Orie Steele has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-05: Discuss
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- DISCUSS: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # Orie Steele, ART AD, comments for draft-ietf-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-05 CC @OR13 * line numbers: - https://author-tools.ietf.org/api/idnits?url=https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-cose-tsa-tst-header-parameter-05.txt&submitcheck=True * comment syntax: - https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments/blob/main/format.md * "Handling Ballot Positions": - https://ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ ## Discuss Thanks to Shuping Peng for the ARTART review. ### Transparency Service The term is capitalized, but no definition is provided. Given the origin of the draft in scitt, its implied that this is the same TS that the SCITT Architecture describes. However, SCITT architecture does not support registering anything in the unprotected header (can't support CTT). https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-11#section-6.2-6 ### CTT ``` 122 entry cannot be changed. In certain cases, such as when a short- 123 lived certificate is used for the signature, the registration policy 124 of a Transparency Service may add a trustworthy timestamp to the 125 signed document. This is done to lock the signature to a specific 126 point in time. To achieve this, the Transparency Service acquires a 127 TST from a TSA, bundles it alongside the signed document, and then 128 registers it. A relying party that wants to ascertain the 129 authenticity of the document after the signing key has expired (or 130 has been compromised), can do so by making sure that no revocation 131 information has been made public before the time asserted in the TST. ``` MUST the TSA be a separate entity from the Transparency Service? Is it possible for the document signer to supply the TST instead of the Transparency Service? What happens if there is already a TST present, when the Transparency Service receives the cose object? _______________________________________________ COSE mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
