Sorry, I'm going to read the documentation more and make this a personal goal by the end of 2019. I didn't want to stir up so much drama. Time and money are not constraints on this particular problem. One way or another by January 22, 2019 I will have either figured it out or I will pay to figure it out. I have used Linux since college. I have no kids. I have no girlfriend. I have tons of free time.
Make It So, Brian Herman So you have made it to the end...... Thanks for reading! On Wed, Aug 29, 2018 at 4:42 PM Youness Alaoui < kakar...@kakaroto.homelinux.net> wrote: > Wow, Mike, seriously, I am going to side 100% with Nico, you are > spreading FUD, making your own personal opinions (which are themselves > derived from other people's FUD) and stating them as the universal > law. > The ME is not known to be a backdoor. It doesn't mean that it's not a > backdoor, it simply means that it's not known to be a backdoor. The > fact that it's closed source and not user-controlled (Even if you had > the sources, you can't modify them and update it to your custom ME > version) is where the problem actually is. There *might* be a backdoor > hidden somewhere in there, or maybe there isn't, nobody knows, but > there has been a lot of research done on the ME and so far, none have > been found as far as I know. > > Your worry about what the ME does, how it can give someone control > over the PC, etc.. are NOT what qualifies it as a "backdoor", but like > Nico said, it's a frontdoor, it's not a "hidden access", it's a > "promoted access" to the PC, it's the main ME functionality which is > well documented. You don't have to use some "only known to some secret > person" trick to access the ME, you just need to point your web > browser to the right port on localhost. > Your comparison of saying the ME is a backdoor is like saying that a > webcam is a spying device because it can capture images of you! Yeah, > sure, that's technically true, it can capture images of you, but only > after you plug it in and open an image capture software, and you still > have control of those images. The fact that the webcam schematics > isn't open means that it could still have a small wifi or GSM chip > embedded inside which makes it send the images to the CIA, but it's > not a guarantee that it does. So, yes, you can complain that the > webcam isn't open hardware so you can't technically trust what it > does, but you can't just come out and say with absolute certainty that > any and all webcams in the world are spying devices for the CIA, > that's just ridiculous. > > So, back to the ME, we know exactly what it does, it's all extremely > well documented and explained, the fact that it allows remote control > of the PC is actually the reason for its existence and it's a very > very valid reason in the corporate context and the fact that those > features also 'coincidentally' resemble the features of an actual > 'trojan horse' virus, doesn't mean that the ME itself is a virus.. > otherwise the 'rm' linux command would be considered a virus since it > deletes files and there are some viruses that can delete your files as > well.... > Now the problem is that it's closed source, and not user controlled > (remote control features *are* user controlled, I'm talking about > being able to replace the firmware with your own), so yes, it can't be > audited by the larger open source community, but that also doesn't > guarantee any security necessarily (how many open source programs > still have security bugs?). > > Either way, you yourself said earlier, when talking about the AtomBIOS > that "it could be disassembled quite well with AtomDis - > https://github.com/mikebdp2/AtomDis - reducing any security concerns > regarding this blob to a minimum.", well, the ME can be disassembled > with any x86 disassembler, so why can't you also say that "reduces any > security concerns regarding the ME to a minimum". > > We're about to get full control back of the ME. I've been working for > the past few weeks on reproducing the PTResearch buffer overflow > exploit on the ME, and yesterday they released a PoC for Apollolake > (in case you missed it : https://github.com/ptresearch/IntelTXE-PoC), > so with the progress I made and with that, I should be able to soon > port it to skylake (and write docs on how to port to other platforms > as well) which will at least give us the ability to gain back the > 'user-controlled' aspect of it as we'd have code execution on it. > Which by the way, also means that BootGuard can be disabled (since the > ME is the one checking for the boot guard signatures), which should > enable the ability to port coreboot to a lot more machines (including > the T450S that this thread is supposed to be about). Hopefully.... > > On Wed, Aug 29, 2018 at 5:50 AM Mike Banon <mikeb...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > What suspicious activities? I know, for many people the Intel ME > firmware > > > contains unwanted features. But these features are documented. > > > In your world, a device becomes backdoored because somebody > > > didn't read the manual?!? > > > > Somewhere I've seen a report about Intel ME suspicious network > > activities (if I remember correctly they were using Wireshark on a PC > > placed between a computer with ME and the outside network) which has > > affected my personal opinion. Although it could be argued that its > > just some OEM has set up their ME in such a way, maybe even in a > > documented way (although a way undesirable to the end user), still it > > didn't look good to me. In addition, regarding all those Intel ME > > vulnerabilities recently discovered: one could assume that at least > > some of these "vulnerabilities" @ were actually the backdoors which > > have been patched just because they have been discovered by someone > > else than the american intelligence agencies who always knew them @ . > > Now Intel has patched these "vulnerabilities", but we do not know if > > some other "vulnerabilities" have been left unnoticed by the outsiders > > or if some new "vulnerabilities" have been added. And we the open > > source enthusiasts can't even verify that personally, because the > > source code of Intel ME firmware is closed. I cannot understand, how > > such a high level professional open source developer as you, Nico, > > finds it okay to just trust Intel ME despite its' deeply proprietary > > nature. Management engine with a closed source proprietary firmware - > > it even sounds awful..... I totally agree with Richard Stallman when > > he calls Intel ME a backdoor - https://stallman.org/intel.html > > > > > Please read [1] and [2] very carefully, I hope even you will spot > > > technical differences. [...] You cannot just take somebody's words > > > and give them a different meaning just because somebody else used > > > them in a different context. [...] You did it again, btw., stating > something > > > (definition of frontdoor) and making it look like the generally > accepted definition. > > > > Before receiving your message I knew only one definition of a > > "frontdoor" computing term which I described in my previous message. > > Although I don't know which definition is more popular, sorry for > > misunderstanding you. > > > > Mike > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 29, 2018 at 12:24 AM Nico Huber <nic...@gmx.de> wrote: > > > > > > *sigh*, > > > > > > On 28.08.2018 22:00, Mike Banon wrote: > > > > You are right, my choice of words has been far from ideal. I > apologize > > > > for that. However, to be confident that Intel ME is a backdoor > > > > (personal opinion) - one does not have to be its' creator. > > > > > > sorry I meant the creator of us (God) not the ME. I doubt the creator > > > of the ME knows everybody's opinion either. Which is what I was talking > > > about. A good practice is to quote and answer below that quote, this > way > > > you can easily check if what you write makes sense in the given > context. > > > > > > > I think > > > > there are enough documents describing its' functionality and enough > > > > evidence gathered by the independent security researchers about the > > > > suspicious activities of this hardware module. If it looks like a > > > > duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is > a > > > > duck? > > > > > > WTF again? what suspicious activities? I know, for many people the ME > > > firmware contains unwanted features. But these features are documented. > > > In your world, a device becomes backdoored because somebody didn't read > > > the manual?!? > > > > > > > There are no technical differences between the 'backdoor', and > > > > 'frontdoor'. > > > > > > Please read [1] and [2] very carefully, I hope even you will spot tech- > > > nical differences. > > > > > > > Like a 'conspiracy theorist', 'frontdoor' is a term > > > > coming from the american 3-letter-agencies. 'Frontdoor' is their term > > > > for a 'backdoor' to which only they (currently) have an access. This > > > > article summarizes it well: > > > > > https://www.justsecurity.org/16503/security-front-doors-vs-back-doors-distinction-difference/ > > > > . 'Backdoor' term has a negative reputation, so they would like to > > > > push this 'frontdoor' term forward. > > > > > > This is very infantile. You cannot just take somebody's words and give > > > them a different meaning just because somebody else used them in a dif- > > > ferent context. When I say frontdoor, I mean a door at a front where > > > everyone can see it. A backdoor implies something hidden, the ME fea- > > > tures were never hidden (AFAIK, a stupid OEM may prove me wrong, but I > > > don't know any instance). > > > > > > You did it again, btw., stating something (definition of frontdoor) and > > > making it look like the generally accepted definition. > > > > > > Nico > > > > > > [1] https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/back_door > > > [2] https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/front_door > > -- > coreboot mailing list: coreboot@coreboot.org > https://mail.coreboot.org/mailman/listinfo/coreboot >
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