As for your second question, I think there's a simple reason why Art. I, sec. 9, cl. 6 did not come up in Gibbons: that clause is (like all others in sec. 9) a limitation on the federal government's power, not the power of the states. The only federal law at stake in Gibbons was the one under which Gibbons acquired his "coasting license," and that law gave no "preference" that could be implicated by the clause in question.
Matt
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Matthew J. Franck
Professor and Chairman
Department of Political Science
Radford University
P.O. Box 6945
Radford, VA 24142-6945
phone 540-831-5854
fax 540-831-6075
e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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At 06:51 AM 8/13/2003 -0400, you wrote:
Two virtually independent issues: (1) There is a familiar line designed, I think, to minimize (perhaps that's too strong) Marbury's importance which states that the Supreme Court did not strike down another federal law for over fifty years. I assume this also is designed to show (suggest) that judicial review/supremacy during those years was not a terribly significant power, especially compared with judicial review/supremcy's role in the 20th century. Is there any literature addressing this particular issue: Despite the lapse in the use of judicial review to strike down federal statutes, the history of the Marshall Court demonstrates the tremendous (additional?) power Marshall grabbed for the Court in upholding federal statutes in such cases as McCulloch, Gibbons, and others? Thus, the lapse in striking down federal statutes is not even remotely dispositive in the debate over the power (legitimate or stolen) Marshall garnered for the Court during his tenure as Chief Justice because in upholding federal statutes Marshall nevertheless arguably transformed American constitutionalism and government. If so, upholding federal laws as much as striking them down should be considered in evaluating the power the Court acquired during this period."No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another." in Gibbons? Thanks.
(2) Is there an obvious answer (which I'm unfortunately overlooking) why didn't Marshall address Art. I, Section 9, cl. 6:
Bobby Lipkin
Widener University School of Law
Delaware
