In response to John's post:
The difference between a mandatory preliminary injunction and a prohibitory preliminary injunction is not at issue here, in my view. Rather the issue is whether the prohibitory prelim injunction was unnecessarily broad.
No one is saying - certainly I'm not -- that the Ninth Circuit should have *ordered* use of paper ballots by way of a mandatory prelim injunction. But the Ninth Circuit could simply have enjoined use of the punch card machines and thus *permitted* the Sec. of State to comply with California law as to the date of the election by using an alternative voting technology. Instead, the court flatly enjoined any election being held on Oct. 7.
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit shows as little sensitivity to the statutory timeline for voting as the Fla. S. Ct. in 2000 showed for the statutory timeline for certifying voting results. Of course, any California timeline that would violate the 14th amendment must give way. (By contrast the statutory deadlines in Florida were, IMHO, binding on the Fla. S. Ct. under US Const. Art. II, sec. 1, to the exclusion of any consideration of the Fla. S. Ct.'s views of the requirements of the Fla. Constitution.) But there is no serious argument that holding an election on Oct. 7 violates the 14th amendment, if the voting technology used is appropriate. Note that the Ninth Circuit goes out of its way to say that California really has no legitimate, nonarbitrary interest in holding the election on the schedule provided by California law. That is an arrogant approach to the provisions of California law that are designed to allow replacement of a governor without undue delay. The result is an improperly overbroad preliminary injunction.
Mark S. Scarberry Pepperdine University School of Law
-----Original Message-----
At 3:18 PM -0700 9/15/03, Scarberry, Mark wrote:
The 4th Circuit's June decision in In re Microsoft discusses the distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctive relief, citing Rehnquist in Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 409 U.S. 1235 (1972) ("While a Circuit Justice of this Court apparently has authority under Supreme Court Rule 51 to grant such relief in the form of a mandatory injunction, usage and practice suggest that this extraordinary remedy be employed only in the most unusual case. In order that it be available, the applicants' right to relief must be indisputably clear.")
The 9th Circuit's ruling is prohibitory in that it enjoins an election procedure that would allegedly violate equal protection. Ordering that the recall proceed on paper ballots would constitute mandatory relief -- a remedy that no one has even requested. The Cal. Sec'y of State might duck the injunction by agreeing to proceed with state-wide paper balloting, but the 9th Cir. shouldn't order it sua sponte.
John Noble |
Title: Re: Ninth circuit and the recall
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall James Maule
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Edward A Hartnett
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Sanford Levinson
- Appealing the Ninth circuit Decision Marty Lederman
- Fw: Ninth circuit and the recall Don Crowley
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Scarberry, Mark
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall John Noble
- Ninth circuit and the recall Marty Lederman
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Sanford Levinson
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Scarberry, Mark
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall John Noble
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Scarberry, Mark
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Paul Finkelman
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Sanford Levinson
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Ilya Somin
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Paul Finkelman
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Sanford Levinson
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Scarberry, Mark
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Marty Lederman
- Re: Ninth circuit and the recall Gregg Miller