Repository: hadoop
Updated Branches:
  refs/heads/branch-2.8 714a079ff -> 8048c8fd6

HDFS-13427. Fix the section titles of transparent encryption document.

(cherry picked from commit c7cd362afd21add324c3a82c594b133d41cf8d03)
(cherry picked from commit be627ccfe373cb5dc4e8bb2a17495ef898caaee1)


Branch: refs/heads/branch-2.8
Commit: 8048c8fd61568a54523782f2b21383b96d018651
Parents: 714a079
Author: Akira Ajisaka <>
Authored: Thu Apr 12 10:44:56 2018 +0900
Committer: Akira Ajisaka <>
Committed: Thu Apr 12 10:50:07 2018 +0900

 .../src/site/markdown/  | 53 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git 
index 247fa61..15794b0 100644
--- a/hadoop-hdfs-project/hadoop-hdfs/src/site/markdown/
+++ b/hadoop-hdfs-project/hadoop-hdfs/src/site/markdown/
@@ -42,12 +42,12 @@ Transparent Encryption in HDFS
     * [HDFS admin exploits](#HDFS_admin_exploits)
     * [Rogue user exploits](#Rogue_user_exploits)
-<a name="Overview"></a>Overview
 HDFS implements *transparent*, *end-to-end* encryption. Once configured, data 
read from and written to special HDFS directories is *transparently* encrypted 
and decrypted without requiring changes to user application code. This 
encryption is also *end-to-end*, which means the data can only be encrypted and 
decrypted by the client. HDFS never stores or has access to unencrypted data or 
unencrypted data encryption keys. This satisfies two typical requirements for 
encryption: *at-rest encryption* (meaning data on persistent media, such as a 
disk) as well as *in-transit encryption* (e.g. when data is travelling over the 
-<a name="Background"></a>Background
 Encryption can be done at different layers in a traditional data management 
software/hardware stack. Choosing to encrypt at a given layer comes with 
different advantages and disadvantages.
@@ -64,17 +64,17 @@ HDFS-level encryption fits between database-level and 
filesystem-level encryptio
 HDFS-level encryption also prevents attacks at the filesystem-level and below 
(so-called "OS-level attacks"). The operating system and disk only interact 
with encrypted bytes, since the data is already encrypted by HDFS.
-<a name="Use_Cases"></a>Use Cases
+Use Cases
 Data encryption is required by a number of different government, financial, 
and regulatory entities. For example, the health-care industry has HIPAA 
regulations, the card payment industry has PCI DSS regulations, and the US 
government has FISMA regulations. Having transparent encryption built into HDFS 
makes it easier for organizations to comply with these regulations.
 Encryption can also be performed at the application-level, but by integrating 
it into HDFS, existing applications can operate on encrypted data without 
changes. This integrated architecture implies stronger encrypted file semantics 
and better coordination with other HDFS functions.
-<a name="Architecture"></a>Architecture
-### <a name="Architecture_overview"></a>Overview
+### Overview
 For transparent encryption, we introduce a new abstraction to HDFS: the 
*encryption zone*. An encryption zone is a special directory whose contents 
will be transparently encrypted upon write and transparently decrypted upon 
read. Each encryption zone is associated with a single *encryption zone key* 
which is specified when the zone is created. Each file within an encryption 
zone has its own unique *data encryption key (DEK)*. DEKs are never handled 
directly by HDFS. Instead, HDFS only ever handles an *encrypted data encryption 
key (EDEK)*. Clients decrypt an EDEK, and then use the subsequent DEK to read 
and write data. HDFS datanodes simply see a stream of encrypted bytes.
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ A new cluster service is required to manage encryption keys: 
the Hadoop Key Mana
 The KMS will be described in more detail below.
-### <a name="Accessing_data_within_an_encryption_zone"></a>Accessing data 
within an encryption zone
+### Accessing data within an encryption zone
 When creating a new file in an encryption zone, the NameNode asks the KMS to 
generate a new EDEK encrypted with the encryption zone's key. The EDEK is then 
stored persistently as part of the file's metadata on the NameNode.
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ All of the above steps for the read and write path happen 
automatically through
 Access to encrypted file data and metadata is controlled by normal HDFS 
filesystem permissions. This means that if HDFS is compromised (for example, by 
gaining unauthorized access to an HDFS superuser account), a malicious user 
only gains access to ciphertext and encrypted keys. However, since access to 
encryption zone keys is controlled by a separate set of permissions on the KMS 
and key store, this does not pose a security threat.
-### <a name="Key_Management_Server_KeyProvider_EDEKs"></a>Key Management 
Server, KeyProvider, EDEKs
+### Key Management Server, KeyProvider, EDEKs
 The KMS is a proxy that interfaces with a backing key store on behalf of HDFS 
daemons and clients. Both the backing key store and the KMS implement the 
Hadoop KeyProvider API. See the [KMS 
documentation](../../hadoop-kms/index.html) for more information.
@@ -110,21 +110,21 @@ The KMS implements additional functionality which enables 
creation and decryptio
 In the context of HDFS encryption, EEKs are *encrypted data encryption keys 
(EDEKs)*, where a *data encryption key (DEK)* is what is used to encrypt and 
decrypt file data. Typically, the key store is configured to only allow end 
users access to the keys used to encrypt DEKs. This means that EDEKs can be 
safely stored and handled by HDFS, since the HDFS user will not have access to 
unencrypted encryption keys.
-<a name="Configuration"></a>Configuration
 A necessary prerequisite is an instance of the KMS, as well as a backing key 
store for the KMS. See the [KMS documentation](../../hadoop-kms/index.html) for 
more information.
 Once a KMS has been set up and the NameNode and HDFS clients have been 
correctly configured, an admin can use the `hadoop key` and `hdfs crypto` 
command-line tools to create encryption keys and set up new encryption zones. 
Existing data can be encrypted by copying it into the new encryption zones 
using tools like distcp.
-### <a name="Configuring_the_cluster_KeyProvider"></a>Configuring the cluster 
+### Configuring the cluster KeyProvider
 The KeyProvider to use when interacting with encryption keys used when reading 
and writing to an encryption zone.
 HDFS clients will use the provider path returned from Namenode via 
getServerDefaults. If namenode doesn't support returning key provider uri then 
client's conf will be used.
-### <a name="Selecting_an_encryption_algorithm_and_codec"></a>Selecting an 
encryption algorithm and codec
+### Selecting an encryption algorithm and codec
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ Default: `8192`
 The buffer size used by CryptoInputStream and CryptoOutputStream.
-### <a name="Namenode_configuration"></a>Namenode configuration
+### Namenode configuration
 #### dfs.namenode.list.encryption.zones.num.responses
@@ -162,10 +162,10 @@ Default: `100`
 When listing encryption zones, the maximum number of zones that will be 
returned in a batch. Fetching the list incrementally in batches improves 
namenode performance.
-<a name="crypto_command-line_interface"></a>`crypto` command-line interface
+`crypto` command-line interface
-### <a name="createZone"></a>createZone
+### createZone
 Usage: `[-createZone -keyName <keyName> -path <path>]`
@@ -176,13 +176,13 @@ Create a new encryption zone.
 | *path* | The path of the encryption zone to create. It must be an empty 
directory. A trash directory is provisioned under this path.|
 | *keyName* | Name of the key to use for the encryption zone. Uppercase key 
names are unsupported. |
-### <a name="listZones"></a>listZones
+### listZones
 Usage: `[-listZones]`
 List all encryption zones. Requires superuser permissions.
-### <a name="provisionTrash"></a>provisionTrash
+### provisionTrash
 Usage: `[-provisionTrash -path <path>]`
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ Provision a trash directory for an encryption zone.
 |:---- |:---- |
 | *path* | The path to the root of the encryption zone. |
-### <a name="getFileEncryptionInfo"></a>getFileEncryptionInfo
+### getFileEncryptionInfo
 Usage: `[-getFileEncryptionInfo -path <path>]`
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ Get encryption information from a file. This can be used to 
find out whether a f
 |:---- |:---- |
 | *path* | The path of the file to get encryption information. |
-<a name="Example_usage"></a>Example usage
+Example usage
 These instructions assume that you are running as the normal user or HDFS 
superuser as is appropriate. Use `sudo` as needed for your environment.
@@ -225,10 +225,10 @@ These instructions assume that you are running as the 
normal user or HDFS superu
     hdfs crypto -getFileEncryptionInfo -path /zone/helloWorld
     # console output: {cipherSuite: {name: AES/CTR/NoPadding, 
algorithmBlockSize: 16}, cryptoProtocolVersion: 
CryptoProtocolVersion{description='Encryption zones', version=1, 
unknownValue=null}, edek: 2010d301afbd43b58f10737ce4e93b39, iv: 
ade2293db2bab1a2e337f91361304cb3, keyName: mykey, ezKeyVersionName: mykey@0}
-<a name="Distcp_considerations"></a>Distcp considerations
+Distcp considerations
-### <a name="Running_as_the_superuser"></a>Running as the superuser
+### Running as the superuser
 One common usecase for distcp is to replicate data between clusters for backup 
and disaster recovery purposes. This is typically performed by the cluster 
administrator, who is an HDFS superuser.
@@ -236,11 +236,11 @@ To enable this same workflow when using HDFS encryption, 
we introduced a new vir
 When using `/.reserved/raw` to distcp encrypted data, it's important to 
preserve extended attributes with the 
[-px](../../hadoop-distcp/DistCp.html#Command_Line_Options) flag. This is 
because encrypted file attributes (such as the EDEK) are exposed through 
extended attributes within `/.reserved/raw`, and must be preserved to be able 
to decrypt the file. This means that if the distcp is initiated at or above the 
encryption zone root, it will automatically create an encryption zone at the 
destination if it does not already exist. However, it's still recommended that 
the admin first create identical encryption zones on the destination cluster to 
avoid any potential mishaps.
-### <a name="Copying_into_encrypted_locations"></a>Copying into encrypted 
+### Copying into encrypted locations
 By default, distcp compares checksums provided by the filesystem to verify 
that the data was successfully copied to the destination. When copying from 
unencrypted or encrypted location into an encrypted location, the filesystem 
checksums will not match since the underlying block data is different because a 
new EDEK will be used to encrypt at destination. In this case, specify the 
[-skipcrccheck](../../hadoop-distcp/DistCp.html#Command_Line_Options) and 
[-update](../../hadoop-distcp/DistCp.html#Command_Line_Options) distcp flags to 
avoid verifying checksums.
-<a name="Rename_and_Trash_considerations"></a>Rename and Trash considerations
+Rename and Trash considerations
 HDFS restricts file and directory renames across encryption zone boundaries. 
This includes renaming an encrypted file / directory into an unencrypted 
directory (e.g., `hdfs dfs mv /zone/encryptedFile /home/bob`), renaming an 
unencrypted file or directory into an encryption zone (e.g., `hdfs dfs mv 
/home/bob/unEncryptedFile /zone`), and renaming between two different 
encryption zones (e.g., `hdfs dfs mv /home/alice/zone1/foo /home/alice/zone2`). 
In these examples, `/zone`, `/home/alice/zone1`, and `/home/alice/zone2` are 
encryption zones, while `/home/bob` is not. A rename is only allowed if the 
source and destination paths are in the same encryption zone, or both paths are 
unencrypted (not in any encryption zone).
@@ -252,10 +252,11 @@ To comply with the above rule, each encryption zone has 
its own `.Trash` directo
 If the encryption zone is the root directory (e.g., `/` directory), the trash 
path of root directory is `/.Trash`, not the `.Trash` directory under the 
user's home directory, and the behavior of renaming sub-directories or 
sub-files in root directory will keep consistent with the behavior in a general 
encryption zone, such as `/zone` which is mentioned at the top of this section.
 The `crypto` command before Hadoop 2.8.0 does not provision the `.Trash` 
directory automatically. If an encryption zone is created before Hadoop 2.8.0, 
and then the cluster is upgraded to Hadoop 2.8.0 or above, the trash directory 
can be provisioned using `-provisionTrash` option (e.g., `hdfs crypto 
-provisionTrash -path /zone`).
-<a name="Attack_vectors"></a>Attack vectors
+Attack vectors
-### <a name="Hardware_access_exploits"></a>Hardware access exploits
+### Hardware access exploits
 These exploits assume that attacker has gained physical access to hard drives 
from cluster machines, i.e. datanodes and namenodes.
@@ -269,7 +270,7 @@ These exploits assume that attacker has gained physical 
access to hard drives fr
     * By itself, this does not expose cleartext, as it also requires access to 
-### <a name="Root_access_exploits"></a>Root access exploits
+### Root access exploits
 These exploits assume that attacker has gained root shell access to cluster 
machines, i.e. datanodes and namenodes. Many of these exploits cannot be 
addressed in HDFS, since a malicious root user has access to the in-memory 
state of processes holding encryption keys and cleartext. For these exploits, 
the only mitigation technique is carefully restricting and monitoring root 
shell access.
@@ -293,7 +294,7 @@ These exploits assume that attacker has gained root shell 
access to cluster mach
     * By itself, insufficient to read cleartext without the EDEK's encryption 
key and encrypted block files.
-### <a name="HDFS_admin_exploits"></a>HDFS admin exploits
+### HDFS admin exploits
 These exploits assume that the attacker has compromised HDFS, but does not 
have root or `hdfs` user shell access.
@@ -305,6 +306,6 @@ These exploits assume that the attacker has compromised 
HDFS, but does not have
     * By itself, insufficient to read cleartext without EDEK encryption keys.
-### <a name="Rogue_user_exploits"></a>Rogue user exploits
+### Rogue user exploits
 A rogue user can collect keys of files they have access to, and use them later 
to decrypt the encrypted data of those files. As the user had access to those 
files, they already had access to the file contents. This can be mitigated 
through periodic key rolling policies.

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