Is it that the litigant is a lawyer or simply that there are no out-of-pocket attorney fees to be reimbursed? In other words, the statute doesn't cover the value of the litigant's time, just the value of actual expended dollars? (Same thing with the tax case attorney fee recovery statute (26 USC sec 7430) (see Sorrentino v US 199 F Supp 1068, and cases cited therein), and my guess is that all such statutes, state and federal, end up being limited to reimbursement of actual outlays barring specific legislation saying otherwise).
I assume Newdow is a lawyer? If he weren't, would the result be different? Jim Maule Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law Villanova PA 19085 [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://vls.law.vill.edu/prof/maule President, TaxJEM Inc (computer assisted tax law instruction) (www.taxjem.com) Publisher, JEMBook Publishing Co. (www.jembook.com) Owner/Developer, TaxCruncherPro (www.taxcruncherpro.com) Maule Family Archivist & Genealogist (www.maulefamily.com) >>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] 10/15/2003 1:41:09 PM >>> Under Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991), a pro se litigant who is also a lawyer cannot be awarded fees under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988, which is, I assume, the fee-shifting statute most likely to apply to this case. Pam Karlan At 01:09 PM 10/15/2003 -0400, you wrote: >Since Mark Newdow is apparently representing himself, would he be entitled >to attorneys' fees if he prevails in the pledge of allegiance case? If so, >approximately how much would they be (four figures, five figures, or six >figures)? Pamela S. Karlan Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law Stanford Law School 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, CA 94305-8610 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 650.725.4851
