Dear Athina, The ICG report is dependent on the recommendations of CWG-Accountability, so it seems clear to me that the oversight of the IANA functions also depends on the recommendations of CWG-Accountability.
Since it seems that we have different interpretations, I suggest that we agree to disagree. Best, Richard > -----Original Message----- > From: cooperation-wg [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf > Of Athina Fragkouli > Sent: lundi, 21. décembre 2015 17:54 > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related > Analysis > > Dear Richard, > > According to the ICG proposal the oversight of the IANA function, as a > whole, will not be conducted by ICANN. In particular the IANA numbering > function will be conducted by the numbers community represented by the > five RIRs and the IANA protocol parameters function will be conducted > by the IETF community represented by the IAB. > > With regards to the NTIA requirements, these are addressed by the ICG > proposal in pages 59-61 (https://www.ianacg.org/icg- > files/documents/IANA-stewardship-transition-proposal-EN.pdf). > > I hope this clarifies the situation. > > Kind regards, > Athina > > > On 21/12/15 16:46, Richard Hill wrote: > > Dear Atina, > > > > Thank you for this and please see embedded comment below. > > > > Best, > > Richard > > > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: cooperation-wg [mailto:[email protected]] On > >> Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli > >> Sent: lundi, 21. décembre 2015 16:36 > >> To: [email protected] > >> Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers > >> Related Analysis > >> > >> Dear Richard, > >> > >> Thank you for your reply. > >> > >> Regarding your comment on the Sole Designator Model, I would like to > >> highlight that the NTIA requirement you mention refers to the > >> oversight of the IANA function. The replacement of the oversight of > >> the IANA function is described in the ICG proposal. > >> > >> The CCWG draft report, however, refers to the oversight of ICANN. > >> Therefore, the NTIA requirement would not be applicable in this > case. > > > > I beg to differ. The oversight in question is the oversight for > > ICANN's performance of the IANA function, so the NTIA requirement > does apply. > > > > The issue of the general oversight of ICANN is being handled > separately. > > > >> > >> With regards to the topic of U.S. Headquarters as part of ICANN's > >> fundamental bylaws, thank you for expressing your agreement to the > >> ASO representatives' position. > >> > >> Kind regards, > >> > >> Athina Fragkouli > >> ASO representative to the CCWG > >> > >> > >> > >>> Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 10:40:37 +0100 > >>> From: "Richard Hill" <[email protected]> > >>> To: "'Athina Fragkouli'" <[email protected]>, > >>> <[email protected]> > >>> Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers > >>> Related Analysis > >>> > >>> Thank you for this. > >>> > >>> Please see embedded comments below. > >>> > >>> Best, > >>> Richard > >>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: cooperation-wg [mailto:[email protected]] On > >>>> Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli > >>>> Sent: Wednesday, December 16, 2015 16:46 > >>>> To: [email protected] > >>>> Subject: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers > Related > >>>> Analysis > >>>> > >>>> Dear colleagues, > >>>> > >>>> I would like to remind you that the Cross Community Working Group > >>>> on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG) has published a third > >>>> Draft Report, available here: > >>>> https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- > >> accountability > >>>> - proposal-work-stream-1-recs-30nov15-en.pdf > >>>> > >>>> Comments can be sent via this webpage: > >>>> https://www.icann.org/public-comments/draft-ccwg-accountability- > >>>> proposal-2015-11-30-en > >>>> > >>>> The comment period closes on 21 December 2015 at 23:59 UTC. > >>> > >>> SNIP > >>> > >>>> > >>>> 2. Sole Designator Model > >>>> > >>>> The second Draft Report suggested that these powers would be > >>>> exercised by changing ICANN?s structure, and introduced a > structure > >>>> called the Sole Membership Model. > >>>> > >>>> During and following the public consultation, objections to this > >>>> model were expressed. As a result of further discussions and > >>>> consultations, the third Draft Report introduces a new structure > >>>> called the Sole Designator Model. > >>>> > >>>> The details of the Sole Designator Model can be found in ANNEX 01 > >>>> (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- > >> accountabilit > >>>> y- > >>>> proposal-annex-1-30nov15-en.pdf). > >>>> > >>>> The following aspects of the model are important to highlight: > >>>> > >>>> - To implement the ?Sole Designator? model, ICANN?s Supporting > >>>> Organizations and Advisory Committees would create a unified > entity > >>>> to enforce their Community Powers. This unified entity will be > >>>> referred to as the ?Empowered Community?. SO/ACs are not required > >>>> to have a legal personhood. > >>>> - Under California law, the Sole Designator has the right to > >>>> appoint and remove ICANN Board directors, whether individually or > >>>> the entire Board. > >>>> Please note that Directors appointed by an SO may only be removed > >>>> by a decision of that specific SO. The Sole Designator would > merely > >>>> implement their decisions. > >>>> - If the ICANN Board refused to comply with a decision by the > >>>> Empowered Community to use the statutory rights, the refusal could > >> be > >>>> petitioned in a court that has jurisdiction to force the ICANN > >>>> Board to comply with that decision. > >>>> - Details of the Community Process defined (including thresholds > to > >>>> start the process and to exercise community power) are described > in > >>>> ANNEX 04 > >>>> (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- > >> accountabilit > >>>> y- > >>>> proposal-annex-4-30nov15-en.pdf) > >>>> > >>>> Do you have any comments with regard to this model? > >>> > >>> Paragraph 58 of that proposal shows that the "empowered community" > >> would consist of 5 organizations: ALAC, ASO, GNSO, ccNSO, and GAC. > >> Each of these organizations is an organic component of ICANN, and > the > >> majority of them represent the domain name and addressing > industries. > >>> > >>> Thus, the proposal does not provide for any external accountability > >> or supervision of ICANN: ICANN would be accountable only to entities > >> that are part of ICANN. > >>> > >>> In March 2014, NTIA announced that it intended "to transition key > >> Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder > >> community", see: > >>> > >>> > >>> https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent- > >> tran > >>> sition-key-internet-domain-name-functions > >>> > >>> An entity (the "empowered community") that consists of > organizations > >> that are organic components of ICANN is obviously not "the global > >> multistakeholdercommunity", nor can it be construed to be > >> representative of that community when 3 out of 5 of the cited > >> organizations represent the domain name and addressing industries. > >>> > >>> Consequently, the proposal manifestly fails to meet the main > >> objective enunciated by NTIA, namely that ICANNshould be accountable > >> to a the broad global multistakeholder community. Therefore, I do > >> not agree with recommendations contained in the proposal. > >>> > >>> It still seems to me that it would be better to turn ICANN into a > >> proper membership organization, see: > >>> > >>> http://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/pdfXXrCnTxCwW.pdf > >>> > >>> SNIP > >>> > >>> > >>>> > >>>> 4. U.S. Headquarters as part of the Fundamental Bylaws > >>>> > >>>> In the third Draft Report (as in the first and second Draft > Report) > >>>> the CCWG proposes the incorporation of some ICANN > >>>> accountability-related provisions from the Affirmation of > >> Commitments > >>>> into the Bylaws (in particular regarding ICANN?s Mission and Core > >>>> Values). The CCWG suggested defining these provisions as > >> "Fundamental > >>>> Bylaws". The concept of Fundamental Bylaws is described in ANNEX > 03 > >>>> (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- > >> accountabilit > >>>> y- > >>>> proposal-annex-3-30nov15-en.pdf) > >>>> of the third Draft Report. > >>>> > >>>> The main difference with the common Bylaws provisions is that > while > >>>> the Board could propose a change to this Bylaws provision, > >> Supporting > >>>> Organizations and Advisory Committees (SO/ACs) with voting rights > >>>> could block the proposed change (by a 66% vote). On the other hand > >>>> any change to Fundamental Bylaws would require approval by SO/ACs > >>>> with voting rights (75% vote). > >>>> > >>>> One of the provisions of the AFfirmation of Commitments requires > >> that > >>>> ICANN ?remains headquartered in the United States of America?. The > >>>> CCWG noted that this provision exists already in current ICANN > >>>> Bylaws, at Article XVIII Section 1: > >>>> > >>>> ?OFFICES. > >>>> The principal office for the transaction of the business of ICANN > >>>> shall be in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United > >>>> States of America. ICANN may also have an additional office or > >>>> offices within or outside the United States of America as it may > >> from > >>>> time to time establish.? > >>>> > >>>> The CCWG considered whether this provision should also be listed > as > >> a > >>>> Fundamental Bylaw, since it has been suggested that the rest of > >>>> Affirmation of Commitments provisions be incorporated in the > >>>> Fundamental Bylaws. > >>>> > >>>> The ASO representatives communicated to the CCWG the following > >> comment: > >>>> > >>>> ?There is general support the introduction of Fundamental Bylaws. > >>>> Regarding, the list of Bylaws that should become Fundamental > >>>> Bylaws, most of them indeed contain fundamental principles. > >>>> However, the RIR community does not believe that the requirement > >>>> for ICANN to remain in the United States of America is > fundamental, > >>>> but rather is an administrative issue.? > >>> > >>> I agree. It is not appropriate to case into stone that ICANN must > >> reside in the USA. > >>> > >>> SNIP > >>> > > > >
