"vulnerabilities": [
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -663,7 +663,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -839,7 +839,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -871,7 +871,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -938,7 +938,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -989,7 +989,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
},
@@ -1038,7 +1038,92 @@
},
"affects": [
{
- "ref": "f5e98f6b-8f1b-5444-beae-716478ae4df3"
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "CVE-2026-34477",
+ "source": {
+ "name": "NVD",
+ "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34477"
+ },
+ "analysis": {
+ "state": "not_affected",
+ "justification": "requires_configuration",
+ "detail": "CVE-2026-34477 is **not** considered exploitable in typical
deployments of Apache Solr.\nSuccessful exploitation requires a specific,
non-default logging configuration together with a privileged network
position.\nThe following conditions **must all be met**:\n\n* The Log4j
configuration is modified to add an `SMTP`, `Socket` or `Syslog` appender that
ships logs over TLS through a nested `<Ssl>` element.\n* That appender relies
on the `verifyHostName` attribute to auth [...]
+ },
+ "affects": [
+ {
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "CVE-2026-34478",
+ "source": {
+ "name": "NVD",
+ "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34478"
+ },
+ "analysis": {
+ "state": "not_affected",
+ "justification": "requires_configuration",
+ "detail": "CVE-2026-34478 is **not** considered exploitable in typical
deployments of Apache Solr.\nSuccessful exploitation requires a specific,
non-default logging configuration.\nThe following conditions **must all be
met**:\n\n* The Log4j configuration is modified to send logs to a stream-based
(TCP or TLS) syslog service using `Rfc5424Layout` directly.\n* An attacker is
able to inject CRLF sequences into the logged data.\n\nBecause the
`newLineEscape` and `useTlsMessageFormat [...]
+ },
+ "affects": [
+ {
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "CVE-2026-34479",
+ "source": {
+ "name": "NVD",
+ "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34479"
+ },
+ "analysis": {
+ "state": "not_affected",
+ "justification": "requires_configuration",
+ "detail": "CVE-2026-34479 is **not** considered exploitable in typical
deployments of Apache Solr.\nSuccessful exploitation requires a specific,
non-default logging configuration.\nThe following conditions **must all be
met**:\n\n* The Log4j 1-to-Log4j 2 bridge emits logs through
`Log4j1XmlLayout`,\n either configured directly in a Log4j 2 configuration\n
or selected as `org.apache.log4j.xml.XMLLayout` through the Log4j 1
compatibility layer.\n* The logged data contains charact [...]
+ },
+ "affects": [
+ {
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "CVE-2026-34480",
+ "source": {
+ "name": "NVD",
+ "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34480"
+ },
+ "analysis": {
+ "state": "not_affected",
+ "justification": "requires_configuration",
+ "detail": "CVE-2026-34480 is **not** considered exploitable in typical
deployments of Apache Solr.\nSuccessful exploitation requires a specific,
non-default logging configuration.\nThe following conditions **must all be
met**:\n\n* The Log4j configuration is modified to write events through
`XmlLayout`.\n* A log message or MDC value contains characters forbidden by the
XML 1.0 specification.\n\nWhen triggered, the layout produces malformed XML,
which downstream log processors may [...]
+ },
+ "affects": [
+ {
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "CVE-2026-34481",
+ "source": {
+ "name": "NVD",
+ "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34481"
+ },
+ "analysis": {
+ "state": "not_affected",
+ "justification": "code_not_reachable",
+ "detail": "CVE-2026-34481 is **not** considered exploitable in any
deployment of the Apache Solr binary distribution.\nSuccessful exploitation
requires the application to log a `MapMessage` (or one of its
subclasses)\ncarrying a non-finite floating-point value (`NaN`, `Infinity` or
`-Infinity`) through `JsonTemplateLayout`,\nwhich the layout then serializes as
invalid JSON, in breach of RFC 8259.\n\nProducing a `MapMessage` requires
application code, and users of the binary distr [...]
+ },
+ "affects": [
+ {
+ "ref": "533b70ab-7b8b-53a5-b9e1-e829e7017b67"
}
]
}
diff --git a/output/vex.html b/output/vex.html
index 15abf5a3a..f272f9da7 100644
--- a/output/vex.html
+++ b/output/vex.html
@@ -139,6 +139,245 @@
<h1>Apache Solr VEX</h1>
<p><a href="/security-dependency-cves.html">← Back to the dependency
CVE table</a></p>
+ <article id="cve-2026-34481" class="post panel radius">
+ <header class="post-header">
+ <h3 class="title"><a
href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34481">CVE-2026-34481</a>,
Apache Log4j JSON Template Layout: Invalid JSON for non-finite floating-point
values</h3>
+ <div class="panel callout">
+ <p class="subheader">
+ <strong>Published:</strong>
+ <time
datetime="2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00">2026-04-10</time>
+ </p>
+ <p class="subheader">
+ <strong>Status:</strong>
+ <span class="cdx-not-affected">not_affected</span>
+ </p>
+ <p class="subheader"><strong>Affected Solr
versions:</strong> 9.10.1, 10.0.0</p>
+ </div>
+ </header>
+
+ <h4>Description</h4>
+ <p>CVE-2026-34481 is <strong>not</strong> considered
exploitable in any deployment of the Apache Solr binary distribution.
+Successful exploitation requires the application to log a
<code>MapMessage</code> (or one of its subclasses)
+carrying a non-finite floating-point value (<code>NaN</code>,
<code>Infinity</code> or <code>-Infinity</code>) through
<code>JsonTemplateLayout</code>,
+which the layout then serializes as invalid JSON, in breach of RFC 8259.</p>
+<p>Producing a <code>MapMessage</code> requires application code, and users of
the binary distribution run only the code shipped by Apache Solr.
+A scan of the bytecode of all JAR files in the distribution confirms that the
<code>MapMessage</code> family
+(<code>MapMessage</code>, <code>StringMapMessage</code> and
<code>StructuredDataMessage</code>)
+is referenced only inside Log4j's own JARs.
+Neither Solr nor any of its bundled dependencies ever constructs or logs such
a message.</p>
+<p>Because no shipped code can hand a triggering value to the layout,
+the vulnerable code path cannot be reached regardless of the configured layout,
+and the Solr community considers this vulnerability
<strong>non-exploitable</strong> in the binary distribution.</p>
+
+ <h4>References</h4>
+ <ul>
+ <li>JIRA: <a
href="https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-18288">SOLR-18288</a></li>
+ <li>CVE: <a
href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34481">CVE-2026-34481</a></li>
+ </ul>
+ </article>
+ <article id="cve-2026-34480" class="post panel radius">
+ <header class="post-header">
+ <h3 class="title"><a
href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34480">CVE-2026-34480</a>,
Apache Log4j Core: Invalid XML output from XmlLayout</h3>
+ <div class="panel callout">
+ <p class="subheader">
+ <strong>Published:</strong>
+ <time
datetime="2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00">2026-04-10</time>
+ </p>
+ <p class="subheader">
+ <strong>Status:</strong>
+ <span class="cdx-not-affected">not_affected</span>
+ </p>
+ <p class="subheader"><strong>Affected Solr
versions:</strong> 9.10.1, 10.0.0</p>
+ </div>
+ </header>
+
+ <h4>Description</h4>
+ <p>CVE-2026-34480 is <strong>not</strong> considered
exploitable in typical deployments of Apache Solr.
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to write events through
<code>XmlLayout</code>.</li>
+<li>A log message or MDC value contains characters forbidden by the XML 1.0
specification.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>When triggered, the layout produces malformed XML, which downstream log
processors may reject:
+silently with the JRE built-in StAX, or by dropping the event with alternative
implementations such as Woodstox.</p>
+<p>None of the Log4j configuration files shipped in the Solr 9.10.1 binary
distribution reference <code>XmlLayout</code>.
+They only use <code>PatternLayout</code>, so the vulnerable code path is never
reached.
+The MDC values that Solr populates (collection, shard, replica, core and node
names, plus a trace id) are not emitted as XML either.</p>
+<p>A configuration that does meet the conditions above looks like this:</p>
+<div class="codehilite"><pre><span></span><code><span
class="nt"><Appenders></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"><RollingFile</span><span
class="w"> </span><span class="na">name=</span><span
class="s">"xml"</span><span class="w"> </span><span
class="na">fileName=</span><span
class="s">"${sys:solr.log.dir}/solr-events.xml"</span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span
class="na">filePattern=</span><span
class="s">"${sys:solr.log.dir}/solr-events.xml.%i"</span><span
class="nt">></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"><XmlLayout/></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"></RollingFile></span>
+<span class="nt"></Appenders></span>
+</code></pre></div>
+
+<p>Operators who do configure <code>XmlLayout</code> should replace the
vulnerable JAR file
+(<code>server/lib/ext/log4j-core-2.25.3.jar</code>)
+with <code>log4j-core-2.25.4.jar</code>.</p>
+
+ <h4>References</h4>
+ <ul>
+ <li>JIRA: <a
href="https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-18288">SOLR-18288</a></li>
+ <li>CVE: <a
href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34480">CVE-2026-34480</a></li>
+ </ul>
+ </article>
+ <article id="cve-2026-34479" class="post panel radius">
+ <header class="post-header">
+ <h3 class="title"><a
href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34479">CVE-2026-34479</a>,
Apache Log4j 1.x bridge: Malformed XML output from Log4j1XmlLayout</h3>
+ <div class="panel callout">
+ <p class="subheader">
+ <strong>Published:</strong>
+ <time
datetime="2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00">2026-04-10</time>
+ </p>
+ <p class="subheader">
+ <strong>Status:</strong>
+ <span class="cdx-not-affected">not_affected</span>
+ </p>
+ <p class="subheader"><strong>Affected Solr
versions:</strong> 9.10.1, 10.0.0</p>
+ </div>
+ </header>
+
+ <h4>Description</h4>
+ <p>CVE-2026-34479 is <strong>not</strong> considered
exploitable in typical deployments of Apache Solr.
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j 1-to-Log4j 2 bridge emits logs through
<code>Log4j1XmlLayout</code>,
+ either configured directly in a Log4j 2 configuration
+ or selected as <code>org.apache.log4j.xml.XMLLayout</code> through the Log4j
1 compatibility layer.</li>
+<li>The logged data contains characters forbidden by the XML 1.0
specification.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>The <code>log4j-1.2-api</code> JAR is shipped so that third-party libraries
that still call the Log4j 1 API keep working.
+However, Solr is configured through Log4j 2 configuration files that only use
<code>PatternLayout</code>,
+and the distribution ships no Log4j 1 (<code>log4j.properties</code> or
<code>log4j.xml</code>) configuration file,
+so the vulnerable layout is never instantiated.</p>
+<p>A configuration that does meet the conditions above looks like this:</p>
+<div class="codehilite"><pre><span></span><code><span
class="nt"><Appenders></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"><File</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">name=</span><span class="s">"xml"</span><span
class="w"> </span><span class="na">fileName=</span><span
class="s">"${sys:solr.log.dir}/solr-events.xml"</span><span
class="nt">></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"><Log4j1XmlLayout/></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"></File></span>
+<span class="nt"></Appenders></span>
+</code></pre></div>
+
+<p>Operators who use legacy Log4j 1 configuration files or
<code>Log4j1XmlLayout</code> should replace the vulnerable JAR file
+(<code>server/lib/ext/log4j-1.2-api-2.25.3.jar</code>)
+with <code>log4j-1.2-api-2.25.4.jar</code>.
+Support for <code>Log4j1XmlLayout</code> and legacy Log4j 1 configuration
files may be removed in a future Solr release,
+so migrating to a native Log4j 2 configuration is recommended.</p>
+
+ <h4>References</h4>
+ <ul>
+ <li>JIRA: <a
href="https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-18288">SOLR-18288</a></li>
+ <li>CVE: <a
href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34479">CVE-2026-34479</a></li>
+ </ul>
+ </article>
+ <article id="cve-2026-34478" class="post panel radius">
+ <header class="post-header">
+ <h3 class="title"><a
href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34478">CVE-2026-34478</a>,
Apache Log4j Core: Log injection via CRLF sequences in Rfc5424Layout</h3>
+ <div class="panel callout">
+ <p class="subheader">
+ <strong>Published:</strong>
+ <time
datetime="2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00">2026-04-10</time>
+ </p>
+ <p class="subheader">
+ <strong>Status:</strong>
+ <span class="cdx-not-affected">not_affected</span>
+ </p>
+ <p class="subheader"><strong>Affected Solr
versions:</strong> 9.10.1, 10.0.0</p>
+ </div>
+ </header>
+
+ <h4>Description</h4>
+ <p>CVE-2026-34478 is <strong>not</strong> considered
exploitable in typical deployments of Apache Solr.
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to send logs to a stream-based (TCP or
TLS) syslog service using <code>Rfc5424Layout</code> directly.</li>
+<li>An attacker is able to inject CRLF sequences into the logged data.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>Because the <code>newLineEscape</code> and <code>useTlsMessageFormat</code>
attributes were silently renamed in Log4j Core 2.21.0,
+newline escaping stopped working and TLS framing was downgraded to plain TCP,
+leaving such configurations exposed to CRLF log injection.</p>
+<p>None of the Log4j configuration files shipped in the Solr 9.10.1 binary
distribution reference <code>Rfc5424Layout</code>.
+They only use <code>PatternLayout</code>, so the issue cannot be triggered.
+Users of the <code>Syslog</code> appender are not affected either, since its
attributes were not renamed.</p>
+<p>A configuration that does meet the conditions above looks like this:</p>
+<div class="codehilite"><pre><span></span><code><span
class="nt"><Appenders></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"><Socket</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">name=</span><span
class="s">"syslog"</span><span class="w"> </span><span
class="na">host=</span><span class="s">"logs.example.com"</span><span
class="w"> </span><span class="na">port=</span><span
class="s">"601"</span><span class="w"> </span><span
class="na">protocol=</span><span class="s">"TCP"</span><span
class="nt">></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"><Rfc5424Layout</span><span
class="w"> </span><span class="na">appName=</span><span
class="s">"Solr"</span><span class="w"> </span><span
class="na">newLineEscape=</span><span class="s">"\\n"</span><span
class="nt">/></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"></Socket></span>
+<span class="nt"></Appenders></span>
+</code></pre></div>
+
+<p>Operators who do configure <code>Rfc5424Layout</code> should either:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>replace <code>newLineEscape</code> with <code>escapeNL</code> and
<code>useTlsMessageFormat</code> with <code>useTLSMessageFormat</code>
+ (note the capitalization), or</li>
+<li>replace the vulnerable JAR file
+ (<code>server/lib/ext/log4j-core-2.25.3.jar</code>)
+ with <code>log4j-core-2.25.4.jar</code>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+ <h4>References</h4>
+ <ul>
+ <li>JIRA: <a
href="https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-18288">SOLR-18288</a></li>
+ <li>CVE: <a
href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34478">CVE-2026-34478</a></li>
+ </ul>
+ </article>
+ <article id="cve-2026-34477" class="post panel radius">
+ <header class="post-header">
+ <h3 class="title"><a
href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34477">CVE-2026-34477</a>,
Apache Log4j Core: TLS hostname verification silently ignored in Socket, SMTP
and Syslog appenders</h3>
+ <div class="panel callout">
+ <p class="subheader">
+ <strong>Published:</strong>
+ <time
datetime="2026-04-10T00:00:00+00:00">2026-04-10</time>
+ </p>
+ <p class="subheader">
+ <strong>Status:</strong>
+ <span class="cdx-not-affected">not_affected</span>
+ </p>
+ <p class="subheader"><strong>Affected Solr
versions:</strong> 9.10.1, 10.0.0</p>
+ </div>
+ </header>
+
+ <h4>Description</h4>
+ <p>CVE-2026-34477 is <strong>not</strong> considered
exploitable in typical deployments of Apache Solr.
+Successful exploitation requires a specific, non-default logging configuration
together with a privileged network position.
+The following conditions <strong>must all be met</strong>:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>The Log4j configuration is modified to add an <code>SMTP</code>,
<code>Socket</code> or <code>Syslog</code> appender that ships logs over TLS
through a nested <code><Ssl></code> element.</li>
+<li>That appender relies on the <code>verifyHostName</code> attribute to
authenticate the remote receiver, which was silently ignored through Log4j Core
2.25.3.</li>
+<li>A man-in-the-middle attacker can intercept the connection and present a
certificate issued by a CA trusted by the configured (or default) trust
store.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>None of the Log4j configuration files shipped in the Solr 9.10.1 binary
distribution define such an appender.
+They only use <code>Console</code> and <code>RollingRandomAccessFile</code>
appenders, which open no network connection,
+so no TLS hostname verification ever takes place.
+The <code>HTTP</code> appender is not affected either, as it uses a separate
<code>verifyHostname</code> attribute that verifies host names by default.</p>
+<p>A configuration that does meet the conditions above looks like this:</p>
+<div class="codehilite"><pre><span></span><code><span
class="nt"><Appenders></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"><Socket</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">name=</span><span
class="s">"remote"</span><span class="w"> </span><span
class="na">host=</span><span class="s">"logs.example.com"</span><span
class="w"> </span><span class="na">port=</span><span
class="s">"6514"</span><span class="nt">></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="cm"><!--
verifyHostName="true" was silently ignored through 2.25.3
--></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"><Ssl</span><span class="w">
</span><span class="na">verifyHostName=</span><span
class="s">"true"</span><span class="nt">></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"><KeyStore</span><span
class="w"> </span><span class="na">location=</span><span
class="s">"..."</span><span class="w"> </span><span
class="na">password=</span><span class="s">"..."</span><span
class="nt">/></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"><TrustStore</span><span
class="w"> </span><span class="na">location=</span><span
class="s">"..."</span><span class="w"> </span><span
class="na">password=</span><span class="s">"..."</span><span
class="nt">/></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"></Ssl></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"><PatternLayout</span><span
class="w"> </span><span class="na">pattern=</span><span
class="s">"%m%n"</span><span class="nt">/></span>
+<span class="w"> </span><span class="nt"></Socket></span>
+<span class="nt"></Appenders></span>
+</code></pre></div>
+
+<p>Operators who do configure TLS network appenders should replace the
vulnerable JAR file
+(<code>server/lib/ext/log4j-core-2.25.3.jar</code>)
+with <code>log4j-core-2.25.4.jar</code>.</p>
+
+ <h4>References</h4>
+ <ul>
+ <li>JIRA: <a
href="https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-18288">SOLR-18288</a></li>
+ <li>CVE: <a
href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34477">CVE-2026-34477</a></li>
+ </ul>
+ </article>
<article id="cve-2024-7254" class="post panel radius">
<header class="post-header">
<h3 class="title"><a
href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7254">CVE-2024-7254</a>,
protobuf-java: Potential Denial of Service issue</h3>