Please explain. Are there no implications, or are those implications not interesting, or not constitutionally interesting? Is it that one can never eliminate the possibility of good faith evolving jurisprudence, no matter how stark a contradiction, so one can never have a sufficient belief that a judicial nominee lied under oath to warrant impeachment? (That seems to be true of Thomas in this circumstance, but is it necessarily always true?) Or is it that lying under oath -- or making misleading statements that are arguably not technically lies -- is not an impeachable offense, except under particularly serious circumstances? (It seems to me a lot of people were interested in similar questions within the past few years.) And can it really be that lying to the Senate under oath during the process of confirmation as to how one will perform one's job is so obviously not impeachment-worthy that there are no interesting constitutional implications?
-- Jon Jon Romberg Seton Hall Law School Earl Maltz wrote: No. At 12:28 PM 6/26/2003 -0700, howard gillman wrote: Are there any interesting constitutional implications associated with judicial nominees who say one thing during confirmation hearings and something else once they are on the bench? >Howard Gillman >USC Political Science
