http://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf
They present the first analysis of the popular Tor anonymity network
that indicates the security of typical users against reasonably
realistic adversaries in the Tor network or in the underlying
Internet. Our results show that Tor users are far more susceptible to
compromise than indicated by prior work. Specific contributions of
the paper include
(1) a model of various typical kinds of users,
(2) an adversary model that includes Tor network relays, autonomous
systems (ASes), Internet exchange points (IXPs), and groups of IXPs
drawn from empirical study,
(3) metrics that indicate how secure users are over a period of time,
(4) the most accurate topological model to date of ASes and IXPs as
they relate to Tor usage and network configuration,
(5) a novel realistic Tor path simulator (TorPS), and
(6) analyses of security making use of all the above.
To show that our approach is useful to explore alternatives and not
just Tor as currently deployed, we also analyze a published
alternative path selection algorithm, Congestion-Aware Tor. We create
an empirical model of Tor congestion, identify novel attack vectors,
and show that it too is more vulnerable than previously indicated.
The results do suggest that current users of 'For should carefully
consider if it meets their security needs. In particular, users
facing persistant adversaries who might run relays or monitor network
traffic should be aware of the threat of traffic correlation.
A goal of this analysis is that it inform safer use of Tor and
inspire more secure designs. Despite our pessimistic results, Tor has
provided real and valuable privacy to thousands of users.
They are optimistic that it can continue and improve this service.
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