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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-15235?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16375379#comment-16375379
]
Xiao Chen commented on HADOOP-15235:
------------------------------------
Hi [~rkanter],
Anecdotally I'm reviewing an hdfs jira, and it seems this one broke
{{TestHttpFSServerWebServer#testStartStop}}:
{noformat}
2018-02-23 23:13:29,791 WARN ServletHandler - /webhdfs/v1/
java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Empty key
at javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec.<init>(SecretKeySpec.java:96)
at
org.apache.hadoop.security.authentication.util.Signer.computeSignature(Signer.java:93)
at
org.apache.hadoop.security.authentication.util.Signer.sign(Signer.java:59)
at
org.apache.hadoop.security.authentication.server.AuthenticationFilter.doFilter(AuthenticationFilter.java:587)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.servlet.ServletHandler$CachedChain.doFilter(ServletHandler.java:1751)
at
org.apache.hadoop.http.HttpServer2$QuotingInputFilter.doFilter(HttpServer2.java:1617)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.servlet.ServletHandler$CachedChain.doFilter(ServletHandler.java:1759)
at org.apache.hadoop.http.NoCacheFilter.doFilter(NoCacheFilter.java:45)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.servlet.ServletHandler$CachedChain.doFilter(ServletHandler.java:1759)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.servlet.ServletHandler.doHandle(ServletHandler.java:582)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.server.handler.ScopedHandler.handle(ScopedHandler.java:143)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.security.SecurityHandler.handle(SecurityHandler.java:548)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.server.session.SessionHandler.doHandle(SessionHandler.java:226)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.server.handler.ContextHandler.doHandle(ContextHandler.java:1180)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.servlet.ServletHandler.doScope(ServletHandler.java:512)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.server.session.SessionHandler.doScope(SessionHandler.java:185)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.server.handler.ContextHandler.doScope(ContextHandler.java:1112)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.server.handler.ScopedHandler.handle(ScopedHandler.java:141)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.server.handler.HandlerCollection.handle(HandlerCollection.java:119)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.server.handler.HandlerWrapper.handle(HandlerWrapper.java:134)
at org.eclipse.jetty.server.Server.handle(Server.java:534)
at org.eclipse.jetty.server.HttpChannel.handle(HttpChannel.java:320)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.server.HttpConnection.onFillable(HttpConnection.java:251)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.io.AbstractConnection$ReadCallback.succeeded(AbstractConnection.java:283)
at org.eclipse.jetty.io.FillInterest.fillable(FillInterest.java:108)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.io.SelectChannelEndPoint$2.run(SelectChannelEndPoint.java:93)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.util.thread.strategy.ExecuteProduceConsume.executeProduceConsume(ExecuteProduceConsume.java:303)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.util.thread.strategy.ExecuteProduceConsume.produceConsume(ExecuteProduceConsume.java:148)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.util.thread.strategy.ExecuteProduceConsume.run(ExecuteProduceConsume.java:136)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.util.thread.QueuedThreadPool.runJob(QueuedThreadPool.java:671)
at
org.eclipse.jetty.util.thread.QueuedThreadPool$2.run(QueuedThreadPool.java:589)
at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:745)
java.lang.AssertionError:
Expected :500
Actual :200
<Click to see difference>
{noformat}
Mind take a look?
> Authentication Tokens should use HMAC instead of MAC
> ----------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: HADOOP-15235
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-15235
> Project: Hadoop Common
> Issue Type: Improvement
> Components: security
> Affects Versions: 2.10.0, 3.2.0
> Reporter: Robert Kanter
> Assignee: Robert Kanter
> Priority: Major
> Fix For: 2.10.0, 3.2.0
>
> Attachments: HADOOP-15235.001.patch, HADOOP-15235.002.patch
>
>
> We currently use {{MessageDigest}} to compute a "SHA" MAC for signing
> Authentication Tokens. Firstly, what "SHA" maps to is dependent on the JVM
> and Cryptography Provider. While they _should_ do something reasonable, it's
> probably a safer idea to pick a specific algorithm. It looks like the Oracle
> JVM picks SHA-1; though something like SHA-256 would be better.
> In any case, it would also be better to use an HMAC algorithm instead.
> Changing from SHA-1 to SHA-256 or MAC to HMAC won't generate equivalent
> signatures, so this would normally be an incompatible change because the
> server wouldn't accept previous tokens it issued with the older algorithm.
> However, Authentication Tokens are used as a cheaper shortcut for Kerberos,
> so it's expected for users to also have Kerberos credentials; in this case,
> the Authentication Token will be rejected, but it will silently retry using
> Kerberos, and get an updated token. So this should all be transparent to the
> user.
> And finally, the code where we verify a signature uses a non-constant-time
> comparison, which could be subject to timing attacks. I believe it would be
> quite difficult in this case to do so, but we're probably better off using a
> constant-time comparison.
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