Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-cose-webauthn-algorithms-08: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-webauthn-algorithms/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Thank you for addressing my review comments. I would prefer to go even further on the "more strongly reiterate the cross-algorithm risk" front, perhaps OLD: Care should be taken that a secp256k1 key is not mistaken for a P-256 [RFC7518] key, given that their representations are the same except for the "crv" value. As described in Section 8.1.1 of [RFC8152], we currently do not have any way to deal with this attack except to restrict the set of curves that can be used. NEW: Care should be taken that a secp256k1 key is not misinterpreted as a P-256 [RFC7518] key, given that their representations are the same except for the "crv" value. As described in Section 8.1.1 of [RFC8152], we currently do not have any way to deal with this attack except to restrict the set of curves that can be used. In general, any system that is willing to accept both "crv" values "secp256k1" and "P256" is vulnerable to this substitution attack, absent some external mechanism for integrity protecting the "crv" value used to interpret the key. _______________________________________________ COSE mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cose
