On 9/15/16, Krishnamurthy, Ramesh <r.krishnamur...@aston.ac.uk> wrote:
> Hi Albretch - is it really *not* AlbreCHT?
It is really Albretch (lbrtchx) for a reason ;-) and, no, I am not
German/Germanic by any stretch or, I am to the extent that I went to
school in (East) Germany (TU Dresden/Physics School 1982-86) and even
though languages have always been a fastidious thing to me (people
tell me I speak my L1 as if I were a language learner. I can't
understand why people make such a big deal about language usage and
"correctness"), learning German made me change my mind. I was so
fascinated by the lego-like incantation of the German language (how
could you say "darüberhinausgehend" in English?) that it was the first
language in which I wrote poetry:
Darüberhinausgehend, I became fascinated with languages in general
and by something, which then I learned was called semiotics.
> you may be interested in Klaus Thiele's PhD thesis on the use of metaphor in
> spoken academic discourse (Aston Uni, UK, 2014)...?
Thank you very much for pointing to me Klaus Thiele's PhD thesis.
I will definitely print it out and give it a more thorough reading,
but I couldn't find what I am looking for in order to guide my
That thesis had quite a bit of metatalk "now I will explain ...", but
it contains a pretty encompassing and current rehash of metaphor
I had read already Lakoff's "Metaphors We Live By" and "Where
Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into
Being" which, as I remember, I didn't find that impressive, mostly due
to my hard sciences bias, I find a bit weak the way researchers come
to conclusions when it comes to the so-called Humanities.
I don't know if Thiele hangs out here, but I would like to give some
feedback about the general points he made or recycled from other
authors in his thesis.
"The meaning of an utterance is hence determined in a dialogical
manner, which means that it is a product of two or more minds (cf.
also Blommaert ibid. p. 44)"
"minds" is a device we use to explain intersubjectivity and
dialogicity, but as part of the creative process an author's mind is
so richly and deeply excited that we could say that authoring requires
many minds (in one). I think, when it comes to authoring, instead of
us using our semiosis as medium, our semiosis use an author's minds as
medium. Have they done free association tests with poets? Have they
"watched" their brains using fMRIs when they read, write, think about
The three (unfortunately European) languages I speak feel quite
different to me. When I switch from speaking to
scientifically/technically oriented people to artistic ones I put on a
totally different hat/almost quite literally "change 'my mind'" (you
kind of feel like a spy ;-)) (If you want to sense what I mean, tell
musicians that there is quite a bit of Math in music or painters that
there is a reason why the sky is blue and the rainbow's gradation of
colors is as it is or Mathematicians, Physicists that that thing they
call "'objective' reality" isn't really independent of our minds).
So, "minds" seem to even have some language, social preferences?
I also write in English and people have told me that what I write is
something but certainly not "poetry" ;-) that they can notice how do I
even avoid exploiting low hanging poetic fruits and choose to "abuse
https://hsymbolicus.wordpress.com/category/poems/ (lies ...)
I wonder if those corpora-based authoring analyzing tools would find
out that it is the same author writing in different languages.
I couldn't quite get the aim of the thesis about a comparative study
of German <-> English technical cultures' discourse.
To me all meaningfully complete utterances engaging people's
interpretations are to a certain extent metaphorical, but as I was
saying we should first separate the footing of the metaphor from its
salient, aiming aspects and (again this is, an opinion) when it comes
to metaphors what counts is close-range intra-, not intertextuality.
"This quotation explains why analyzing linguistic evidence is
important. It’s the only form of evidence people can get to uncover
the workings of the human mind."
My conjecture is, as I have been saying for a long time, that our
semiosis is the mind-body link and our semiosis does not belong only
to our (individual) minds so that is the reason why they haven't been
able to find it in our (individual) brains.
We wrongly tend to think of our own "brains" when we think of
"minds". All types of semiosis are intersubjective. Another clue
showing that the mind-body link is not physical/biological (just
partially physiological) in nature is that we are able to communicate
just fine with anaerobic beings living under extreme physical
conditions, which we had never encountered before and which nervous
systems are totally different than ours.
// __ Earth Story - The Deep
As the biologist trying to grab those lobster-like beings said: "they
were like, 'no, no, no ... I am not getting in there' ..."
Also, there are animals such as bats, which similar NS to ours and
sharing our same living environments but their perception is very
different. However, they "see", navigate their environment better than
most other animals and forage just fine. Without "eyes" using their
own echolocation. So, in that sense Nagel's "What is it like to be a
bat?", questioning materialist theories of mind yet suggesting that
there is there is "something that it is like to be a particular
organism" I find questionable. It is us who see birds flying and bats
echolocating. They are doing their thing with what they've got, just
as we do even with what we believe to be a more sophisticated
language, semiological system.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 12): “We need new alternative sources of
energy”, means something very different to the president of Mobil Oil
from what it means to the president of Friends of the Earth”
I remember once I was in a movie theater watching a documentary about
the abuses of the Israeli government against Palestinian people and I
just said out loud: "the chosen ones" (as Israelis, "the region's only
'democracy'", tear gassed small children while in schools). When they
turned the light on I realized people had moved away from me. They
didn't seem to disagree with my quiet, sarcastic reaction, but
apparently knowing that the U.S. has turned into a police state and
they make shills and snitches "monitor" social activities and that USG
politically backs state terrorism by Israel and uses tax payers moneys
to fund it, they apparently chose not to be that auffällig.
Indexicality reveals utterances as being made by a man or woman, old,
young, or part of a particular group or region (cf. ibid.). Besides,
people make character judgements about the way something is uttered
e.g. whether the utterances are ‘arrogant’, ‘funny’, ‘serious’,
‘self-conscious’, or ‘business-like’. Every utterance reveals
something about its pragmatic function. “Is it serious or banter? Is
this an anecdote, joke, an order, a request?” (ibid.). All of these
aspects lead to the conclusion that a sociolinguistic notion of
‘meaning’ is very complex and rich because it includes ‘pure meaning’
alongside ‘social meaning’.
I don't think there is such a thing as "pure meaning". All meaning is
intersubjective and even the more general, "standard", "social"
stratifications of meaning we intersubjectively learn through language
use. Even contextualisation is intersubjective, dialogic.
"Metaphors in Spoken Academic Discourse ..."
Academic cultures characteristically use terminology and language is
a more strict way. Their metaphors have more of a cultural (not
social) teeth, but I am still curious about the kinds of issues
relating to the cultural and social poetic bees of an era.
Also, now that people are addicted to visual cues, in many
multi-encoded discourses at times a plane of discourse is used in a
half assed attempt to back the other one as if they were making truth
be. People think they are "more right" when they show nice visual
"Metaphor categories ... Fandrych (2005)"
and Fandrych came up with "Metaphor categories" using wordnet, right?
"Besides, Ehlich (ibid. p. 15) shows how parts of everyday academic
discourse are a pitfall for misunderstandings for learners of German
as a foreign language when they deal with articles or other research
genres. He shows a long list of examples of how the term
Forschungsgegenstand (research topic) is misunderstood by the
non-native German-speaking students in their writing. This again is
used to illustrate the centrality of everyday academic discourse.
Meißner also shows that metaphors and everyday academic discourse in
the form of verbs are interwoven, and that metaphors play a central
I think we should be a bit more careful while considering what would
be (metaphorical or plain) learning "mistakes" by language learners.
"a study by Woolgar (1980) has identified that in a Nobel Prize
acceptance speech, the concepts of trail, road and path were very
as do "God" and "God-blessed", "Yes we can" kinds of matters by U.S.
Presidents in their inaugural speeches, but to me more important than
using metaphors is how they are being used, their close-range
intratextual underpinnings and interplay.
"... part of the EXMARaLDA (Extensible Markup Language for Discourse
seem to be about Discourse Annotation
"to calculate the metaphors per 1000 words?"
What could you get out of such figures? What do they even mean?
How on earth could you quantify poetry?
"Metaphors of movement / journey/ space"
Metaphors tend to be peculiar by their very nature. Their
connotations make plain different from poetic metaphors: a “late comer
to technology” is just a plain metaphor which interpretation is
straightforward and unequivocal.
I think the conceptual vs. referentialist view of metaphors is, if
not a false one, an unimportant dichotomy.
All metaphors have some conceptual and referential aspects which may overlap.
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