Questions of secession and democratic representation in the new Iraqi
constitution are particularly problematic because of the international
context within which Iraq finds itself, a context which has no easy analogy
to the
American case.

On secession:  Turkey has expressed extreme nervousness about an independent
Kurdistan in the north, perhaps even enough to go to war against it should
it declare itself.  Saudi Arabia has expressed extreme nervousness about an
independent Shiite Republic in the South, to the point of considering it
presumptively hostile to their particularly strict form of Sunni Islam.   If
the new constitution allowed either to secede, we could reasonably expect a
new round of devastating wars in the region.

On representation:  For many of the same reasons, the US has never endorsed
a one-person, one-vote principle for Iraq and seems particularly reluctant
to entertain the idea of a truly representative constitutional convention.
Shiites are about 60% of the population and are particularly aggrieved by
their historic subjugation at the hands of the Sunnis, so one might
reasonably expect a truly representative process run in simple majoritarian
terms would produce a constitution that would ensure Shiite domination.  But
if that were to happen in post-war Iraq, this would generate complicated
foreign relations -- an overly friendly Iran  and an overly hostile Saudi
Arabia, seen from the perspective of present US policy.   So the US is in
the awkward position of championing democracy while simultaneously being
wary of a simple majoritarian system.

These international complications are just one of the reasons why Iraq is
unlikely to have a functioning constitution with any reasonable chance of
survival within six months.  There is simply no easy solution to these
issues on the horizon at the moment.  Presumably some strong form of
federalism is the only way to square the circle here, in which case the
asymmetric federalisms of Spain, Canada and Russia might be more attractive
as models than the symmetrical federalism of the United States.


Kim Lane Scheppele
Professor of Law and Sociology
University of Pennsylvania
3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia PA 19104
Phone:  215-898-7674   Fax 215-573-2025
Email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]

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