Hello!
On 24.04.2018 21:27, Mat wrote:
> That's why I (believe I) need the blobs from the newest update. Is the
> reasoning correct, or I could do it more wise?
AFAIK: You only really need the microcode update from Intel.
Don't know, if gbe.bin or ifd.bin is vulnerable.
If you apply the microcode cpu206A7 from 2018-02-07 you will get the
following results.
Regards,
Reiner
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Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.37+
Checking for vulnerabilities on current system
CPU is Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz
Hardware check
* Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques
* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)
* SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
* CPU indicates IBRS capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
* PRED_CMD MSR is available: YES
* CPU indicates IBPB capability: YES (SPEC_CTRL feature bit)
* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)
* SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: YES
* CPU indicates STIBP capability: YES (Intel STIBP feature bit)
* Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)
* CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: NO
* ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: NO
* CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown (RDCL_NO): NO
* CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: NO (model 42 stepping
7 ucode 0x2d cpuid 0x206a7)
* CPU vulnerability to the three speculative execution attack variants
* Vulnerable to Variant 1: YES
* Vulnerable to Variant 2: YES
* Vulnerable to Variant 3: YES
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: __user pointer
sanitization)
* Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec (x86): YES (1 occurrence(s) found of 64
bits array_index_mask_nospec())
* Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch: NO
* Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm): NO
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: Full generic
retpoline, IBPB, IBRS_FW)
* Mitigation 1
* Kernel is compiled with IBRS support: YES
* IBRS enabled and active: YES (for firmware code only)
* Kernel is compiled with IBPB support: YES
* IBPB enabled and active: YES
* Mitigation 2
* Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm): NO
* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: YES
* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: YES (kernel reports
full retpoline compilation)
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Full retpoline + IBPB are mitigating the
> vulnerability)
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (Mitigation: PTI)
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
* PTI enabled and active: YES
* Reduced performance impact of PTI: YES (CPU supports PCID, performance
impact of PTI will be reduced)
* Running as a Xen PV DomU: NO
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: PTI)
A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer
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