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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TAP5-1988?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
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Howard M. Lewis Ship updated TAP5-1988:
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Attachment: MATTA-2012-004.txt
> Tapestry Security Violations
> ----------------------------
>
> Key: TAP5-1988
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TAP5-1988
> Project: Tapestry 5
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: tapestry-core
> Affects Versions: 5.3, 5.4
> Reporter: Howard M. Lewis Ship
> Labels: security
> Attachments: MATTA-2012-004.txt
>
>
> An unsolicited security review arrived from Matta concerning Tapestry; both
> core code, and the GSoC project that provides anti-CSRF (cross-site forgery
> protection).
> Although I am dubious about the "gzip bombs" allegation, it can be addressed.
> In theory, because the contents are an object stream, the objects could be
> replaced. In practice, all objects need to implement a Tapestry-specific
> interface (ComponentAction) which means that arbitrary objects can not be
> injected; only objects that are already present on the classpath of the
> running application AND implement the ComponentAction interface could be
> injected. An attacker would already have "the keys to the kingdom" before
> they could do damage .. that is, if they can manipulate the classpath of the
> running application, they already have the ability to deploy any code, or
> access internal servers directly.
> However, I would see this as an opportunity to remove the t:state:client
> ("client" PersistentFieldStrategy implementation).
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