Robert Sheridan [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [Original Message] > From: Robert Sheridan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: Discussion list for con law professors <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Date: 7/15/2003 6:52:28 PM > Subject: RE: Lawrence v. Texas and statutory rape > > Question: Now that the Court has held that the Constitution secures > > a right to have sex with consenting adults, is it still constitutionally > > permissible for states to make statutory rape a strict liability offense as > > to age? > > Ans: Not in California. > > People v. Hernandez (1964) [61 Cal.2d 529] > > Which holds that knowledge of minority is an element of mens rea, thus must be proved by the prosecution. Lack of knowledge on the part of the defendant, or an honest and good faith belief that the female is of age, are thus defenses. > > Below is a bit of cut-and-paste from Hernandez setting forth the rationales for the existence of the crime of stat-rape. > > The conlaw question is whether any of these are put in serious question with the advent of Lawrence. > > *** > "Consent of the female is often an unrealistic and unfortunate standard for branding sexual intercourse a crime as serious as forcible rape. Yet the consent standard has been deemed to be required by important policy goals. We are dealing here, of course, with statutory rape where, in one sense, the lack of consent of the female is not an element of the offense. In a broader sense, however, the lack of consent is deemed to remain an element but the law makes a conclusive presumption of the lack thereof because she is presumed too innocent and naive to understand the implications and nature of her act. (People v. Griffin, 117 Cal. 583, 585 [49 P. 711, 59 Am.St.Rep. 216]; Golden v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 379 [158 S.W.2d 967].) The law's concern with her capacity or lack thereof to so understand is explained in part by a popular conception of the social, moral and personal values which are preserved by the abstinence from sexual indulgence on the part of a young woman. An unwise disposition of her sexual favor is deemed to do harm both to herself and the social mores by which the community's conduct patterns are established. Hence the law of statutory rape intervenes in an effort to avoid such a disposition. This goal, moreover, is not accomplished by penalizing the naive female but by imposing criminal sanctions against the male, who is conclusively presumed to be responsible for the occurrence. (See Elkins v. State, 167 Tenn. 546 [72 S.W.2d 550].) > > The assumption that age alone will bring an understanding of the sexual act to a young woman is of doubtful validity. Both learning from the cultural group to which she is a member and her actual sexual experiences will determine her level of comprehension. The sexually experienced 15-year- old may be far more acutely aware of the implications of sexual intercourse than her sheltered cousin who is beyond the age of consent. A girl who belongs to a group whose members indulge in sexual intercourse at an early age is likely to rapidly acquire an insight into the rewards and penalties of sexual indulgence. Nevertheless, even in circumstances where a girl's actual comprehension contradicts the law's presumption, the male is deemed criminally responsible for the act, although himself young and naive and responding to advances which may have been made to him. fn. 1 {Page 61 Cal.2d 532} > > The law as presently constituted does not concern itself with the relative culpability of the male and female participants in the prohibited sexual act. Even where the young woman is knowledgeable it does not impose sanctions upon her. The knowledgeable young man, on the other hand, is penalized and there are none who would claim that under any construction of the law this should be otherwise. However, the issue raised by the rejected offer of proof in the instant case goes to the culpability of the young man who acts without knowledge that an essential factual element exists and has, on the other hand, a positive, reasonable belief that it does not exist. > > The primordial concept of mens rea, the guilty mind, expresses the principle that it is not conduct alone but conduct accompanied by certain specific mental states which concerns, or should concern, the law. In a broad sense the concept may be said to relate to such important doctrines as justification, excuse, mistake, necessity and mental capacity, but in the final analysis it means simply that there must be a "joint operation of act and intent," as expressed in section 20 of the Penal Code, to constitute the commission of a criminal offense. The statutory law, however, furnishes no assistance to the courts beyond that, and the casebooks are filled to overflowing with the courts' struggles to determine just what state of mind should be considered relevant in particular contexts. In numerous instances culpability has been completely eliminated as a necessary element of criminal conduct in spite of the admonition of section 20 to the contrary. (See In re Marley, 29 Cal.2d 525 [175 P.2d 832] (shortweight); People v. McClennegen, 195 Cal. 445 [234 P. 91] (membership in organizations advocating criminal syndicalism); People v. McCalla 63 Cal.App. 783 [220 P. 436] (violation of Corporate Securities Act); People v. Bickerstaff, 46 Cal.App. 764 [190 P. 656] (sale of liquor).) More recently, however, {Page 61 Cal.2d 533}this court has moved away from the imposition of criminal sanctions in the absence of culpability where the governing statute, by implication or otherwise, expresses no legislative intent or policy to be served by imposing strict liability. (People v. Stuart, 47 Cal.2d 167 [302 P.2d 5, 55 A.L.R.2d 705]; People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d 798 [299 P.2d 850]; People v. Winston, 46 Cal.2d 151 [293 P.2d 40].)... > > *** > > I'm having a little trouble with the "too innocent and naive" justification on the ground that it looks a bit like a stereotype to me. > > Note also, "An unwise disposition of her sexual favor is deemed to do harm both to herself and the social mores by which the community's conduct patterns are established." > > Here we have the legislature second-guessing the wisdom of the disposition of sexual favor by a let's say, seventeen-year-old who may be wiser in the ways of the world than a few of her older peers, as the opinion allows is possible but of no matter. > > Is there a difference between the state legislature imposing moral values, apparently not recognized in Lawrence, and doing "harm both to herself and the social mores by which, etc..."? Which is it really, harm to herself or to the social mores? > > Have there been any changes in the sophistication level of young women since 1964? Aren't teenagers taught more about pregnancy and STD now in school? > > I think it of the essence of conservatism to try to uphold existing categories, while the liberal mind set is prepared to question them. I don't know what the libertarians do. > > As a colleague argued today, re: Lawrence: If two homosexuals are allowed to marry (some day, I guess), why not the members of a menage a trois? > > The conservative mindset sees the worst case scenario, or the slippery slope thereto, where others see one stepping stone at a time and maybe not that. > > > Robert Sheridan > [EMAIL PROTECTED] [I'd thought I'd sent this out the other day, but apparently didn't somehow. It appears to be worth the effort in light of the continuing question about strict liability in stat-rape law. Hernandez has been the leading California case on the subject for a long time now. Hope this helps.] > > > > [Original Message] > > From: Volokh, Eugene <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Date: 7/15/2003 5:52:30 PM > > Subject: Lawrence v. Texas and statutory rape > > > > Question: Now that the Court has held that the Constitution secures > > a right to have sex with consenting adults, is it still constitutionally > > permissible for states to make statutory rape a strict liability offense as > > to age? > > > > After all, even child pornography prosecutions require some showing > > of scienter, see New York v. Ferber, since the theory is that otherwise the > > strict liability ban on unprotected conduct may also deter protected > > conduct. If "I reasonably believed she was 18" is a defense in a child > > pornography case, why wouldn't it similarly be a defense in a statutory rape > > case? > > > > Eugene